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ABSTRACT

PERESTROIKA AND THE POLITICS OF
THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT IN LATIN AMERICA
SEPTEMBER 1991

STEPHEN R. PELLETIER, B.A., MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
Ph D
.

.

,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Howard Wiarda

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the

impact of Soviet perestroika and foreign policy "new
thinking" on the Revolutionary Left in Cuba, Nicaragua
and El Salvador.

Chapters on each of these nations

examine the response of the Cuban Communist Party, the

Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)

,

and the

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
respectively, to the changes in the Soviet Union and the

socialist world.

Moreover, the question of what the

"demise of communism" means for these actors is

addressed in detail.

The concluding chapter widens the

discussion by asking if Soviet perestroika and the
momentous changes it has ushered in signal the decline
of the "revolutionary paradigm" in Latin America.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

A recently published popular biography of Mikhail
Gorbachev describes the Soviet leader as "the man who
changed the world."

1

Anointing Gorbachev in this way

is not pure hyperbole, as his policies of perestroika

glasnost and foreign policy "new thinking" have altered
the course of world history.

The reforms initiated by

Gorbachev, which many argue have engendered the global
"demise of Communism," are a topic of debate among the

Latin American Left.

One can find both pro and anti-

perestroika viewpoints held by Latin American
leftists

2

Gail Sheehy, The Man Who Changed the World: The
Lives of Mikhail S. Gorbachev (New York: Harper
Collins 1990
x

,

,

)

.

Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, General Secretary of the
Mexican Communist Party from 1963 to 1981, when the
party became part of the Unified Socialist Party of
Mexico says: "People ask me, 'What does Gorbachev's
perestroika signify for Latin America? My answer is
"In Third World, The
nothing, and this is very good."
Legacy of Marx Takes Many Shapes," New York Times
24 January 1989, p. 11.
Conversely, Jose Riva, member of the Central
Committee Political Commission and Central Committee
secretary for international relations of the Dominican
Communist Party posits that "some in the democratic
movement view the change underway in the USSR with a
considerable degree of skepticism. They believe that
this change may end up weakening the revolutionary
militancy of the Soviet Communists. This is a
pessimistic attitude. At the same time, the conviction
is widespread in the Left, democratic movement that
perestroika in the Soviet Union will increase its
2

'

,

1

This study focuses on the impact of perestroika and
"new thinking" in foreign policy on the revolutionary

Left in Latin America.

Specifically, it examines Soviet

President Gorbachev's reforms, which have concrete
foreign policy implications, and the effects of these

changes on Marxist-Leninist movements in Cuba,
Nicaragua, and El Salvador.

This study will examine the

receptivity to the new thinking of the Soviet Union on
the part of these movements; the impact of "the demise
of Communism" on the goals and tactics of the

revolutionary Left; and the implications of Soviet
reforms for the future of the revolutionary Left in

Latin America.

Gorbachev, Perestroika and Foreign Policy "New Thinking"

Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev the

Soviet Union has embarked on major domestic reforms and

proclaimed the need for new political thinking in
international relations.

A few years ago only the most

serious specialists and scholars of Soviet affairs

speculated about the prospects of internal reform in the
Soviet Union.

Today western policymakers in government

and business, journalists, commentators, and the public
to step up
economic potential and enable it
assistance to the world's revolutionary forces." Jose
Riva, "Perestroika in the USSR and the International
Communist Movement," World Marxist Review 31
(September 1988): 92-109.
.

2

.

.

at large are interested in the incessant Soviet

discussions of imminent domestic reform and foreign
policy "new thinking." 3

Gorbachev's perestroika

(restructuring), glasnost (speaking out publicly), and

novoye myshleniye (new thinking) have prompted

unprecedented debate about the present state of the
Soviet economy, party leadership and foreign policy.

4

William E. Odom posits that while the change is
being attributed to General Secretary Gorbachev, the new
course was actually initiated under his predecessor
Yuriy Andropov, temporarily set aside by Konstantin
Chernenko, and reasserted by Gorbachev.
However,
Andropov's anti-corruption and anti-alcoholism
campaigns, he asserts, did not signal so clearly the
extent of the intended transformation as have
Gorbachev's glasnost perestroika and novoye
myshleniye
See William E. Odom, "How Far Can Reform
Go?"
Problems of Communism 36 (November /December 1987):
18-33.
Similarly, Jerry Hough argues that the extent to
which Andropov was willing to support radical domestic
reforms is unclear. Andropov did attack the social
policy that Brezhnev had followed, calling for increased
"
"discipline."
D] iscipline meant not an unconditional
right to a job, but a 'right' to lose a job if a person
was not productive." Further, Andropov wrote about the
need for prices to correspond to costs and hinted at the
need to raise subsidized meat prices. These concerns
will be shared by Gorbachev. In his foreign policy
pronouncements "Andropov had been more urgent ... in
pushing for improved relations with the West" and his
international policy moved away from "Brezhnev's
American-centered policy in the direction of a
multipolar one." This desire to engage in a multi-polar
foreign policy will also be shared by Gorbachev. See
Jerry Hough, Russia and the West (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1988), pp. 148-152.
3

,

,

.

[

,

There exists, of course, a range of
interpretations of what is happening in the Soviet
Some think little is changing, except, perhaps
Union.
See Adam Ulam, Alain
of Soviet politics.
"tone"
the
in
Happening in
"What's
in
Thom
Francoise
and
Besancon,
(Summer
1987),
no.
Interest
8
National
Moscow?" The
albeit
change
see
Others
27-30.
pp. 11-13 and
4

,

3

—

Gorbachev defines perestroika as a revolutionary
and radical "elimination of obstacles hindering social

and economic development, of outdated methods of

managing the economy and of dogmatic stereotype
mentality." 5

Scholars of the Soviet Union, as well as

Gorbachev himself, argue that perestroika is a
"revolution" born of necessity.

The Stalinist system in

the Soviet Union was in crisis by the mid-1980s.

The

Soviet Union was, and still is, suffering from serious

economic stagnation.

Rates of economic growth are

declining, the economy is increasingly squeezed
financially, and the government is increasingly unable
to meet the nation's growing needs in housing.

—

reversible in the political but little meaningful
change in the economic realm. See Marshall I. Goldman,
Gorbachev's Challenge (New York: Norton, 1987). Still
others see much potential for change but claim it is too
early to speak about major change. See Seweryn Bialer,
Dissent (Spring 1987), p. 188; William E. Odom, "The
Future of the Soviet Political System," PS: Political
Science and Politics 21 (June 1989). Finally, Jerry
Hough Russia and the West and Archie Brown ("What's
Happening in Moscow?" The National Interest no. 8
[Summer 1987]: 6-10) argue that Gorbachev is committed
to significant economic and political reform. Gorbachev
is, however, working under considerable constraints and
thus it is irresponsible to expect the USSR to transform
itself into a Western-type pluralist democracy (or to
assume that Gorbachev's reforms mean nothing because
The
they have not engendered such a transformation)
stimulate
could
changes begun by Gorbachev, they argue,
in time demands for a more thorough pluralization of the
political and economic
systems
.

.

(

)

,

.

Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for
our Country and the World (New York: Harper and Row,
1988), p. 38.
5

,

4

foodstuffs

,

transportation, health services, and

education. 6

Soviet economic problems had a ripple effect in

society at large.

On the ideological plane, economic

stagnation, coupled with the "ossified social thought
.

.

divorced from reality

.

.

.

typical of the period

.

of the personality cult" 7 brought about greater

resistance to the attempts to scrutinize constructively
the problems that were emerging.

New ideas were

rejected as "the needs and opinions of ordinary working
people, of the public at large, were ignored." 8

Moreover, a "credibility gap" grew within Soviet society
as the propaganda emanating from the party leadership,

which presented a trouble-free reality, did not match
the reality experienced by Soviet citizens.
"

[Everything that was proclaimed from the rostrums and

printed in newspapers and textbooks was put in question.
Decay began in public morals;

.

.

.

alcoholism, drug

addiction and crime were growing; and the penetration of

Abel Aganbegyan, Head of the Economics Department
of the USSR Academy of Sciences and chief economic
advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev describes the USSR's
immediate economic concerns (housing, food and
agriculture, health services) and the nation's more
fundamental or structural economic problems in "The
Economics of Perestroika," International Affairs
(London) 64 (Spring 1988): 179-185.
6

7

Gorbachev, p. 34.

8

Ibid.

,

p.

7

5

the stereotypes of mass culture alien to us, which bred

vulgarity and low tastes and brought about ideological
barrenness, increased." 9
At the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the Central

Committee the basic principles of the new strategy of

perestroika were announced.

These were more clearly

defined at the Conference of the CPSU Central Committee
in June 1985, the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in

February 1986, and at the June 1987 Plenary Meeting of
the CPSU Central Committee.

The Soviet leadership's

first priority was to reverse the nation's economic and
social problems which were the most obvious signs of a

crisis in the Stalinist system by which the USSR has
been ruled for sixty years.
Lenin is turned to as the ideological source of
Gorbachev attempts to replace the

Soviet restructuring.

Stalino-Brezhnevite system with a more efficient and
more open model of socialism based on the work of Lenin.

According to Lenin, socialism is the living creativity
of the masses.

Moreover, Lenin views socialism and

democracy as indivisible.
writes in Perestroika

,

Therefore, as Gorbachev

Soviet reform must "activate the

human factor," it must take into consideration the

diverse interests of people, work collectives, public
bodies and various social groups.
9

Ibid.

,

p.

8
6

Gorbachev claims that

only by abandoning the "ossified social thought"

identified with the "period of the personality cult" and
launching a broad democratization of all aspects of
society, which will lead to the full utilization of the

human factor, will the Soviet economy and Soviet society
advance

10

The domestic manifestations of the crisis in the

Stalinist system have necessarily affected Gorbachev's
foreign policy.

The needs of domestic policy have

merged with the failures of Brezhnev's foreign policy to
impel the Soviet Union to look for new approaches to

foreign and military policy. 11

Foreign Minister Eduard

10

Gorbachev s plan for reform is, as Seweryn Bialer
posits, multifaceted. First, Gorbachev plans to use
exhortation and appeals to national pride as well as
greater openness within society in order to spur
economic growth. Second, Gorbachev will argue in favor
of increased domestic investment and growth in the
domestic economy even at the expense of increased
military spending or increased social payments to
workers and peasants. Third, Gorbachev will stress
"discipline" and "order," which, despite their Stalinist
connotations, are code words for the introduction of
market mechanisms into the Soviet economy. Finally,
Gorbachev's plans for reform necessitate the replacement
of aging members of the Central Committee with younger,
more energetic officials who do not share the "ossified
social thought" of their predecessors. See Seweryn
Bialer, The Soviet Paradox; External Expansion, Internal
Decline, (New York: Knopf, 1986), pp. 150-153.
'

“Peter Zwick argues that new thinking, perestroika
and glasnost are integral and mutually supportive
"New Thinking in foreign policy
elements of reform.
contributes to the restructuring of the Soviet economy,
and domestic economic reform and political openness
influence the implementation and direction of Soviet
foreign policy. Therefore new thinking in foreign
policy must be understood in the larger context of
7

Shevardnadze has said that the main requirement in
foreign policy
is that our country should not bear additional
expenditures in connection with the necessity
of supporting our defense capability and the
defense of our legitimate foreign policy
interests. That means that we must seek paths
to the limitation and reduction of military
rivalry, to the removal of confrontational
moments in relations with other states, to the
clamping down of conflicts and crises. 12

Gorbachev's "new thinking" also looks to Lenin for
inspiration.

In October 1986, in response to a question

asking if a potential conflict should exist between
peace and socialism, which should the USSR pursue,

Gorbachev said that "Lenin in his time expressed an idea
of colossal depth

— concerning

the priority of the

interests of social development, of all human values,
over the interests of one or another class."

Gorbachev

went on to speak of the importance in the nuclear age of

Mikhail Gorbachev's vision of the Soviet future, rather
than merely as a revision of certain aspects of Soviet
international behavior." Peter Zwick, "New Thinking and
New Foreign Policy Under Gorbachev," PS: Political
Science and Politics 21 (June 1989): 215. Also see
David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New Thinking," Foreign
Affairs 68, (Winter 1988/Spring 1989): 66-81 for a
discussion of the failures of Brezhnev's foreign policy.
Quoted in Holloway, p. 78. According to Yuri
Maslyukov, Chairman of the State Planning Committee, the
Soviet Union's national debt is approaching $500 billion
and is growing faster than that of the United States.
The Soviet deficit equals 13.8 percent of the annual
production of the country's goods and services. See
"Top Soviet Planner Sees Debt of $500 Billion," Boston
Globe 6 August 1989, p. 2.
12

.

8

the "thesis of the priority of the all-human value of

peace over all others to which different people are
attached." 13

As David Holloway points out,

taken by itself this proposition may seen
banal, but it is significant in the Soviet
context because it implies that the goals of
peace and socialism may come into conflict,
and further it provides justification for
giving priority to the pursuit of cooperation
with the West over search for unilateral
advantage 14
Soviet new thinking, which Gorbachev set out most

recently in his December 1988 speech at the United
Nations, embraces a number of propositions about the

nature of international relations in the modern world:

human interests take precedence over the interests of
any particular class; the world is becoming increasingly

interdependent; there can be no victors in a nuclear
war; security has to be based increasingly on political

rather than military instruments; and security must be
mutual, especially in the context of U.S. -Soviet

relations, since insecurity on one side leads to

insecurity on the other side too. 15

“Quoted in Holloway,
14

This new thinking

70.

p.

Ibid.

“See Matthew Evangelista, "The New Soviet Approach
to Security," World Policy Journal 3 (Fall 1986): 561599 for a discussion of new thinking and Soviet
security, nuclear weapons and disarmament. Also see
Gerhard Wetting, "New Thinking on Security and East-West
Relations," Problems of Communism 37 (March-April 1988):
1-14.
9

rejects many basic assumptions of earlier Soviet policy
and should be understood as a response to the crisis in

relations to which Leonid

I.

Brezhnev

;

s

policies

had brought the Soviet Union by the early 1980s as well
as the need for domestic reform.

16

The USSR and Latin America
In the last twenty years as the Soviets'

understanding and knowledge of Latin America has
increased the Soviet Union has become a significant
actor in the region. 17

The Soviet military presence

has increased considerably in nations like Cuba,

Nicaragua, and Peru; Soviet trade with the area,

especially Argentina, has expanded; and Soviet
diplomatic ties and normal state-to-state relations now
encompass virtually all the countries in the area. 18
16

Jerry Hough argues that Brezhnev's foreign policy
was too reliant on a bipolar relationship with the U.S.
which led the Soviet Union to accept the status quo in
U.S. foreign policy.
Gorbachev, however, desires to
move beyond this bipolar foreign policy and he initiates
a multipolar policy which plays upon the "contradictions
between the three centers of Capitalism the U.S.,
Western Europe and Japan." Jerry Hough, Russia and the
Gorbachev's call for a "common European
West, p. 223.
home" is one manifestation of this shift in foreign
policy, and it has had the effect of challenging the
traditional U.S. position in Western Europe. See, for
example, "U.S. Voicing Fears of Effect on West from
Gorbachev," The New York Times 16 September 1989, p. 1.

—

,

Howard Wiarda, "The Rising Soviet Presence in
Latin America," World Affairs 149 (Fall 1986): 59.
17

18

Ibid.
10

Not surprisingly, the Soviets have also adapted a wider

range of strategies for the region, 19

they seek to influence democratic governments
as well as gain control of the opposition to
repressive ones, and they have adapted their
policies to the individual situations of the
distinct Latin American countries. 20
At the same time there exist limits on the Soviets

increasing their role in the region.

"Latin America is

far away from the Soviet Union geographically, there are

not many vital Soviet interests there, and Latin America

ranks low on the Soviet list of priority areas." 21

The

Soviets are also cognizant of the overwhelming local

advantage of the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere, and
their domestic economic priorities and reorganization
plans may limit their playing a significant role in the
future.

This latter point is discussed in considerable

detail by Costa Rican political scientist Rodolfo Cerdas
Cruz, who argues that:

We are witnessing the dawn of a new era in
which the internal priorities of Soviet
politics are acquiring an unprecedented degree
of importance in the political life of the
country. The demands of the various sectors
for substantial improvements in public
services, supply of consumer goods,
improvements in the educational system,
See Robert Wesson, "The Soviet Way in Latin
America," World Affairs 149 (Fall 1986): 67-75. This
issue of World Affairs is devoted to the Soviet Union
and Latin America.
19

20

Wiarda, p. 59.

21

Ibid.
11

housing and health, etc., are beginning to
occupy a position of priority in the
institutional life of the Soviet Union. Such
demands, previously controlled by the
dictatorial grasp of the party over various
channels for expressing social grievances, are
being made even more vociferously and are
facing the CPSU leadership, no longer in a
position to decide on the convenience or
inconvenience of resolving these problems,
with the urgent necessity to respond to
concrete petitions and protests which cannot,
as hitherto, be postponed indefinitely without
doing serious damage to the legitimacy of the
system. 22
All this may lead to a more limited scope for action by
the Soviet Union, fewer possibilities for adventurism

and less favorable conditions for undertaking risky

commitments in Third World countries and more

particularly in Latin America.
Under these conditions, one can forecast the
following political result: a contraction in
the funds allocated to international
solidarity. Although these will not disappear
completely and will maintain sizable levels,
primarily for reasons to do with the global
interests of the USSR, for the first time
sufficient and explicit political, moral and
economic justifications will need to be found,
in a social climate where greater controls are
operating, disputes over better distribution
of resources becoming more acute and internal
pressures for expenditure becoming more openly
apparent. 23

Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz, "New Directions in Soviet
Policy in Latin America," Journal of Latin American
Studies 21 (February 1989): 2.
22

W. Raymond Duncan posits that for
Ibid., p. 4.
about poor management of the
complaints
time
the first
the Nicaraguan economy may
in
turmoil
Cuban economy or
social pressures for a
and
opinion
create currents of
Union and C uba.
Soviet
change of policy. See The
Interests and Influence, (New York: Praeger, 1985),
23

12

The changes taking place in the USSR and the Soviet

bloc are tending to strengthen national responses to
local problems and to lessen the weight and significance
of demands coming from the international arena,

especially from the Third World countries in general and
Latin America in particular. 24

To this may be added

the new position of Latin America in the global strategy
of the USSR:

The ideological tendencies which wanted to see
a shift of the world revolutionary axis to the
Third World and to convert it into a forum for
confrontation with imperialism have suffered
an irreparable defeat with the new
orientations of perestroika 25
.

The Soviet debate on the Third World has ranged

widely over the nature of its revolution, regional and
national differentiation, stages of development, the

possibilities of non-capitalist means of development,
and other issues, however during the period from 1978
193.
Edward Gonzales writes: "For Castro,
Gorbachev's new priorities will probably mean not only
more limited largess for the Cuban economy but also
renewed Soviet pressure for Havana to put its own
Castro may find Soviet
economic house in order.
support for an activist Cuban foreign policy in the
Third World less forthcoming, not only because of
Gorbachev's domestic priorities but also because of
Soviet attempts to stabilize the more important
strategic relationship with the U.S." Edward Gonzalez,
"Cuba, the Third World, and the Soviet Union," in The
Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three
Decades, eds. Francis Fukuyama and Andrzej Korbonski,
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 67-81.
p.

.

24

.

Cruz, p. 5.

“Ibid.

,

p.

6

13

.

(shortly before the Sandinista revolution) until 1985
(which saw the infancy of perestroika) the Soviet Union

sought to heighten regional conflicts and saw in the

politico-military instability of the region confirmation
of the increasing weakness of imperialism. 26
In 1982

the Communist Party Conference in Havana

,

declared that the center of gravity of the Latin

American revolution had shifted to Central America and
the Caribbean. 27

Revolution there was not simply

democratic revolution aimed at overthrowing the military

dictatorships allied to imperialism, but also a struggle
to establish by a continuous process a socialist system.

Writing before the victory of the Sandinistas, Mi jail
Gornov and Yuri Koroliov 28 argued that the foundations
had already been laid for socialist and democratic

revolution in Latin America, and especially in Central

26

See Jerry F. Hough, The Struggle for the Third
(Washington
World; Soviet Debates and American Options
DC: Brookings, 1986) and Joseph G. Whelan and Michael J.
Dixon, The Soviet Union in the Third World: Threat to
(Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey s 1986).
World Peace?
,

'

,

27

,

Cruz, p. 7.

According to Jerry Hough, "M. F. Gornov" is the
pseudonym of M.F. Kudachin, Head of the Latin American
Sector of the Central Committee. Struggle
America Latina describes Yuri Koroliov
p. 173, note 90.
as a Doctor of Historical Science who works with the
Latin American Institute of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences
28

.

14

.

.

,

America. 29

Therefore the reformist tendencies seeking

to resolve the transition to democracy had to be

countered in order to open the way for the revolutionary
designs of the masses and of the working class. 30
Following the Sandinista success in 1979, it became

clear that the armed struggle was the preferred road to
success.

It was this alone that had resulted in victory

for the socialist revolutions in Latin America. 31

This

reading of the political processes in Latin America in
general and Central America in particular "was in line

with Soviet global strategies for the Third World in its
confrontation with the West and especially the United
States." 32

However, it did not correspond, as

perestroika itself came to demonstrate, with any real
economic, financial or technological capacity on the

part of the USSR to sustain the changing socialist

trends being imminently proclaimed throughout Latin

America and especially in Central America.

Mijail Gornov and Yuri Koroliov, "El Torbellino
Centroamericano " America Latina (Moscow), no. 6,
29

,

(1978): 7.
30

Ibid.

,

p.

19

Sergo Mikoyan, " Las Particularidades de la
Revolucion en Nicaragua y sus Tareas desde el punto de
Vista de la Teoria y la Practica del Movimiento
Librador," America Latina (Moscow), no. 3 (1980): 103.
31

32

Cruz, p. 8.
15

When Gorbachev was appointed General Secretary and

perestroika was initiated, it was obvious that a
realistic survey of the Soviet Union's own economic

position and the socialist struggle had to be made, and
that the impossibility of pursuing the internationalist
line advocated by the Brezhnev administration would be

recognized.

Soviet "new thinking" is therefore of

particular significance for Latin America and more
specifically for Central America.

Yuri Koroliov, who in

1978 emphasized the taking up of arms in order to hasten

the revolution, had, by 1988, changed his tune.

The

struggle now proposed is not class struggle, but rather
it is a struggle for national resurgence.

As Koroliov argues in "Metamorfosis de la

Interdependencia: Aspecto Regional

socialism is postponed.

,

"

the struggle for

It is evident now that in many

Latin American countries the right conditions for
"bourgeois" democracy have been created, and

sufficiently stable social structures have been erected
to enable such a "bourgeois democracy" to function.

In

practical political terms any attempt to change this
state of affairs will require lengthy preparation.

hour of revolution is no longer nigh

postponed indefinitely.

— it

The

is in fact

These are countries that no

longer belong to the group of underdeveloped states that
are fertile ground for revolution, for they have now
16

joined that group where the conditions only ripen after
long and complex preparation. 33

Such a change in

conception is in keeping with the thinking of Leonid
Medvedko, who, in the New Times of Moscow, wrote:
The present global parity of forces is a
"balance of impotence" in regional conflicts.
None of the belligerents is able to achieve
convincing superiority, let alone victory.
Now, it is, of course, immoral to stir up
conflicts and unleash wars in the hope of
winning an easy victory, by taking advantage
of the difficulties experienced by one or the
other country. But to add fuel to the flames
of war in the hope of deriving somewhat
dubious benefits is even more immoral.
History has amended the classic definition of
war.
More often than not, it is a
continuation of immoral policy. Hence it is
necessary to change policy in order to put a
stop to wars. 34

This view is shared by Radomir Bogdanov, in an

article published in the official organ of the Soviet

Foreign Ministry, in which he clearly states the
"nuclear arms have actually equated the destinies of

capitalism and socialism in the face of military
confrontation, have made them equally vulnerable, and
have posed a broader problem than that of choosing a

social system

— the

problem of the survival of

Yuri Koroliov, "Metamorfosis de la
Interdependencia : Aspecto Regional," Americ a Latina
33

(Moscow), no.
34

4

(1988), p.

Quoted in Cruz, p.

11.

8.
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mankind." 35

For this very reason, contrary to prior

political practice and Marxist-Leninist ideological
conception,

international relations must be placed in a
context divorced from the correlation of
forces.
The new system of international
relations and its problems must be approached
from a basis of common interests and mutual
compromise, with reciprocal concessions and
without destabilizing the international
situation by taking unilateral action. 36
"This new Soviet focus on the nature and character
of international relations and peaceful coexistence,

divorced from the notion of class, is proving to be a
debate of major political significance." 37

Soviet

leaders have turned to Lenin's claim that "the interests
of social development take precedence over the interests
of the proletariat" in order to justify the new less

radical emphasis.

It is being argued that there is a

global interest to which the particular must be
sacrificed, whether it be class based, national or
regional.

It is not a question of renouncing class

struggle in an antagonistic society, but of the form
that it takes in the nuclear age, when the future of

humanity is at stake; it is a question of identifying

Radomir Bogdanov, "From the Balance of Forces to
a Balance of Interests," International Affairs (Moscow),
35

no.

4

(

1988

)

:

36

Ibid

37

Cruz, p.

56

10.
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the class struggle with the problem of the survival of

mankind. 38

"The Communist parties of Latin America

understand, it is said, the need for creative analysis
of the situation of countries in that continent and of

relating national problems to global ones." 39
Cruz posits that the message being sent by the

Soviet leadership to the revolutionary Left in Latin

America is one of "historical patience."

Although there

has been no official renunciation of armed struggle, the

leftist thesis of armed struggle and revolutionary

violence as the midwife of history must be reconsidered.
Pravda on December 14, 1986 had this to say:

Violence on that continent [Latin America] can
easily become transformed from the midwife to
the gravedigger of history.
The birth of
socialism may end in the death of socialism.
In the present situation any local conflict
may escalate into regional and even world
The nuclear age demands of
conflict.
revolutionary forces the most serious
consideration of decisions over armed struggle
and the definitive rejection of actions
characteristic of leftist extremism. 40
.

.

.

The remainder of this work will examine the

receptiveness of the Latin American revolutionary Left
to the new Soviet policies of perestroika

foreign policy new thinking.

Chapter

2

,

glasnost and

provides a

historical overview of Soviet thinking about revolution
38

Ibid.

39

Ibid.

40

Quoted in Ibid.
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in the Third World from Lenin to Brezhnev and also

discusses the development of the Communist movement in
Latin America during this period.

Chapter

3

focuses on

the changes in Soviet thought ushered in by Mikhail

Gorbachev's rise to power.

Chapters

4,

5

and

6

examine

the receptivity to perestroika and foreign policy "new

thinking" on the part of the Cuban Communist Party, the

Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), and the

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
respectively.

These chapters also examine the impact of

Soviet new thinking on the goals and tactics of each

revolutionary movement.

Chapter

7

concludes the study

with a discussion of the implications of perestroika and
foreign policy "new thinking" for the future of the

revolutionary Left in Latin America.

20

CHAPTER

2

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET THINKING
ABOUT THE THIRD WORLD AND LATIN AMERICA

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the

implications of Soviet perestroika and foreign policy
new thinking for the revolutionary Left in Latin
America.

This chapter attempts to "set the stage" for

this discussion by providing a historical overview of

Soviet revolutionary strategy and Latin America's

position in it.

As Jerry Hough posits, Soviet debates

on revolutionary strategy have focused on two crucial

questions: "What is the nature of the state in foreign

countries and does it have to be overthrown by violent

revolution if there is to be hope for social progress;"
and "What is the natural tendency of historical

development as feudalism

.

.

.

with the growth of capitalism.

begins to disintegrate
.

.

.

Are major

historical forces leading to socialist revolution in the
near term."

1

These questions will be addressed in this

chapter by focusing on the historical development of
Soviet thought 2 concerning revolution in the Third
Jerry Hough, The Struggle for the Third World
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986),
1

p.

,

142.

Earlier there had been a western belief that there
is no serious debate in the Soviet Union concerning
foreign policy. Hence analysts have been inclined to
write of "the Soviet position" on various issues.
2
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World

3

,

and by examining the policies and strategies

adopted by Latin American Communists and Communist
Parties in their attempt to engender "social progress"
in the region.

This chapter begins with a discussion of Marx and
the "colonial question" and proceeds to examine Soviet

thinking about revolution in the Third World from Lenin
to Brezhnev.

Parallel with this discussion, this

chapter also traces the development of the Communist

movement in Latin America from 1919, when the Comintern
began to pay increased attention to the colonial and
semi-colonial worlds, to 1985 and the ascension to power
by Mikhail Gorbachev.

Since 1985, Soviet ideas about

international politics and how the Soviet Union should
However, in the 1980s there was a proliferation of
western studies detailing Soviet foreign policy debates
which all make the point, explicitly or implicitly, that
speaking of "the" Soviet position on any foreign policy
issue is a dubious venture. Probably the best known of
these studies is Hough's The Struggle for the Third
World
However see also Daniel S. Papp, Soviet
Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980s: The
(Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1985);
Ideological Basis
Edme Dominguez, "La Vision Academics Sovietica Sobre el
Caribe y Centroamerica (1960-1984) ," in America Latina Y
La Union Sovietica: Una Nueva Relacion ed. Augusto
Varas, (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano
1987); Allen Lynch, The Soviet Study of International
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Relations
1989); and Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of
International Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press,
.

,

,

,

,

,

1987)

.

In this chapter "Third World" and "developing
nations" will be used interchangeably even though Soviet
writers prefer the latter.
3
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perforin as a superpower have been in constant flux.

These ideas and their implications for the revolutionary
Left in Latin America will be addressed in subsequent

chapters

Marx and the Colonial Question

Classical Marxism provided an analysis of the

contradictions of capitalist society and indicated means
by which its revolutionary overthrow might be

accomplished.

It was only peripherally concerned with

the colonial world, and its analysis of the manner in

which the political practice of the working class

movement might take account of developing metropolitancolonial economic links is fragmentary and incomplete.
It fell to Lenin to develop the classical Marxist

heritage on the national and colonial question and, in
particular, to specify the nature of the connection

between revolutions in advanced capitalist society and
those in the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

He

summed up the tasks now facing socialists in the words,

"Proletarians of all countries and oppressed peoples,

unite 1"

Lenin acknowledged that, strictly speaking, no

warrant for such a formulation could be found in any of
Marx's writings; but the Communist Manifesto

,

he

emphasized, had been written in "completely different

23

circumstances."

4

It was the task of the science of

revolution to adapt itself to such changes in its
environment. 5
Yet, when Marx did address the issue directly, as
in On Colonialism

,

it was clear that,

in his estimation,

the cruelties of colonialism were justified by its

historical effect of breaking down traditional socioeconomic structures and paving the way for the

universalization of the capitalist system. 6

Yet,

Marx's ideas were sometimes contradictory.

While

attributing the political relations among nations to the
needs of their economic "base," Marx, in un-Marxist
fashion, was known to discuss the influence of non-

economic factors in explaining colonialism.
In an article written for the New York Herald
Marx gave an analysis of Persian-Af ghan
political antagonisms founded on diversity of
race, blended with historical reminiscences,
kept alive by frontier quarrels and rival

Daniel S. Papp posits that Marx himself was rarely
concerned with the colonial question and with the role
that colonies played in the global capitalist system of
his time because "at the time of Marx's writings, the
world had not yet experienced what has been described as
v
the second round of empire, which occurred during the
last two decades of the nineteenth century" (Papp,
4

'

pp.

3-4

)

.

Stephen White, "Colonial Revolution and the
Communist International, 1919-1924," Scienc e and Society
40 (Summer 1976): 173-193.
5

Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, On Colonialism
(New York: International Publishers), 1972.
6
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,

claims ... sanctioned by religious
antagonism. 7
Just as colonialism was recognized as having the

historical effect of breaking down traditional socio—

economic structures and paving the way for capitalism
and eventually socialism, Marx argued that nationalism

was a powerful tool that revolutionaries could employ

against the established political and social orders in
order to further the movement of history.

Despite the

seeming ideological incompatibilities of Marxism and
nationalism, 8 Marx was an ardent advocate of Polish

nationalism directed as it was against Prussian, Russian
and Austrian domination, despite the fact that it was

limited to the Polish upper and middle-classes. 9
Similarly, Marx's writings on the American Civil War

illustrate his support for the bourgeois but progressive

7

Allen Lynch, p. 11. A major theme running through
Lynch's work is that Marxist-Leninist ideology and
Soviet thinking about the international system is more
complex, contradictory, and nuanced than often believed
in the West.

According to Walker Connor, "nationalism is
predicated upon the assumption that the most fundamental
divisions of humankind are the many vertical cleavages
that divide people into ethnonational groups.
rests upon the conviction that the most
Marxism
fundamental human divisions are horizontal class
distinctions that cut across national groupings" (Walker
Connor The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory
and Strategy [Princeton: Princeton University Press,
.

.

.

,

,

1984], p. 5).
9

Papp, p. 4.
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North in its struggle against the feudal and regressive
South. 10

Lenin and Stalin: 1917-1951
By Lenin's time, nearly all of Africa and Asia were

controlled by Great Britain, France, Germany, Portugal,
Spain, Belgium, Holland, Russia, and the United States.

Great Britain alone governed one-fifth of the world's
land mass and one-fourth of its population.

Lenin's

thoughts on the colonial world were more sharply drawn
than Marx's.

In 1916 Lenin wrote his most famous

commentary on the colonial world, Imperialism; The
Highest Stage of Capitalism

Adam Ulam argues that this

.

work provides "the single most important theoretical
treatise" for the study of all Soviet foreign policy,
not just Soviet perceptions of the colonial world. 11

Lenin's argument was derived from earlier works by
J. A.

Hobson and Rudolf Hilferding, but his conclusions

were new.

Beginning in the 1870s, Lenin argues,

capitalism passed beyond its constructive and largely
peaceful phase and entered the stage of monopoly
capitalism.

This stage in the development of capitalism

Saul K. Padover, ed., On America and the Civil
(New York; McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 94.

10

War

,

“Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Co-Existence; Soviet
Foreign Policy 1917-1973 (New York; Praeger, 1974),
,

p

.

27
26

is characterized by the scarcity of domestic investment

opportunities in the most advanced capitalist countries,
which, in turn, necessitates the search for colonial

territories where both cheap labor and raw materials can
be obtained.

The subsequent imperialist competition for colonies
is significant for two reasons.

First, the advanced

capitalist nations were able, through the acquisition of
colonies, to postpone the internal contradictions of

advanced capitalism which, Marx argued, would lead to
its overthrow as nations reached a high level of

industrialization.

Lenin posited that the rise in

living standards of the English, French, and German

workers had been purchased through the exploitation of
colonial peoples.

Therefore, the good Marxist should

feel no qualms about allying himself with even the

middle or upper classes of the oppressed nationality if
they oppose colonial domination.

No matter how

reactionary their social views, their nationalist

opposition to European colonialism make them natural
allies.

Second, the capitalist competition for colonies

was bound to turn into political and then military

competition from which there would be no escape short of

27

the destruction of capitalism as an international
system. 12

The implications of Lenin's work were considerable.
First, Marxist analysis was no longer
primarily domestic in nature; it was now
international as well. Second, Marx had
argued that the weakest link in the capitalist
system was the revolutionary resentment
building in the proletariat worker in
developed capitalist societies; Lenin
maintained that capitalism's weakest link was
actually it colonial possessions. Third,
Lenin built on Marx's willingness to side with
the more progressive forces in society to
foment changes and revolution, and argued that
the national bourgeoisie of colonial
countries, that is, those elements in society
that both resented external control of their
homeland and wished to maintain private
ownership of the means of production, should
actually be seen as allies of convenience by
the revolutionary proletariat in their assault
on the global capitalist system. Thus, the
proletariat revolution would be facilitated by
Finally, the focus
the national bourgeoisie.
of revolution moved from developed European
societies to underdeveloped colonial
territories. As the weakest link in the
capitalist system, and with indigenous forces
both willing and able to weaken and break that
link, Lenin concluded that the opportunities
for revolution were as great, if not greater,
in the colonies as in Europe. 13
In his "Preliminary Draft Theses on the National

and Colonial Questions," prepared for the Second

Congress of the Communist International (Comintern) in
June 1920, Lenin argued that liberation would result

V I. Lenin, Imperialism; The Highest Stage of
Capitalism (New York; International Publishers, 1977),
and Ulam, pp. 27-29.
12

.

,

13

Papp, p. 5.
28

from the joint struggle by the proletariat of the

advanced countries and the subjugated peoples of the
colonial areas.

Acknowledging that liberation movements

would usually have a bourgeois-nationalist character
initially

Lenin nevertheless endorsed temporary

,

cooperation with them provided that the proletarian
movement, however rudimentary, maintained its sense of

identity and independence of action. 14

At the Second

Congress Lenin theorized that the colonial territories,
like the developed capitalist states, would experience a

two-stage revolution.

The national bourgeoisie would

lead the first stage which would culminate in national

independence and bourgeois democracy for their country.
The second stage of the revolution would be led by

communists and would eventually lead to a dictatorship
of the proletariat. 15
14

Lenin, "Communism and the East: Theses on
the National and Colonial Questions," in The Lenin
Anthology ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton,
1975), pp. 619-625.
V.

I.
,

Papp, pp. 5-6; Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W.
Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World
(Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1983), p. 181.
Conflicts
Lenin's prescription for colonial revolution met
with strong opposition from the Indian communist M. N.
He argued that the colonial bourgeoisie, by virtue
Roy.
weakness and its dependent relationship with the
its
of
colonial powers, was incapable of leading the first
stage of the revolution. Roy advocated communist
leadership of the first stage of the revolution, as well
as the second, positing that this would hasten the rise
The Comintern's solution to the Lenin-Roy
of socialism.
debate was to pass both resolutions, thus postponing an
important theoretical debate.
15

.
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Immediately after coming to power, the Bolshevik

government called on Persians, Turks, Arabs, Hindus and
all other peoples of the "East" to overthrow their

imperialist rulers.

At Lenin's instigation, a Congress

of the Peoples of the East was convened by the Comintern

in Baku in September 1920 in the hope of hastening anti-

imperialist revolution.

At the Baku congress "a holy

war was declared against British imperialism." 16

According to Alvin

Z.

Rubinstein, the congress:

Called for world revolution and tried to
attract the support of Muslims of the East for
an all-out struggle against the West.
At this
time this meant opposition to British and
French power in the Middle East; association
of Soviet Russian and the Bolshevik Revolution
with the aspirations of indigenous peoples
seeking independence; and penetration of
bourgeois-nationalist freedom movements by
[While the Baku
pro-Moscow communists.
Congress never fulfilled Lenin's hopes]
its theme became a permanent part of the
Soviet foreign policy outlook. 17
.

.

.

Indeed, though Lenin did not live to see Russia

reap the benefits of decolonization, he anticipated the

demise of colonial empires.
The movement in the Colonies is still regarded
as an insignificant national and completely
peaceful movement. However, that is not the
For great changes have taken place in
case.
this respect since the beginning of the
twentieth century, namely, millions and

Klaus Von Beyme, The Soviet Union in World
Politics, (Brookfield, MA: Gower, 1987), p. 118.
16

Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Moscow's Third World
Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988),
17

,

p.

16
30

—

hundreds of millions actually the
overwhelming majority of the world's
population are now coming out as an
independent and revolutionary factor. And it
should be perfectly clear that the coming
decisive battles of the world's revolution,
this movement of the majority of the world's
population, originally aimed at national
liberation, will turn against capitalism and
imperialism and will, perhaps, play a much
more revolutionary role than we have been led
to expect. 18

—

Similarly, in his last article, written on March

2,

1923

and devoted primarily to the need for improving the

efficiency of the state bureaucracy, Lenin expressed

optimism over the outcome of the Soviet Union's struggle
to defend itself against imperialism by virtue of the
fact that Russia, India, China, and others "account for

the overwhelming majority of the world's population" and

they are engaged in the struggle for liberation, thus

assuring a complete victory for socialism. 19
Lenin's incapacitation and death (1920-1924)

unleashed a power struggle within the Kremlin that
absorbed much of the attention of the Soviet leadership

during the 1924-1928 period.

Joseph Stalin "made the

colonial question part of his own program in the
20
maneuvering to possess Lenin's mantle of legitimacy."

Lenin, The National Liberation Movement i n
Foreign Languages Publishing House,
(Moscow:
the East
289-290.
1957), pp.
18

V.

I.

,

19

Quoted in Rubinstein, p. 17.

20

Rubinstein, p. 17.
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Hence, in a series of lectures entitled The Foundations
of Leninism

,

which he gave three months after Lenin's

death, Stalin lauded Lenin for illuminating inter-

relationships that exist and affect the future of

revolution in Europe, and for strengthening socialism in
the Soviet Union.

Stalin also reiterated Lenin's thesis

that bastions of capitalism can be toppled by depriving

them of the raw materials and markets of the colonies,

declaring that the road to victory lies through the
revolutionary alliance with the liberation movements of
the colonies and dependent countries against

imperialism. 21

After Stalin emerged preeminent from the leadership
struggle, Soviet interest and involvement in the

colonial world occupied, at best, third place in Soviet
priorities, behind institutionalizing Stalin's rule and

building socialism in one country, and coping with the
22
threat presented by capitalist encirclement.

"Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that

Stalin and other Soviet leaders of his era considered
the colonial territories to be unimportant or

insignificant.

" 23

Stalin, The Foundations of Leninism
Languages Press, 1975).
Foreign
(Peking:
21

J. V.

22

Papp, p. 6.

23

Ibid.
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,

Stalin had been intimately involved with questions
of colonial nationalism and revolution long before he

acquired his ultimate position in the Soviet Union.

As

Commissar for Nationality Affairs he had been a leading

Bolshevik theoretician on the nationalities question

within Russia.

On external nationalities questions he

implored his fellow revolutionaries shortly after the

revolution that "the East should not be forgotten for a
single moment, if only because it represents the
v

inexhaustible

'

reserve and

world imperialism."

v

most reliable' rear of

To Stalin, communists had to "break

the age-long sleep of the oppressed peoples of the East"

and "rouse them to fight imperialism," for without the

colonial peoples, "the definite triumph of socialism" is
"unthinkable."

Therefore, one duty of the communists

was "to intervene in the growing spontaneous movement in
the East and to develop it further into a conscious

struggle against imperialism."

Stalin reiterated these

and similar viewpoints throughout the early and mid1920s. 24

Under Stalin, the Soviet policy of alliances with

nationalist movements was refined and reinforced.
Stalin, writing on "The National Question" argued:

This does not mean, of course, that the
proletariat must support every national

Joseph Stalin, Works, (Moscow: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1973), pp. 143-154 and 174-176.
24

33

movement, everywhere and always, in every
individual concrete case.
It means that
support must be given to such national
movements as tend to weaken, to overthrow
imperialism, and not to strengthen and preserve
it.
Cases occur when the national movements
in certain oppressed countries come into
conflict with the interests of the development
of the proletariat movement.
In such cases
support is
entirely out of the
question. ... In the forties of the last
century Marx supported the national movement
of the Poles and Hungarians and was opposed to
the national movement of the Czechs and South
Slavs.
Why? Because the Czechs and South
Slavs were then "reactionary nations,"
outposts of absolutism, whereas the Poles and
Hungarians were "revolutionary nations,"
fighting against absolutism.
The
struggle that the Emir of Afghanistan is
waging for the independence of Afghanistan is
objectively a revolutionary struggle, despite
the monarchist views of the Emir and his
associates, for it weakens, disintegrates and
undermines imperialism.
For the same
reasons, the struggle that the Egyptian
merchants and bourgeois intellectuals are
waging for the independence of Egypt is
objectively a revolutionary struggle, despite
the bourgeois origin ... of the leaders of
the Egyptian national movement. 25
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Unfortunately for Stalin, his efforts to support

revolutionary nationalists in the colonial world between
1924 and 1928 were less than successful.

Stalin's

experience with China was especially disastrous.
Even prior to Lenin's death, local Chinese
communists were urged to join the Kuomintang
and in 1933, the Soviets expressed support for
Sun Yat-Sen, while noting that "conditions for
the successful establishment of either
communism or Sovietism" did not exist in
In the mid-twenties, Stalin argued
China.
communists, waiting for a later
Chinese
that
chance to take over the government, could best
25

Stalin, The Foundations of Leninism
34

,

pp.

76-78.

advance their own fortunes by collaborating
with the nationalists. Chiang Kai-Shek,
however, successfully out-maneuvered the
communists and in 1927 he nearly annihilated
them all. 26

Whether because of his failures in China, or
because of new perceptions of Soviet domestic political
and economic realities and international threats to

Soviet security, Stalin used the Sixth Comintern

Congress in 1928 to alter many of Lenin's and his own

earlier assessments of the colonial world.

While not

abandoning the colonial world, 27 the Soviets at the
Sixth Congress retreated from earlier overly optimistic

evaluations of the colonial national bourgeoisie.

The

new "united front from below" strategy adopted at the

Congress urged communists in the developing world to

unmask the deceptions of the national bourgeoisie.

If

revolution were to occur, the communists were to lead
it. 28

26

Carol R. Saivetz and Sylvia Woodby, Soviet-Third
World Relations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985),
,

p.

6

A point made quite clearly by Edward T. Wilson,
"Russia's Historic Stake in Black Africa," in Communism
in Africa ed. David E. Albright (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 81-83.
27

,

Papp, p. 7; see also Hosmer and Wolfe, pp. 182The latter argue that the Comintern's abrupt shift
183.
to a more militant line in this period reflected
It was used by Stalin, they
internal Soviet politics.
posit, against Bukharin, who was identified with the
previous more moderate line.
28

35

Rubinstein writes that despite the Comintern's new

"ultrarevolutionary line" Stalin, prior to World War II
chose not to incite communist agitation in the
colonies for fear of provoking the already
deeply ingrained suspicions of Britain and
France, the principal colonial powers and his
principal allies against Hitler. Nor in any
event was he in a position to do much: the
ruling colonial powers were firmly in control;
the national liberation movements were still
in the formative stages; the communists were
weak; and the Soviet Union lacked the
capability for direct involvement. 29

World War II precipitated massive changes in the
international system, but brought no major changes in
Soviet policy toward the colonial world.

Stalin's

priorities were elsewhere, especially in Europe, and his
resources remained limited.
For Stalin, newly independent states not under
control of communists subservient to Stalin
represented more a threat to be contained than
an opportunity to be exploited. As a result,
Soviet spokesmen and experts on the colonial
and newly independent world decried the
independence of the new nations as a sham and
classified the national bourgeoisie of those
countries as imperialist collaborationists and
counterrevolutionaries. Even notables such as
Gandhi and Nehru were considered little more

Rubinstein, p. 17. Moreover, Fernando Claudin
argues that Stalin's concern with the creation of
"socialism in one country" meant that Comintern policy
emphasized that class struggles and national liberation
struggles of peoples oppressed by imperialism were
subordinate to the desires and needs of the USSR. In
effect, despite the rhetoric, the building of socialism
in colonial areas was subordinated to the building of
socialism in the Soviet Union. Fernando Claudin, The
Communist Movement (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1970), pp. 71-91.
29

,

36

than capitalist stooges during the immediate
postwar period. 30

Similarly

,

the victory of Mao's forces in China in 1949

"did nothing to alter Stalin's view of the national

bourgeoisie in the newly independent countries; for that
was a revolution won by a Communist party against Soviet
advice." 31

The Chinese Revolution's success did,

however, complicate the Soviet position in the

developing world since revolutionaries now had a second
successful model to emulate.

Latin American Communism: Growth and Dissolution

Sheldon B. Liss in his 1984 Marxist Thought in

Latin America

,

points out that while laymen commonly

associate Marx with revolutionary thought and often

erroneously attribute to him theories of imperialism, in
reality Marx and Engels knew little and "never had more
than an indirect and tangential interest in the

30

Papp, p. 8.

31

Ibid.
37

region." 32

Lenin was both more well-read and more

interested in Latin America.
Lenin read A. B. Hart's The Monroe Doctrine
which heightened his awareness of the
(1916)
growth of "protectorates" and of the role of
the United States in Latin America.
He
referred to the Latin American republics as
"dependent countries;
which officially
are politically independent, but which are in
fact enmeshed in the net of financial and
diplomatic dependence." His thinking formed
the foundations upon which were built the
dependency themes that became popular among
some Marxist and non-Marxist Latin American
scholars in the late 1960s and 1970s. 33
,

.

.

.

With the ascendence of Lenin and the emergence of
the Third International in 1919, increased attention was

paid to the colonial and semi-colonial worlds.

The

Comintern focused its colonial agitation on the Far East
and, as Regis Debray points out,

"it came very late to

an interest in Latin America." 34

Part of this was due

to the fact that Latin American nations were hard to

characterize.

"The combination of class struggle and

32

Sheldon B. Liss, Marxist Thought in Latin
America (Berkeley: University of California Press,
Ronaldo Munck argues that "the sheer
1984), p. 18.
ignorance of Marx and Engels about Latin America
led them to support the ('progressive') invasion of
Mexico by the United States in 1847, and to launch an
unfounded diatribe against the leader of the South
American independence struggle, Simon Bolivar" (Ronaldo
Munck, Revolutionary Trends in Latin America [Montreal:
McGill University Centre for Developing Area Studies,
,

.

,

1984

]

,

33

p.

6

)

Liss, p. 25.

Regis Debray, A Critique of Arms
Penguin Books, 1977), p. 41.
34

38

,

(London:

.

.

national struggle in Latin America

grasped by the early Comintern." 35

McKenzie

,

.

.

.

was not clearly

According to Kermit

it was not until 1928 that the Comintern

revived Lenin's term "dependent country" (used in
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism

,

to

characterize Argentina) on the prompting of Ricardo
Parades of Ecuador, to cover those areas which had been

penetrated economically by imperialism but which still
retain a higher degree of political independence than

colonies and semi-colonies. 36

Perhaps most

importantly, however, the Russian leaders of the

Communist International exhibited little interest in
Latin America in the 1920s because Soviet foreign policy
was more concerned with the danger of "encirclement."

Soviet leaders saw the British and the French as the

major threat, and so concentrated their extra-European
activities in the Asiatic and African territories of
those Great Powers.

The United States was considered a

minor foe at the time and Latin America was considered
of small importance.

35

Munck, p.

37

8.

Kermit McKenzie, Comintern and World Revolution,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1974),
1928-1943
36

.

p.

81

Victor Alba, Historia Del Comunismo En America
Latina, (Mexico: Ediciones Occidentales 1954), pp. 137

,

15.
39

Members of the newly formed Latin American

Communist Parties took the initiative to establish links

with the Comintern at this time. 38

Two Argentine

observers attended the First Congress of the Comintern
and there were three Latin American delegates at the

Second Congress, which decided the policy of the
national and colonial questions.

In 1924 a Latin

American Secretariat was set up by the Comintern,
however, "it prompted accusations of Eurocentrism when

only one Latin American, Victorio Codovilla of

Argentina, was appointed to it." 39
The Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928

demonstrated a more sustained interest in Latin America.
It was attended by delegates from Argentina, Brazil,

Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico and Uruguay.

A

special Latin American Commission was established to

elaborate policy which, reflecting events in China,

emphasized the bourgeois-democratic nature of the coming
revolution.

Jules Humbert Droz, a Swiss communist made

Robert J. Alexander, in his influential Communism
in Latin America points out that it was to a very
considerable extent admiration of the Russian Revolution
which led to the founding of the Latin American
Communist parties. Robert J. Alexander, Communism in
Latin America (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1960), p. 15. Communist parties
developed in those countries with the most advanced
development of capitalist relations of production.
These included Argentina and Mexico (1919), Uruguay and
Chile (1921), and Brazil (1922).
38

,

39

Munck, p.

8.

40

the Latin Secretary of the Comintern, maintained that
the revolutionary movement in Latin America must be

assimilated to the type of bourgeoisdemocratic movement ... in semicolonial countries, where the agrarian
problem and the problem of anti-imperialism
form the central focus.
However, "the weakness and the non-revolutionary

character of the bourgeoisie" meant that the bourgeoisdemocratic revolution could only by completed "under the
leadership of the proletariat." 40

During this period.

Communist Party leaders "were searching for Latin

American Kuomintangs

,

"

such as the Peruvian Alianza

Popular Revolucionaria (APRA)

a nationalist formation

,

led by Haya de la Torre, in which the proletariat would

find its national bourgeois ally. 41

Moreover, at this

40

Quoted in Ibid. The apparent contradiction in
this line regarding the nature of the revolution can be
traced back to the Second Congress of the Comintern in
1920 which endorsed the positions of both Lenin and Roy.
See footnote number 15.
41

This tactic was opposed by a number of
independent Marxist thinkers in Latin America, including
Jose Carlos Mariategui of Peru, Julio Antonio Mella, a
leader of Cuba's Communist Party in its early years, and
Chile's Emilio Recabarren. All three opposed any
collaboration with bourgeois nationalists. According to
Mariategui, "the Latin American bourgeoisie ... is
totally unwilling to consider the idea that a second
the ruling
struggle for independence is necessary
national
degree
of
greater
for
a
yearning
class has no
Anti-Imperialist
"The
Mariategui,
autonomy" (Jose Carlos
Perspective," New Left Review 70, [November /December
See also Munck, pp. 9-15; Liss, pp. 751972], p. 67).
79, 129-138, 243-247; and Harry E. Vanden, "Mariategui:
Marxismo Comunismo, and Other Bibliographic Notes,"
Latin American Research Review 14 (Fall 1979): 61-86.
.

,

,

41

.
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time communist parties in the region increasingly came

under the control of Stalinist leaders whose main

characteristic was "their unswerving devotion to the
powerful Soviet bureaucracy, to which they were linked
by innumerable material and political ties." 42

During the years 1929-1935, as the Soviet Union was

making its first great efforts to industrialize and to
destroy the country's independent peasantry, the

Comintern embarked on a policy of building communist
parties free from bourgeois or social democratic
influence, positing that in all the Latin American

countries, "the petty bourgeoisie and the nascent

industrial bourgeoisie are directly linked to

imperialist interests," and based firmly in the "real

revolutionary classes"

— agricultural

workers,

impoverished peasants, and the expanding proletariat of

These early leaders of the communist movement were
soon replaced by a different breed of leader, ones more
willing to follow the Moscow line unconditionally.
Munck argues that Victorio Codovilla of Argentina who,
"in spite of his limited political abilities, controlled
the whole movement as head of the Latin American
Bureau;" Luis Carlos Prestes of Brazil, "who rose from a
leader of the Tenentes revolt in the 1920s to become
until 1980;" and
undisputed leader of the CP
Lombardo Toledano of Mexico, "for many years the CP
v
front man' in the Latin American Trade Union movement,
were essential elements in the Stalinization of the
Latin American communist movement." Munck, pp. 11-13.
See also Alexander, pp. 18-44.
.

42

Munck, p. 14.
42

.

.

large scale industries. 41

This policy was endorsed by

the Conference of Latin American Communist Parties,

meeting in Buenos Aires in June 1929, in

a

report by

Humbert Droz entitled "The Struggle Against Imperialism
and Problems of the Tactics of the Communist Parties of

Latin America."

Robert J. Alexander argues that this

era of extreme communist isolation from other left-wing

and working-class groups, was fully experienced by Latin

American Communism, and led communist parties to oppose
left-leaning nationalist governments, labeling them
fascist, quasi-fascist or instruments of Yankee

imperialism. 44
The extreme isolation of the 1929-1935 period was

followed by the almost equally extreme collaboration of
the Popular Front period (1935-1945), which was ushered

4

'The working class in Latin America at the time
was composed largely of independent artisans; small
workshops predominated over the few large factories.
Nevertheless, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico in particular
had developed a relatively solid trade union movement,
into which the Profintern (The Red International of
Labor Unions--RILU began to make inroads. Munck,
)

p.

14
44

Alexander argues that "this period was perhaps
more appealing than some others to the Latin American
temperament and state of political organization. The
Latin American tradition of violent revolution made the
extremism [of the period] more acceptable than it was in
countries with stable political systems such as the
United States and Great Britain" (Alexander, pp. 21-22).
See also Luis E. Aguilar, ed., Marxism in Latin America
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), pp. 20,

27.
43

in at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935.

It

was argued at the Seventh Congress that

many of our comrades in Latin America
have characterized nearly all the
bourgeois and petty bourgeois parties
as fascists, thus hindering the
establishment of an anti-Fascist
Popular Front. 45
During this period Latin American Communist sought

alliances with Socialist or left-wing nationalist

parties which represented the reformist, moderate left.
The Communist Party in Argentina held out its hand to
the previously "social fascist" Radicales

;

the

Brazilians offered the olive branch to dictator Getulio

Vargas in spite of the fact he was holding their most

prominent leaders in jail and had outlawed the party;
the Chileans allied themselves with the Socialists; the

Peruvians turned towards APRA; in Cuba the Autenticos

were hailed as allies of the proletariat, but when
rebuffed the Cuban Communists ultimately turned toward
Colonel Fulgencio Batista. 46
45

Quoted in Aguilar, p. 27. See also "The
Situation of the Latin American Communist Parties in the
Eve of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern," The
Communist International 12 (May 20, 1935). Reprinted in
Aguilar, pp. 152-157.
Batista was anxious at that moment to become
President through more or less honest elections, but he
lacked any wide basis of popular support. Hence he was
willing to make an alliance with the Communists, who he
thought might gain him such support. As a result the
Communist Party became legal, the Confederation of
Workers of Cuba was established, and the Communists were
put in control of it. This alliance long survived the
46

44

The Popular Front epoch marked the first period

during which the Communist parties of Latin America
really assumed political importance in the life of the
hemisphere.

It was during this period that non-

Communist politicians in a number of countries were

willing

,

for the first time, to enter into agreements

and alliances with Communists, and that they began to

acquire serious followings among the workers and

intellectuals in the region.

Alexander attributes the

Communists' success during this period to a number of
factors, including: the Communists' vociferous support
for the Allied cause during World War II; the widespread

admiration among the politically conscious Latin

Americans for the struggle which the Russians put up
against the Nazi invaders; and the Communists' leading
role in organizing committees for the support of the

allies

47
.

During this period, the Communists dispensed with

talk of revolution and dictatorship.

Similarly,

Communist "anti-imperialism" was forgotten during these
years

When Communists spoke of "imperialism"
it was only the Axis brand to which
they were referring. They attacked
those who still insisted on speaking

Popular Front period. Alexander, p. 22.
Aguilar, pp. 28-34 and Munck, pp. 18-21.
47

Alexander, p. 25.
45

See also

about British or American imperialism
as saboteurs of the war effort.
They
discouraged all strikes and other
activities against American and
British-owned firms. 48
As a result, the Communists were able to develop

friendly relations with a number of erstwhile enemies.

Latin American Communists began to work with antifascist Catholic groups, dictators like Batista in Cuba
and Trujillo in the Dominican Republic (although the

Communist-Tru jillo relationship was extremely shortlived)

,

managers of local American and British-owned

enterprises, and local allied diplomatic personnel.

These new relationships increased the importance of
Latin American Communists, so that by 1946 they were at
the zenith of their power and influence. 49

After World War II however, Latin American

Communists suffered severe defeats in virtually every

country in the hemisphere.

The reasons for these

setbacks are numerous and interrelated.

First, with the

end of World War II Latin American Communist parties

rejected the "Browder deviation," as the previous
48

Ibid.

,

p.

26

Their parties were legal or at least tolerated in
virtually every country in the hemisphere. They had
members of Congress in Cuba, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador,
Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and members
of lesser legislative bodies in several other countries.
In the latter months of 1941 they had their members in
the Chilean Cabinet, and seemed well on the way to
achieving the first Communist government of the
hemisphere in that country. Alexander, p. 27.
49

46

emphasis on conciliation with capitalism was called due
to its association with the United States Communist

leader Earl Browder, and instead marshaled their

propaganda against United States imperialism and in
favor of international peace and the neutralization of

Latin America.

According to Rodney Arismendi, one of

the most outstanding post-World War II theoreticians of

communism in Latin America:
In spite of the fact that
historicalcircumstances led the peoples of
Latin America, in their determination to save
themselves from Nazi aggression, to
collaborate closely with the Roosevelt
government
this particular instance does
not justify the generalconcept of PanAmericanism, based as it is on supposed
historical ties, as postulated by the obliging
lawyers of imperialism. There is a
fundamental incompatibility between American
monopolies and the basic tendencies of
national sovereignty and liberty of the Latin
American countries. These represent two
conflicting, in f actirreconcilably
antagonistic, trends in contemporary
historical development. 50
.

.

.

Robert J. Alexander points out that this shift in
the Communist line was not only an attack against the

United States, but also against every government in the
hemisphere which is friendly toward the United
States. 51

Moreover, the shift in the Communist line

helped sever Communist party relations with groups which

Rodney Arismendi "El Fin de la Guerra y el Nuevo
Imperialismo Norteamericano ," in Aguilar, pp. 182-185.
50

51

,

Alexander, p. 28.
47

had been more sympathetic with them when they were

fighting the Nazis.
Second, Stalin dissolved the Comintern in 1943 as a

"gesture of goodwill" toward the West and replaced it

with the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)
1947 this body,

.

In

"the highest organ of the international

communist movement," gave Soviet blessing to the

division of the world into "zones of influence." 52
Latin America was to be a "zone of influence" for the

United States and the Soviet Union, and by extension
Latin American Communist parties, were to take little
interest in the revolutionary struggles going on
there. 53

The Cominform line was that the Communist

parties must struggle to ensure stable and prolonged
peace and must "subordinate all their activities to this

paramount task of the day." 54

The Comintern always

maintained that the major task of the proletariat in the
oppressed countries was the national struggle against
imperialism, however.

52

Munck, p. 23.

See also Claudin, pp. 465-474.

Stalin's associate Molotov had the following to
say in reply to an accusation of Soviet expansion in
Eastern Europe: "It is known that the United States of
America is also pursuing a policy of strengthening its
relations with neighboring countries--f or instance
Canada, Mexico, and also other countries of America
which is fully understandable" (quoted in Claudin,
p. 472
53

)

54

Quoted in Claudin,

p.

580.
48

during the ambiguous pacifism of the 1950s,
the [Latin American Communist parties] were to
oppose discussion of the problem of national
independence in the peace movement. 55
Finally, as the Cold War developed, the United

States urged Latin American states to take measures to
control the expansion of communism.

Such suggestions

were taken to heart by various Latin American
governments.

After 1947, beginning with Brazil, Chile

and Colombia, a number of Latin American nations broke

diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

In 1947 the

Brazilian Communist party was outlawed and its elected
senators and deputies expelled from the Brazilian
Congress.

In 1948, the government of Chile declared the

Communist Party to be illegal.

In that same year,

military coups took place in Peru and Venezuela and were
followed by immediate anti-communist declarations.

In

Cuba, the democratic government of Grau San Martin began
a successful offensive against Communist control of the

CTC.

In Argentina, Peron forced the Party into

illegality, and in Colombia the conservative reaction

reduced the Party's possibilities of action to their
lowest point. 56

55

Munck, p. 23.

56

Aguilar, pp. 34-42.
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Khrushchev and Brezhnev; 1953-1982

When Stalin died in 1953

,

the USSR had few

diplomatic or economic relations with developing
countries.

By comparison, most of the developing

countries maintained strong political and economic ties

with the developed West.
Forebodingly for the Kremlin, the United
States had initiated preliminary contacts with
many of the countries to bring them into U.S.managed alliances directed against the Soviet
Union. Additionally, China already considered
itself a viable and credible alternative model
for developing-world revolutions.
Indeed, at
the 1955 Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned
States, China played a central and key role in
proposing and adopting the"Five Principles of
Coexistence." None of this redounded to Soviet
advantage 57

However Nikita Khrushchev was to have a profound effect
on Soviet foreign affairs and nowhere more than in

relations with the Third World.

Khrushchev argued that

the situation in the Third World was "ripe" for

socialism and that "progressive forces" capable of

weakening capitalism were emerging.

Khrushchev

persuaded the Party that this was the opportune time for
bold action and thus

enabled the new nations to adopt policies
whose effect was to alienate them from the
West, thus carrying forward Lenin's injunction
to attack the industrial heartland of
capitalism by undermining its relationship
58
with the non-western world.
5?

Papp, pp. 8-9.

58

Rubinstein, p. 22.
50

Soviet attitudes toward the developing world during
the late 1950s and early 1960s were optimistic.

Khrushchev believed that Nehru, for example, was "more
than just another bourgeois liberal politician

— he

was a

true people's democrat" even though he "wasn't a

communist." 59

Gamal Abdul Nasser and his government

"had the national interest of its people at heart and

therefore deserved our respect and support."

Khrushchev

found it "difficult to define the social-political
goals" of Nasser and recognized the danger that Nasser's

government could "be a bourgeois government" but the

potential benefits were worth the risk, Khrushchev
believed. 60

Developing country leaders like Kwame

Nkrumah of Ghana were "interesting, intelligent, and
highly educated," even though they did not have "a

significantly clear perspective on political and social
issues." 61

Leaders who regularly received Soviet

praise included Ben Bella of Algeria, Sukarno of
Indonesia, and Keita of Mali.
Indeed, some Soviet analysts considered conditions
in the developing world to be so favorable for

Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
Last Testament
59

,

1974), p.

306.

Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), p. 432.
60

,

“Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers
Testament, p. 335.
51

:

The Last

revolution and progressive change that national
bourgeois leaders and their national democratic states

might transcend their original class identities and move
toward socialism.

By December 1963, even Nikita

Khrushchev accepted the thesis that this new type of
developing-world leader, the revolutionary democrat,
could lead his state into socialist oriented paths of
development. 62

Fidel Castro's socialist revolution in

Cuba was one of the factors that influenced the more

optimistic Soviet observers to adopt this viewpoint, and
many clearly believed that revolutionary democratic
states were the wave of the future. 63

Cognizant of important changes in the international
system, and, according to Papp, less paranoid about the

developing world than was Stalin, Khrushchev forged a
foreign policy strategy inspired by Lenin's ideas.

He

modernized Leninist formulations on the colonial and
national questions and operationalized them, in the

process moving the Soviet Union into the mainstream of

Third World developments. 64

Khrushchev argued that

62

Uri Ra'anan, "Moscow and the 'Third World',"
Problems of Communism 14 January/February 1965): 22-31.
(

However, Ra'anan also points out that some
Soviet analysts and policymakers disagreed and argued
that only communists could lead the transition to
socialism.
63

Ibid.

See also Rubinstein, pp. 19-21.
For a more detailed discussion of Khrushchev's foreign
policy see Harry Hanak, "Foreign Policy," in Khrushchev
64

Papp, pp. 8-10.

52

the new period in world history which Lenin
predicted has arrived, and the peoples of the
East are playing an active part in deciding
the destinies of the whole world, [they] are
becoming a new mighty factor in international
relations 65

Khrushchev called on these new nations "to build up an
independent national economy and to raise the living
standards of their peoples," and proclaimed that "today
they need not go begging for up to date equipment to
their former oppressors.

They can get it in the

socialist countries without assuming any political or

military commitments." 66

Khrushchev proclaimed that a

"zone of peace" including socialist and non-socialist

states had arisen in Europe, Africa and Asia.

Moreover,

Khrushchev "reconstructed" the national bourgeoisie in
developing countries, arguing as had Lenin, that the
socialist camp and the national bourgeoisie were once
again allies. 67

Nonalignment was accorded new

respectability, and the newly independent states were

recognized as a powerful new force in the international
arena.

and Khrushchevism ed. Martin McCauley (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 180-194.
,

Nikita S. Khrushchev, Report of the Central
Committee of the CPSU to the Twentieth Party Congress,
(Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing
February 14, 1956
65

#

House,
66

67

1956), p. 26.
Ibid.

,
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Papp, p.

27

.
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These changes were added to when, in I960, the USSR

hosted the Meeting of World Communist and Workers'
Parties.

Eighty-one parties attended and considered a

variety of issues that confronted the international
Communist and Workers' movement.

The Soviets posited

that in developing countries "all patriotic forces,"

including that sector of the national bourgeoisie "not

connected with imperialist circles," should combine to
create a "united national democratic front" that would
be anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist.

Khrushchev

described these national liberation movements in
developing countries as second in historical importance
"only to the formation of the world socialist system." 68

68

See "Statement of the Meeting of the Communist
and Workers' Parties, November 1960," World Marxist
Review 3 (December 1960): 4-25; and Nikita Khrushchev,
"For New Victories of the World Communist Movement,"
World Marxist Review 4 (January 1961): 3-28.
Papp argues that the Soviet position on the
national bourgeoisie masked major disputes between China
and the Soviet Union over the ability of this group to
lead national democratic states toward socialism and
over the wisdom of fomenting communist revolutions in
the developing world. According to the Chinese, the
national bourgeoisie were not sufficiently revolutionary
and trustworthy, and therefore communist-led revolution
should be pursued throughout the developing world. To
Khrushchev and his supporters, however, the national
bourgeoisie did have sufficient revolutionary
credentials and could move toward socialism with Soviet
support
Papp posits that Khrushchev's position was not
universally accepted within the CPSU, and that a running
debate over who should lead revolution in the developing
world took place in two prominent Soviet journals Aziya
See Papp,
i Afrika Segodnya and Narodv Azii i Afriki
pp. 10-11.
(

)

54

.

From the mid-1950s on, as part of a new diplomatic
activism, Soviet officials began to establish a wide

variety of contacts with liberation groups operating
abroad.

The principal connections were made through

four networks: the United Nations and its many

committees dealing with colonial issues; Third World
intermediaries like Egypt's Nasser and Ghana's Nkrumah;

Western European Communist Parties, especially the
French and Italian which kept close ties to African
movements; and Soviet sponsored cultural and scientific
meetings, such as the Twenty-Fifth International

Congress of Orientalists, held in Moscow in August 1960,
the frequent gatherings of the Afro-Asian Solidarity

Committee and other Soviet Front Organizations, and the
Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, established in

Moscow in 1961. 69

However, Khrushchev moved

cautiously
He did not make the grand gesture that would
have brought the USSR instant acclaim in Third
World circles: he failed to make Moscow the
first power to grant diplomatic recognition to
ripening independence movements such as the
Algerian Front de LiberationNationale (FLN)
Nor was he freer with arms or funds in amounts
that would have had an impact. Like
Stalin, Khrushchev championed anti-colonialism
and inveighed against imperialism, but did
little.
In no instance was he important to
any liberation struggle. His bark lacked
bite. 70
69

Rubinstein, p. 86.

70

Ibid.
55

What Khrushchev did was pursue a highly visible

anti-colonialist campaign in the United Nations, one

which placed the Soviet Union in sharp contrast with the

Western powers and enhanced Moscow's prestige.

Yet

while supporting radical Afro-Asian resolutions calling
for an end to colonialism, the Soviet Union shied away

from demands for direct intervention by the United

Nations Security Council.
To understand why Khrushchev's "bark lacked bite"

when it came to Soviet support for national liberation
movements seeking independence, one must recognize that
according to Soviet sources, the world revolutionary
process consists of three distinct streams.

The most

important stream is the socialist commonwealth of
It is headed by the Soviet Union and includes

nations.

all countries of "developed socialism."

The second

stream is the international Communist and Workers'
movement, made up of all Marxist-Leninist parties as

well as non-Marxist parties sympathetic to the concepts
of scientific socialism; the CPSU heads the second

The third stream is the "national liberation

stream.

movement

" 71
.

One must also examine the various foreign policy

goals the USSR was pursuing at the time.

While aiding

socialist or anti-Western movements in the Third World
71

See Papp for a discussion of these issues.
56

was a valued goal of the Soviets under Khrushchev, it

was clearly subordinate to others.

First, Soviet

foreign policy under Khrushchev stressed improving

relations and "peaceful coexistence" with the West.

Rubinstein argues that Khrushchev moved cautiously in

Africa "for fear of angering France and compromising the
prospects of a Franco-Soviet rapprochement." 72
Similarly, Khrushchev's refusal to give Fidel Castro an

iron-clad guarantee to defend Cuba from the United
States suggests the greater importance given to U.S.Soviet relations. 73

Interestingly, in an attempt to

reconcile Soviet concern for peaceful coexistence with
Soviet assistance of national liberation movements,
Khrushchev, in a major speech on January

6,

1961 at a

meeting of Party Organizations of the Higher Party
School, The Academy of Social Sciences and the Institute
of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU's Central Committee,

identified four general categories of war: world wars,

which would be nuclear and involve the superpowers;
local wars, which are limited wars fought by an

imperialist power against a Third World country, or

between two capitalist countries; wars of national
liberation, which are struggles for independence from

72

Rubinstein, p. 86.

See Cole Blasier, The Giant's Rival
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).
73

57

,

(Pittsburgh:

foreign rule; and popular uprisings, which are internal

struggles pitting "progressive" groups against
"reactionary" groups tied to the imperialist camp. 74
It was argued that wars of national liberation, unlike

local wars, could not escalate to world war, thus

leaving the Soviet Union "free to help colonial peoples
fight against the yoke of imperialism [and] support

liberation movements and still contend they were

adhering to a policy of peaceful coexistence." 75
Similarly, the Soviet's concern with restoring some

unity in the communist world and reasserting Moscow's

leadership over the world communist movement, and thus

counter Mao's challenge to Moscow's authority, led the
Soviets to provide support to bourgeois-nationalist
leaders in the Third World.

As Khrushchev's quarrel

with Mao worsened, each side felt impelled to stake out
"correct" doctrinal positions on the Third World,
74

Stephen P. Gilbert argues that the difference
between a local war and a war of national liberation is
a political one.
"In short, recourse to war by Western
powers or their allies is condemned as local-limited
war; recourse to arms by the newly-independent or
'colonial' peoples, or by communist states or guerrilla
forces in opposition to Western or Western-oriented
regimes, ordinarily receives Soviet approval as a war of
liberation. The same war may be labeled a war of
liberation by the Soviets when referring to the
belligerent that the USSR supports, but may be
classified as a local-limited war when reference is made
to the Western-oriented combatant" (Stephen P. Gilbert,
"Wars of Liberation and Soviet Military Policy," Orbis
10

[Fall 1966]: 843).
75

Rubinstein, p. 89.
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including attitudes toward liberation struggles.

The

Soviet position was that the anti-imperialist

orientation of many new nations and liberation movements
was substantial and sufficient to bind them to the

socialist camp, and their opposition to colonialism and

imperialism justified Soviet assistance and friendship.
Moreover, it was argued that the Chinese had woefully

underestimated the importance of bourgeois-nationalist
movements and what they had already achieved politically
in breaking with imperialism by stressing their non-

socialist character.
All in all, Khrushchev's policy toward national

liberation movements was one of calculated caution, 76
and when Khrushchev was deposed in October 1964, the

Soviet Union was only on the periphery of national

liberation struggles, in marked contrast to its

expanding relationships with Third World governments.
"Courtship of anti-American regimes, not involvement in
the efforts of non-ruling revolutionary movements,

dominated Soviet policy in the Third World." 77
Rubinstein argues that 1953 was a key year for

Moscow in its relations with the Third World, as the

Rubinstein argues this needs to be emphasized
given the very different interpretation of Soviet
desires and actions held by the Kennedy administration
See Rubinstein, pp. 91-95.
at the time.
76

77

Ibid.

,

p.

95
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change in leadership brought with it a readiness to
explore new approaches to a changing Third World.
Washington, by contrast, the election of Dwight

In

D.

Eisenhower ushered in an administration determined to
globalize containment and foist it on countries who
neither felt threatened by Soviet attack nor saw
anything emanating from the Soviet Union that

necessitated alliance with the West.
The driving force behind this policy was
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who
sorely misread the mood in the new nations.
By uncritically extending to the Third World a
strategy designed for Europe and the Far East,
he was guilty, much like Stalin, of a rigid
and parochial application of a policy
perfectly good for one place to an environment
for which it was ill-suited.
His success in
creating military pacts in the Middle East and
South Asia provided a boon to Moscow.
Khrushchev could not have accomplished as much
so quickly in the mid-1950s without the
inadvertent assistance of Dulles. 78
.

.

.

Khrushchev's first priority was to improve diplomatic
relations with countries on the USSR's southern border:
Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan.

The USSR's foreign

economic assistance program made its debut in

Afghanistan when, on January 27, 1954, Kabul and Moscow
signed an agreement arranging for the construction of
two large grain elevators, a bread baking plant, and a
79
flour mill, and a Soviet credit of $3.5 million.

78

Ibid., pp. 40-41.

79

Ibid.

,

p.

42
60

Soon Moscow was looking beyond its southern tier

neighbors to other Third World countries, as was evident
from the reversal of its previous stand opposing all

United Nations programs for helping less-developed
countries on the grounds that they were dominated by

Western nations and designed to perpetuate Western
investments.

"Moscow hoped to publicize the benefits of

Soviet aid and convince the LDCs that Soviet aid would
not be used to subvert existing governments or promote

communist activities within the recipient countries ." 80
Khrushchev's second objective was the exploitation
of regional conflicts in the developing world.

The aim

was to gain tangible advantages in areas previously

outside of Moscow's purview.

In this quest for

increased influence
the USSR had the advantages of being a new
major power of the Third World scene. It came
with "clean hands," unburdened by a
colonialist past in the Arab world, Southern
Asia, Africa and Latin America; its
imperialist record toward Turkey, Iran,
Afghanistan was ignored or claimed irrelevant
[T]he Soviet Union arrived
by most LDCs.
Its offers of assistance
at the right moment.
enabled nationalist leaderships to explore
alternatives to reliance on the West; its
commitment to "socialism" accorded nicely with
the generally positive attitude toward
"socialism" held by most of the founding
fathers of the newly independent bourgeois nationalist regimes; and its immediate aims
.

80

.

.

Ibid.
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did not conflict with those of prospective
recipients of aid. 81
By the early 1960s the USSR had aid relationships

with twenty-five Third World countries.

More than $4

billion of the approximately $6 billion in credits was
allocated for economic assistance and the rest for

military purchases. 82

When Khrushchev was deposed in

October 1964 the Kremlin could look back on a decade of

accomplishment in the Third World: better relations than
ever before with important tier countries (Turkey, Iran,
and Afghanistan)

,

including their recognition that

economic assistance and political normalization depended
on prohibiting the emplacement of U.S. missiles on their

territory; diplomatic ties with all nonaligned

countries; insinuation of a presence in the regional

politics of key areas; expanded economic ties; high-

visibility development projects in countries such as
India, Egypt, and Afghanistan, which stimulated the

interest of other countries; deference of the LDCs to
Soviet policy positions on issues, such as disarmament,

European security, and Eastern Europe, that were not of
central concern to them; and a narrowing of U.S.
options.

81

82

Rubinstein sums this period up by calling its

Ibid.

,

p.

46

Ibid.
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accomplishments "an impressive list for so short a

period and so limited an involvement." 83
Liberation struggles came to the forefront of
international attention in the mid-1960s.

Within six

months after Khrushchev's deposal, the new Kremlin
leadership, headed by Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei
Kosygin, was drawn deeply into the liberation struggle
in Vietnam.

Pressed by considerations of intra-

communist world politics to expand their support when
the United States bombed North Vietnam and landed the

first major contingent of combat troops in South Vietnam
in March 1965, the Soviet Union promised to strengthen

the military capability of the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam and enable the Hanoi government to repel the
imperialists.

Similarly, they recognized the National

Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam as the sole

representative of the people of South Vietnam.
While the United States waged war against a
communist country, Brezhnev and Kosygin were
not willing to stand idly by and leave the
Chinese a clear field in which to challenge
Soviet leadership of the bloc and tarnish
Soviet prestige abroad. 84
While at the Twenty Third Congress of the CPSU,

Brezhnev declared that "there can be no peaceful
83

Ibid.

,

p.

47;

see also Hosmer and Wolfe.

Rubinstein, p. 96. The author argues further
that competition with China spurred the USSR's
assistance to liberation struggles in Arab East and
Southern Africa as well.
84

63

coexistence when it comes to the internal processes of
the national liberation struggle," behind the scenes

Soviet writers were once again faced with the task of

squaring theory with reality. 85

Khrushchev's shift of

Soviet policy away from orthodox Communists toward

bourgeois nationalists greatly improved Soviet influence
and prestige in the Third World; however, there were

critical weaknesses in the policy as well.

First, many

of Moscow's Khrushchev-era allies proved highly unstable

and vulnerable to sudden shifts in political fortunes.
As the rule of many Soviet allies tended to be highly

personalistic

,

the removal or defection of a single

leader undermined the entire Soviet position in the

nation concerned.

Pro-Soviet governments were

overthrown by military coups in Indonesia and Algeria
(1965), Ghana (1966), and Mali (1968).

Second, even

when Soviet friends stayed in power, they tended to be
highly unpredictable and often uncooperative with Soviet
aims despite large inflows of Soviet military

assistance. 86
85

As Francis Fukuyama says,

Quoted in Ibid., p. 97.

Rubinstein points out that since the mid-1960s
the USSR has shifted its commitments away from economic
assistance to military assistance. Rubinstein, pp. 54See also Melvin A. Goodman, "The Soviet Union and
57.
the Third World: The Military Dimension," in The Soviet
Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades eds.
Francis Fukuyama and Andrzej Korbonski (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1987), pp. 46-66, for a discussion of
the difficulties the Soviet Union has experienced in
86

,

64

it would be impossible to establish all the
instances of a Soviet client acting contrary
to Moscow's wishes; every study of Soviet
dealings with particular countries or regimes
lists several.
With the sole exception
of Cuba, not a single bourgeois nationalist
ally of the Khrushchev era adopted orthodox
Marxism-Leninism as its governing ideology.
The worse case, from the Soviet standpoint,
was Egypt, the centerpiece of Soviet Third
World policy in the fifties and sixties and
the recipient of a total of over $4 billion in
aid, which between 1972 and 1976 defected
altogether to the Western camp. 87

...

Third, arms transfer and economic aid proved to be an

extremely poor source of leverage over intractable
clients

88

As the 1960s progressed, Khrushchev-era optimism

about the likelihood of quick transition to socialism

along the non-capitalist path of development gave way to

increasing skepticism about the reliability of non-

communist Third World states.

The problem, according to

Soviet theorist Rostislav U1 'yanovskiy

,

was that in too

many Third World nations progressive forces
failed to create a revolutionary-democratic
organization which would ensure the
reliability of truly revolutionary-democratic
[relying instead] on a
accomplishments
.

.

.

transforming military aid into political and diplomatic
influence with its allies in the Third World.
Francis Fukuyama, "Soviet Strategy in the Third
World," in Fukuyama and Korbonski, p. 27.
87

Interestingly these points are made by two
authors of starkly different political and ideological
persuasion. See Fukuyama, pp. 28-29, and Fred Halliday,
From Kabul to Managua: Soviet-American Relations in the
(New York: Pantheon, 1989), pp. 97-111.
1980s
88

,

,
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national leader who, in turn, relied on the
army, the security organ, his clan or his
tribe 89

These changed perceptions were accompanied by a

reassessment of Soviet economic involvement in the Third

World and a new policy which promoted parties or
national liberation movements that explicitly based

themselves on Marxist-Leninist ideology. 90

While not

abandoning non-Marxist, bourgeois-nationalists, in
nations where no obvious Marxist-Leninist alternative

existed (Syria, India, Iraq, and Libya in the 1970s),
Soviet theoreticians recognized that, all things being
equal, a self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist state would be

most likely to cooperate reliably with the Soviet bloc.
In the 1970s there was a great upsurge in Soviet

writings on vanguard parties and their importance to the

revolutionary development of Third World states. 91
89

Quoted in Fukuyama, p. 30.

90

Ibid.

,

pp.

30-31.

91

These writings made it clear that the Soviets had
expanded the definition of a vanguard party. Prior to
the late 1970s, the Soviet notion of a vanguard party
followed conventional Leninist lines such a party had
to be an organization of tested cadres with its lower
levels closely subordinated to its upper ones, it also
had to have deep roots in the masses. With the growing
fragmentation of the communist movement, Moscow posited
that a true vanguard party must also accept the Soviet
version of scientific-socialism. Thus selfclassification as a Marxist-Leninist entity would not
qualify a body as a vanguard party unless it met Soviet
standards as well. See David E. Albright, "Vanguard
Parties in the Third World," in The Pattern of Soviet
Conduct in the Third World, ed. Walter Laqueur (New

—

66

Vanguard parties were seen as a means of stabilizing
revolutionary power and institutionalizing the socialist
orientation of a government, permitting it to survive
the whims or the passing of individual Third World
leaders.

Vanguard parties were seen as one way of

making local revolutions in some sense irreversible. 92
Centralization of power in the hands of a reliable
political organization was particularly important given

Moscow's declining ability to assist and control the
economic development of its client states.

As Elizabeth

Valkenier points out Soviet development economists in
the 1970s increasingly concluded that the traditional

socialist formula for economic development, calling for
rapid nationalization of foreign and private property
and isolation of the economic system from the world

capitalist economy, was inadequate.

Developing

countries would actually benefit from a more gradual

transition to socialism similar to that followed during
the period of the New Economic Policy in the USSR during
the 1920s. 93

Francis Fukuyama posits that

whatever the Soviet leadership thought of this
argument on its merits, the notion provided a
convenient justification for the Kremlin's
York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 208-225.
92

Ibid, and Fukuyama, p. 32.

Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, The Soviet Union and
World: An Economic Bind (New York: Praeger,
Third
the
93

,

1983)

.
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increasing reluctance to foot the bill for
large-scale economic development.
[Moreover the] existence of a strong vanguard
party potentially allows Moscow to have its
cake and eat it too, with the West assisting
the economic development of Marxist-Leninist
states that remain in political terms closely
aligned with the USSR. 94
.

.

.

Beginning in the early 1970s Soviet theory and

practice converged, as the USSR undertook the promotion
of Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Parties during the intense

period of Third World activism.

Soviet writers were

quite explicit about their growing list of allies in the

Third World and spoke of a second generation of states
very different from those of the Khrushchev era.
1984 edition of the World Communist Movement

,

The

a handbook

of official Soviet positions concerning the worldwide

revolutionary process, states:
It is impossible to speak of two groups of
countries of a socialist orientation and of a
second generation of revolutionary democrats,
who are closer to scientific socialism. The
distinctiveness of the new groups of countries
of a socialist orientation (Algeria, Ethiopia,
Afghanistan, Kampuchea, the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen, and others) is
that they have to build the economy virtually
from scratch, and that a working class is
springing up in them together with industry.
The political regimes of this group of
countries are distinguished by great clarity
A process in which new
of class positions.
revolutionary parties are coming into being,
parties which at their congresses have
declared their adoption of Marxist-Leninist
It is these
ideology, is under way there.

94

Fukuyama, p. 33.
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P ar ties which are heading the revolutionary
95

development

The Soviets and their allies did not, of course,

abandon their ties with the earlier generation of nonMarxist clients such as Syria, Libya or India.

The

Soviets had invested considerable prestige in these
countries, which were in any case highly important to

Moscow by virtue of their size, wealth or geostrategic
position.

Being relatively stable states, they did not

give the Soviets the option of encouraging alternative,

Marxist-Leninist leaderships.

Nevertheless, where the

Soviets had a choice, their behavior clearly indicated a

preference for national liberation organizations or
parties proclaiming adherence to orthodox scientific
socialism. 96

95

Quoted in Ibid. Fukuyama argues that the list of
second generation Marxist-Leninist clients is actually
longer than the one give here.
"Between 1954 and 1984
the number of regimes proclaiming scientific socialism
as their guiding ideology climbed from three (North
Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba) to sixteen (those three
plus Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, the PDRY,
Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Laos, Kampuchea, Madagascar,
Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Benin, and the People's
Republic of Congo)
In addition, Marxist-Leninists were
in power in Grenada until the American invasion in
October 1983, and there were reports of a Communist coup
attempt in Iraq in 1977" (Fukuyama, p. 33). He explains
this proliferation of Soviet allies in terms of an
expansionistic Soviet foreign policy, aided by its
socialist allies particularly Cuba and East Germany.
Others, including Halliday, explained these developments
in terms of autonomous sociopolitical phenomena.
.

—
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Fukuyama, pp. 34-35; Albright, pp. 213-225.
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With the exception of the People's Democratic Party
of Afghanistan, none of the second-generation clients

began their existence as orthodox communist parties but

evolved out of a variety of national liberation fronts
or military juntas that only later proclaimed their

adherence to Marxism-Leninism.

In these cases, the

Soviets then encouraged these groups, once in power, to

reorganize themselves as formal Leninist vanguard
parties.

This occurred in Mozambique (February 1977),

Angola (December 1977), the PDRY (October 1978), and
Ethiopia (September 1984).

Latin American Communism 1953-1985
From Castro to the Sandinistas

After Stalin's death in March 1953, and with the

enunciation of Khrushchev's new doctrine of "peaceful
coexistence," there emerged a new period of search for

alliances by the Latin American Communist parties.

They

offered their support to the democratic governments that
succeeded some of the fallen dictatorships, as in

Argentina with Arturo Frondizi and in Brazil with
These moves coincided with Khrushchev's

Kubitshek. 97

attempt to establish friendly relations with progressive
See Edme Dominguez, "The Latin American Communist
Movement: Realities and Relations with the Soviet
Union," in The USSR and Latin America: A Developing
Relationship ed. Eusebio Mujal-Leon (Boston: Unwin
See also Munck, pp. 25-29 for a
Hymer, 1989), p. 126.
discussion of the Brazilian Communist Party.
97

,
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regimes in Third World countries."

They also

coincided with a general pessimism, or "geographic
fatalism,

"

about the prospects for Communist revolution

in Latin America.

Khrushchev's notion of a "zone of

peace" in the Third World

— comprised

on newly

independent nations seeking to break from the

imperialism camp

— did

not include Latin America, in part

because most Latin American nations had been independent
since the nineteenth century and in part because of the

area's higher level of economic development than that of

Africa and Asia.

Moreover, Moscow's primary front

— the Afro-Asian
Organization — by definition did

organization for the Third World
People's Solidarity

include the region."

not

The overthrow of the Arbenz

government in Guatemala in 1954 served to confirm the

"At the Twenty-First Party Congress, Khrushchev
declared that "those countries that have gained their
national independence need and will continue to need
support from the socialist countries and from all the
progressive forces. The Soviet Union [is] giving and
will go on giving them aid" (quoted in Alberto Daniel
Faleroni "Soviet Strategy in Latin America," in The
Soviet Union and Latin America eds. J. Gregory Oswald
and Anthony J. Strover [New York: Praeger, 1970],
,

,

p.

41)

.

"Leon Goure and Morris Rothenberg, Soviet
Penetration of Latin America (Miami: University of
Miami Center for Advanced International Studies, 1975),
,

p.

1.

See also Hough, pp. 169-177.
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Soviet view of Latin America as an area where American

power severely limited communist opportunities. 100
Prior to the Cuban Revolution of January 1959,

Nikita

S.

Khrushchev had focused his attention on the

newly independent, ex-colonial countries of Asia and
Africa.

In fact Castro's 26 of July Movement, defeated

in its initial assault on the Moncada Army barracks in

July 1953 and returned to Cuba as a guerrilla movement
in December 1956, received no active Soviet backing.

Nor did it receive support from the Cuban Communists

through the Popular Socialist Party.

Initially the

Soviets saw Castro as unlikely to succeed, since they

believed that sooner or later he would either be

decimated by the United States or else accommodate to
the imperialists.

As late as November 1958 Khrushchev

observed in an interview that everyone remembered the
fate of Guatemala and, even though the Cubans were

heroic in their struggle, they were doomed to fail. 101
Moreover, Castro's guerrilla struggle against

Batista violated what the post-Stalin Soviet leadership

believed was the proper way to achieve socialist
The debate over the efficacy of armed

revolution.

See Herbert S. Dinerstein, "Soviet Policy in
Latin America," American Political Science Review 61
80
(March 1967
100

)

:

Herbert S. Dinerstein, The Making of a Missile
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Crisis: October 1962
University Press, 1976), p. 35.
101

,

72

struggle or political participation in achieving

socialism goes back to the Twentieth Party Congress in
1956, at which Khrushchev argued
In present-day conditions the working class in many
capitalist countries
united around itself the
working peasantry, the intellectuals and all the
patriotic forces
has an opportunity to defeat
the reactionary anti-popular forces, to win a firm
majority in parliament and to turn the parliament
from an agency of bourgeois democracy into an
instrument of the genuinely popular will.
[This]
would create conditions for the working class of
many capitalist and formerly colonial countries to
make fundamental social changes. Of course, in
those countries where capitalism is still strong,
where it possesses a tremendous military and police
machine, a serious resistance by reactionary forces
is inevitable.
The transition to socialism in
these countries will take place amid sharp
revolutionary class struggle. 102
.

.

.

.

.

.

Cole Blasier argues that since 1956 the Soviet line
has been clear,

and tone."

"what changes over the years is emphasis

The Soviet position is that

1) The local Communist parties may take either the
armed or non-armed road, or some combination
thereof. Local conditions determine which road is
followed
2) Communists should take the non-armed road if
If armed opposition appears, the
feasible.
Communists will probably have to resort to arms to
defend the Revolution. 103

Castro's victory, his unexpected shift to MarxismLeninism, and his ability to defy the United States and
to incorporate Cuba into full membership in the Sovietled "community of socialist states," constituted in

Current Digest of the Soviet Press
12
(March 1951
102

)

103

:

.

Blasier, p. 76.
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3

Moscow's view a momentous break in U.S. dominance of
Latin America and appeared to open the way for an

upsurge of pressures for political, social and economic
change on the continent.

Khrushchev, speaking in the

wake of Castro's success in repelling the Bay of Pigs
invasion, went so far as to declare the Monroe Doctrine
dead.

"The only thing left to do with the Monroe

Doctrine is to bury it just as you would bury anything
dead so it will not poison the air." 104

Similarly the

tone of major programmatic speeches and documents

emanating from Moscow from 1960 onwards reflected a
steady increase in Soviet confidence.
The 1960 Declaration of 81 Communist Parties
asserted that "the victory of the Cuban
Revolution has powerfully stimulated the
struggle of the Latin American peoples for
complete national independence" and opened up
"a front of active struggle against
imperialism" in that region. At the 23rd
Congress of the Communist Part of the Soviet
Union in March 1966, Brezhnev made "special
mention" of the "courageous liberation
struggle" in Latin America and declared that
"today in every country in that continent, the
people are waging a struggle against U.S.
[Similarly]
imperialism and its accomplices."
the main document adopted by the International
Communist Conference on June 17, 1969 declared
that not only had Cuba established the first
socialist state on the American continent but
that "in this part of the world, militant,
democratic, anti-imperialist movements and

Quoted in T. S. Cheston and B. Loeffke, Aspects
(New York: MSS
of Soviet Policy Toward Latin America
63.
p.
Corporation,
1974),
Information
104

.
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revolutionary processes are developing which
pave the way to socialism." 105
This hopeful rhetoric notwithstanding, the early
and mid-1960s were years of disagreement between the

Cuban leadership

— Castro

and Ernesto "Che" Guevara

— and

Moscow over the question of how best to bring revolution
to Latin America. 106

Castro and Guevara advocated the

export of guerrilla-style revolution while the Soviets

urged restraint.

For Moscow, Castro's eagerness to

export revolution and the presence of revolution-prone
leftists in Latin America represented a real dilemma.
On the one hand, Moscow believed that the
Cuban experience was sui generis, and that
less militant tactics were apt to prove more
useful elsewhere on the continent. On the
other hand, Moscow was interested in
maintaining influence over these sundry groups
[and making certain Castro would not edge]
taking with him the
closer to Maoism
entire gallimaufry of Castroist parties in
Latin America. 107
.

.

.

Hence, in late 1964, in what has come to be called the

"Havana Compromise," Moscow gave its endorsement to the

strategy of armed struggle, albeit in only five Latin

Goure and Rothenberg, p. 2. For similar
statements see Faleroni, pp. 40-58.
105

See Pedro Ramet and Fernando Lopez-Alvez, "Moscow
and the Revolutionary Left in Latin America," Or bis 28
(Summer 1984): 344-346.
106

107

Ibid. pp. 344-345.
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American countries

Venezuela, Colombia, Honduras,

Paraguay and Haiti. 108
There is, however, little evidence of direct Soviet
aid to advocates of armed struggle in this period, and

despite Cuba's support for guerrillas in Colombia,
Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru and Nicaragua, Moscow

preferred to pursue the normalization of diplomatic
relations and trade

— even

with the anti-Castro

governments of Brazil, Chile, Colombia and
Venezuela. 109

Moscow, in effect, denied that Latin

America was ripe for revolution and, together with its
loyal communist parties, insisted on the possibility of
a peaceful path to power.

Pravda criticized Castro

repeatedly for "petit bourgeois revolutionism" and

Castro replied in kind, assailing Moscow, in a 1967
speech, for its policy of Detente and lashing out at the

Latin American Communist Parties loyal to Moscow. 110
By the late 1960s the armed struggle in Venezuela

had evaporated, the Peruvian guerrillas had been

108

See Blasier, pp. 87-92.

Ramet and Lopez-Alvez, p. 345. See also
Dinerstein, "Soviet Policy in Latin America," p. 80; W.
Raymond Duncan, "Soviet Interests in Latin America: New
Opportunities and Old Constraints," Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 2 6 May 1984)
165-168; and, Edward Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro: The
Limits of Charisma (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974),
109

(
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137.
110

Ramet and Lopez-Alvez, p. 346.
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destroyed, the Colombian guerrilla movement had withered

away

,

and the Brazilian leftist urban insurgency had

collapsed. 111

These developments had little impact on

Moscow as it had refused to help these insurgents.
Indeed, at the CPSU's Twenty-Third Congress in 1966, the

policy of incorporating Latin American Communist parties
into wide political fronts was reasserted.

This policy

of fronts was, in turn, approved by the last Conference
of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969.

112

Moscow

blamed setbacks in several countries on "ultraleftists"
who, according to Pravda,

have completely discarded the Marxist-Leninist
theory of the socialist revolution
[since] ... in their opinion, armed struggle
can be called into being artificially at any
time in any country, regardless of conditions.
[T]hese leftist schismatic groups
[have]
nothing in common with communism and
[coincide] completely with the platform of the
Trotskyite groups. 113
.

.

.

Soviet optimism was stimulated in the late 1960s
and early 1970s by the rise of regimes in Peru, Panama,

Ecuador and Honduras which were favorably inclined

in See

Benedict Cross, "Marxism in Venezuela,"
Problems of Communism 22 (November /December 1973): 5171; and Riordan Roett, "Brazilian Communism: A History
January/February
of Failure," Problems of Communism 25
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1976): 77-81.

See Augusto Varas, "Ideology and Politics in
Latin American-USSR Relations," Problems of Communism 33
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Pravda, November 20, 1968.
Lopez-Alvez, p. 346.
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Quoted in Ramet and

toward cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Moreover, the

election of Salvador Allende as president of Chile in
autumn 1970 seemed to vindicate Brezhnev's gradualist

policy in Latin America.

Augusto Varas argues that

despite the sparse economic support it provided to
Allende, the USSR saw in Chile's experience a model that
the Third World could follow without risking a military

confrontation with the United States.
The Chilean case seemed to show that, even in
an area so sensitive for U.S. interests, the
USSR could gain regional positions befitting
both its revolutionary expectations and its
limited capacity for providing financial or
other economic assistance and all without
adverse effects on Moscow's relations with
Washington 114

—

In an article for the CPSU organ Kommunist, Boris

Ponomarev, head of the International Department of the

Central Committee Secretariat, argued that
the victory of the National Unity Bloc in
Chile, the progressive changes in Peru and the
serious successes achieved by the
revolutionary struggle in Uruguay and several
other countries lead us to believe that the
revolutionary process here is continuing to
develop at a pace faster than in other parts
This is truly a
of the non-socialist world.
115
continent in upheaval.

Ponomarev drew several conclusions from Allende 's
accession, among them that communist collaboration with

socialists in electoral coalitions can produce electoral
114

Varas, p. 42.

"Characteristics of the Revolutionary Process in
Latin America," in Cheston and Loeffke, p. 31.
115
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victory and that socialist-communist governments can
take power by peaceful means. 116

After the military coup that removed Allende from
power

,

Moscow reasserted its position on gradualism and

armed struggle.

Its conclusions were stated by

Ponomarev in mid-1974.

According to Ponomarev, the

Chilean reversal was attributable in part to the Popular
Unity government's inability to "promptly change forms
of struggle" in order to "repel the counter-

revolutionary violence of the bourgeoisie."

"The events

in Chile," Ponomarev argued,

are a reminder of the need to approach the
issue of the peaceful, non-armed road to a
victorious revolution from a correct Leninist
position. The peaceful development of the
revolution is guaranteed not only by an
alignment of social forces under which the
bourgeoisie would not venture to start a civil
war, but by the constant preparedness of the
revolutionary vanguard and the masses in deed
and not in words to use the boldest means of
struggle should the situation require it. 117

—

—

116

Cheston and Loeffke point out
Ibid., pp. 33-34.
in Moscow's Latin
some
Soviet
experts
that while
optimistic
about the prospects
American Institute were
for Allende 's program, others especially those in the
Institute of World Economic and International Relations-predicted it would be overthrown by a military coup.
Cheston and Loeffke, p. 80.

—

Boris Ponomarev, "The World Situation and the
Revolutionary Process," World Marxist Review 17
Similarly, Jerry Hough argues that
(June 1974): 10-11.
the general consensus among Soviet observers of Latin
America, in the wake of Allende 's overthrow, was that
the recourse to extra-legal means should not have been
See Jerry Hough, "The Evolving Soviet Debate
eschewed.
on Latin America," Latin American Research Review 16
117

(Spring,

1981):

131-132.
79

Moreover, as Jerry Hough points out, some within the

Soviet Union attributed Allende's fall to the Popular
Unity government's inability to engage in greater

political compromise, collaboration and alliances with
parties representing the peasants and the middle strata,

especially the Christian Democrats.

According to Irina

Zorina, a specialist on Chile, Allende's regime was

excessively radical and thus was unable to create a
democratic transformation whose substance and
gradualness would have made it acceptable to the

political center as well as the radicals.
The participation of the Christian Democrats
would not have hindered the enactment of the
planned program of democratic transformation
but could have achieved its full realization
and made it really irreversible. 118
In assessments of the lessons of Allende's Chile

published in World Marxist Review

,

leading Chilean

communists did not repudiate the validity of that road
in the Chilean case by pointing out that Allende was

elected to the Presidency and important strides forward

were made during his tenure. 119
118

They also reaffirmed

Hough, The Struggle for the Third World

,

pp.

136-

137.

See V. Teitelboum, "Reflections on the 1,000 Days
of Popular Unity Rule," World Marxist Review 20 (January
1977): 50-62; O. Milas, "Stages of the Struggle," World
Marxist Review 20 (February 1977): 50-62; Hugo Fazio,
"New Front of the Struggle Against Imperialism, " World
Marxist Review 20 (June 1977): 84-93; Gladys Marin,
"Lessons of Chile: The Working Class and its Policy of
Alliance," World Marxist Review 20 (July 1977): 63-75.
119

80

their policy of moderation and support for Allende
against the ultra-leftist MIR party.

The Chilean

communists were equally emphatic that the Chilean

experience does not and should not indicate that the
peaceful and violent roads to revolution are mutually
exclusive.

Instead they emphasize that the Chilean

experience shows the need at times to combine methods
and be prepared to switch flexibly from one to another
as circumstances dictate. 120

By the mid-1970s (before 1979) Soviet leaders

concerned with Latin America surveyed the continent and
found no attractive opportunities to come to power

either peacefully or by force, and Latin American

Communist parties were counseled to orient themselves
against U.S. imperialism in order to carry out
"democratic" revolution

— that

is,

the achievement of

broad economic and political rights for the masses.
Such a revolution, it was thought, would provide the

Communist parties with the best opportunity of expanding
their political influence while protecting them from the
Right.

"Democratic" revolution was perceived as a stage

which would precede the socialist revolution. 121

This

was to be achieved through the creation of "wide antiLuis Corvalan, "The Lessons of Chile," World
Marxist Review 21 (January 1978): 34-48.
120

See also Hough, The Struggle
See Blasier p. 94.
136-140.
for the Third World pp.
121

,

,
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imperialist and democratic coalitions, popular
" 122

fronts

.

In describing the strategies of the various Latin

American Communist parties, the Soviet specialists
divided the countries as of 1978 into three categories:
1)

where patriotic circles of the armed forces are in

power and are carrying out an anti-imperialist and

democratic transformation (e.g. Peru, Panama);

2)

where

liberal reformist bourgeois circles are in power (e.g.

Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Argentina);
and

military dictatorships (e.g. Chile, Brazil,

3)

Bolivia, Paraguay, Guatemala, Uruguay, Nicaragua, and
Haiti)

123
.

In the first instance the Communist parties

sought the widest possible alliance of "progressive"

military, worker, and peasant forces and supported the
"progressive" measures of the government, thereby

seeking to promote the further transformation of
society.

In the countries with liberal reformist

governments, communist strategy was
to unite the democratic and patriotic forces,
isolate the right and liquidate the threat of
coups d'etat, [and] preserve and expand

Kudachkin, The Great October Revolution]
and the Communist Parties of Latin America p. 80,
quoted in Blasier, p. 94. Blasier argues that
Kudachkin' s work is the most authoritative treatment of
the strategies of Latin American Communist parties in
the late 1970s.
122

M.

F.

T

,

123

Blasier, pp. 94-95.
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democratic freedoms and the social
achievements of the people. 124
In countries governed by military dictatorships the main

task of communists is "to promote the formation of wide

anti-dictatorial and anti-fascist fronts designed to

overthrow reactionary regimes, establish citizens'
rights, and achieve a matured socio-economic

transformation" while also supporting revolutionary

guerrilla movements wherever possible. 125
With the victory of the Frente Sandinista in

Nicaragua in July 1979, the policy of broad fronts and
the peaceful road to socialism had to be rethought.

The

overthrow of Somoza and the seizure of power by the

Nicaraguan guerrillas was a pleasant surprise for the
Soviet Union in that the Sandinistas came to power

without any direct support from the Soviets or the

124

Kudachkin, quoted in Ibid., p. 95.

125

Ibid., p. 96 and Jiri Valenta and Virginia
Valenta, "Soviet Strategy and Policies in the Caribbean
Basin," in Rift and Revolution: The Central American
Imbroglio ed. Howard J. Wiarda (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1984), pp. 197-252.
Blasier posits that the list of military
dictatorships falls into two categories: those with
which the USSR has diplomatic relations and those with
which it does not. Focusing on Brazil, in the former
category, and Guatemala, in the latter, Blasier
intimates that Communist parties in nations that have
diplomatic relations with Moscow are more reformist
that is, they seek a freer political climate in which
they can reorganize and broaden their political
following while parties in the latter group are more
revolutionary. See Blasier, pp. 96-102.
,

—
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Socialist Party of Nicaragua (PSN)

,

thus showing how

wrong the Moscow-sponsored strategy of the peaceful road
had been.

The PSN followed the prevailing conciliatory

line that characterized pro-Soviet Latin American

Communist parties at the time, repudiating armed
struggle as "ultra-leftist" and "Castroite" extremism.
Its policy toward the Frente Sandinista was one of self-

restraint and caution. 126
The Soviets were quick to draw conclusions from the

Sandinista victory, and in 1980 the pages of America
Latina "brightened noticeably as an aroused bureaucracy
once again could see opportunities in the Americas." 127

Sergo Mikoyan, editor of America Latina

,

writing in the

wake of "the gratifying surprise of Nicaragua
impossible to predict a year previously," argued that
armed struggle has become the path of success in Central
America. 128

Similarly, Boris Koval, in the March 1980

issue of America Latina

,

wrote

the Nicaraguan experience has demolished the
previous simplistic interpretation of
guerrilla actions, confirmed the justice of
many of Che Guevara's strategic principles,

See Ramet and Lopez-Alvez, p. 351; Edme
Dominguez, pp. 134-136.
126

127

Blasier, p. 100.

Sergio Mikoyan, "Las Particularidades de la
Revolucion en Nicaragua y sus Tareas desde el punto de
Vista de la Teoria y la Practica del Movimiento
Librador," America Latina no. 3 (1980): 103.
128

,
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and crystallized his idea of creating a
powerful popular guerrilla movement. 129
In the same issue, N. Leonov underlined the conclusion

that "the armed road

...

is the most promising in the

specific conditions of most of the Latin American

countries

” 130
.

In general, the lesson of the FSLN victory in

Nicaragua for many communists, was that the communists
should subordinate themselves to their one-time rivals,
the radical nationalists, in order to create

revolutionary coalitions capable of achieving guerrilla
victory.

As Blasier posits, the communists have learned

that "if [they] can't beat these radical nationalists,
it is better to join them." 131

Accordingly, the

Communist Party of El Salvador, led by Shafik Jorge
Handal, opted for armed struggle and swung into line

behind the Popular Forces of Liberation Farabundo Marti
(FMLN)

in late 197 9.

132

General Secretary Handal, not

wanting to be outmaneuvered as was the PSN, said "Our
decision is a bit late, but we're in time."

The timing

Quoted in Robert S. Leiken, Soviet Strategy in
Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 34.
129

.

130

Ibid.

131

Blasier, p. 99.

132

See Edme Dominguez, p. 136-138.
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of the Party's action assured Handal a place on the

coordinating committee leading the revolt. 133
The degree to which the policy of Latin American

Communists joining radical revolutionary fronts is
applicable or desirable outside of Central America is
contentious.

A series of articles in World Marxist

Review in 1982 intimate that Moscow viewed Chile,
Uruguay, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Paraguay as

ripe for revolution. 134

However Blasier argues that

Soviet policy had by no means given up the peaceful
road.

On the contrary, it remained the preferred

strategy, however strategies were to be determined by

"objective conditions" in the country concerned.

As

Blasier says,
it is now possible to envisage at least three
models of Communist strategy in Latin America,
vis-a-vis old regimes: 1) Military
dictatorships, type 1. There will be explicit
or tacit collaboration with military
dictatorships having important economic ties
to the USSR and support for a civil-military
solution. The Communist party will have
limited opportunities to recruit, circulate
publications, and compete in certain

See "Armed Struggle is the Only Road Left,"
Information Bulletin of the World Marxist Review no.
133

,

14

(1980): 43-46.

See Eduardo Viera, "The Political Climate is
Changing," World Marxist Review 25 (January 1982): 6467; Raul Vidal, "For the Chilean People's Freedom and
Happiness," World Marxist Review 25 (February 1982): 3940; "Latin America: Decade with a Hard Beginning," World
Marxist Review 25 (March 1982): 19-25; and "Dramatic
Stage in the History of a Continent," World Marxist
Review 25 (May 1982): 15-23.
134
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elections.
Example: Argentina before 1983.
2) Democratic reformist regimes.
Communists
will follow the peaceful road. They will
accept the constitutional order, compete for
votes and popular support, and collaborate
closely with other legal leftist parties.
Example: Venezuela.
3) Military
dictatorships, type 2. There will be armed
revolutionary opposition. Communists will
collaborate with, and where possible
participate in revolutionary leadership.
Example: El Salvador before 1982. 135
.

.

.

Similar conclusions are reached by Rodney Arismendi,
long-time leader of Uruguay's Communist party.

He

argues that the FSLN victory in Nicaragua does not

invalidate the Chilean experience.

On the contrary, the

real possibilities of the peaceful road to socialism

have increased despite the insurrectional triumph in

Nicaragua

135

136

Blasier, p. 101.

Rodney Arismendi, "La Primavera Popular en
Nicaragua ," Revista Internacional August 1980: 30.
Quoted in Munck, p. 130.
136

,
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CHAPTER

3

GORBACHEV: PERESTROIKA AND
FOREIGN POLICY NEW THINKING
In practice, Brezhnev's promotion of Marxist-

Leninist Vanguard Parties had been a mixed blessing for
the Soviet Union.
On the one hand, such parties indeed
cooperated closely with the Soviet bloc,
signing friendship and cooperation treaties
with Moscow, permitting relatively free air
and naval access to the Soviet military,
supporting sympathetic national liberation
movements and participating in the socialist
"collective security system," voting with the
USSR in the United Nations, and so forth. On
the other hand, these regimes have tended to
be weak and narrowly based, lacking the broad
nationalist legitimacy of the first generation
of clients and heavily dependent on Soviet
bloc support for their initial rise to power
or their ability to remain in place, or
both.
1

A growing awareness of the problematic character of

their recent Third World achievements, coupled with the

increased tension and higher risk in the post-detente,
Reagan administration era, the tenacity and costs of the

Afghan problem, and serious domestic economic
difficulties led the post-Brezhnev leadership to adopt a

Francis Fukuyama, "Soviet Strategy in the Third
World," in The Soviet Union and the Third World: The
Last Three Decades eds. Francis Fukuyama and Andrzej
Korbonski (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987),
,

p.

37

.
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Soviet Union-first" position in its relations with the

Third World. 2
This "Soviet Union-first" orientation will be most

clearly seen in Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy new
thinking.

As detailed below, Soviet new thinking in

foreign policy reconsiders the character of national

security in the nuclear era and posits that, since

nuclear war cannot under any circumstances be won,
national security must be achieved through both military
and political means.

Most important for the

revolutionary Left in Latin America, new thinking also
entails a revision of the concept of peaceful
coexistence.

With the rise to power of Gorbachev,

peaceful coexistence is viewed less as a form of class
struggle and more as a long-lasting condition of states

with different social and political systems living
together peacefully.

Theorists of Soviet new thinking

will posit further, that peaceful coexistence is made
more imperative by the growing interdependence of

international relations.
These positions have their roots in two

interrelated developments: a Soviet economic crisis

which could no longer be ignored; and the need to
See Ibid., p. 38; Fred Halliday, From Kabul to
Managua (New York: Pantheon, 1989), pp. 102-112; and,
Galia Golan, "Moscow and Third World Liberation
Movements: The Soviet Role," Journal of International
Affairs 1 (January 1987): 303-324.
2

,
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improve relations with the West.

The Gorbachev

leadership hopes that improved relations with the West
will allow the Soviet Union to reduce its expenditures
on military preparedness, focus more of its limited

resources on the domestic economy, and to enjoy

increased economic assistance from Western nations.
In their search for a modus vivendi with the United

States, the Soviet Union under President Gorbachev has

engaged in a policy of "strategic retreat" from the

Third World.

This policy is characterized by a lack of

interest in winning new spheres of influence in the

Third World, and by reconsidering relations with

existing Third World allies.

The Soviet Union's

strategic retreat has been accompanied by a search for

conflict resolution in the Third World, especially in
areas where the USSR is in conflict with U.S. interests.
In Latin America these developments have meant that the

USSR has reconsidered its support to "anti-imperialist"
and anti-American forces and has abandoned its

confrontational attitude toward the West.

3

Soviet Policy from Andropov to Gorbachev
Soviet theorists were the first to articulate the
"Soviet Union-first" position; however with the ascent

Sergei Tagor, Perestroika and Soviet-Latin
American Relations (Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson
Center Working Papers, 1991).
3

,
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to power of Yuriy Andropov, the changes apparent earlier
in the theoreticians' works began to emerge in

leadership pronouncements.

Beginning in 1981, a number

of articles appeared which argued that by insuring the

favorable conditions for building Communism in the USSR,
and by defending the USSR's state interests, the

position of world socialism is strengthened

Union-first position. 4

— the

Soviet

Other articles, written by

economists, implied that the economic problems of the

Soviet bloc necessitated a rethinking of its overseas
role, and invoked Lenin's statement that "the socialist

countries would mainly influence the world revolutionary
process through their economic successes." 5

Fukuyama argues that skepticism about the viability
of Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Parties is especially

pronounced in the works of Karen Brutents, one of the
two Central Committee International Department deputies

responsible for the Third World.

Brutents does not

criticize Vanguard Parties explicitly, "but rather damns

them with faint praise and shows a considerably greater
6
interest in the non-Marxist parts of the Third World."

See K. N. Brutents, "A Great Force of Modern
Times," International Affairs no. 2 (February
1981): 83-84; and A. Gromyko, "The Imperialist Threat To
Africa," International Affairs no. 7 (July 1981): 474

,

,

50.
5

See Golan, p. 304 especially footnotes

6

Fukuyama, p. 40.
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5

and 6.

In a February 2,

1982 Pravda article Brutents argues

that there exists a
solid base for the Soviet Union's cooperation
with liberated countries where capitalist
relations are developing but which pursue a
policy of defending and strengthening national
sovereignty in politics and economics. 7

Noting the "contradictions" which exist between the
liberated nations and the imperialist states, he
supports increased Soviet cooperation with nations like
Brazil, Mexico, and India, suggesting that these

nations, while not socialist-oriented nor governed by

Vanguard Parties, provide the more fertile ground for
Soviet policy.

Brutents takes these themes even further

in a February 1984 article in Kommunist in which he

argues that
the development of capitalist relations in the
liberated countries does not nullify [the
contradictions between them and the
imperialist states] and does not directly
contribute to consolidating the position of
imperialism. 8

Another source of skepticism about the
inevitability of socialism in the Third World was

Secretary General Yuriy Andropov himself, who in his
June 1983 speech to the Central Committee echoed the
line of many Soviet Third World theoreticians.

"It is

one thing to proclaim socialism as one's aim and quite

7

8

Ibid.

,

pp. 40-41

Quoted in Ibid., p. 41.
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another to build it.

For this," Andropov claimed, "a

certain level of productive forces, culture and social

consciousness are needed."

While sympathizing with

states of a socialist orientation, he noted "the

complexity of their position and the difficulties of
their revolutionary development" and added that Soviet
help would be "to the extent of our possibilities," but
that ultimately these states had to rely on
themselves. 9

This and other statements by Andropov

suggest an unhappiness with the activist Third World

policy that characterized the late Brezhnev years in
general and a disillusionment with the socialist-

oriented countries in particular. 10

The brief

Chernenko period did witness some return in Soviet
leadership pronouncements concerning national liberation

movements and the need to assist them; however,

Gorbachev has returned to Andropov's Soviet Union-first
position

The Gorbachevian Synthesis in Soviet Foreign Policy

Jerry Hough argues that the rise to power of

Mikhail Gorbachev signals the start of a process whereby
an older generation of leaders whose "mental world" is

dominated by "old suspicions of Western ideas,
9

Quoted in Golan, p. 306.

10

Fukuyama, p. 41.
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influences

,

and markets" is being replaced by a younger

generation with a different world view.
Gorbachev's generation
took
industrialization for granted and did not find
urban life as upsetting as Stalin's and
Brezhnev's generations did
Soviet youth
since the 1950s have not seen Western ideas as
satanic.
Instead they have been fascinated by
jazz and blue jeans and Western films and the
thought of travel to the West. 11
.

.

.

.

.

.

This new generation of leaders, led by Gorbachev
and working in a context characterized by the growth of
a middle class wanting change,

an economic system that

does not work well, and a political leadership

increasingly frustrated by its lack of control over the
bureaucracy, has argued in favor of modernizing the

Soviet Union

— moving

it beyond the xenophobia and anti-

Western posture characteristic of the nation since the
Bolshevik Revolution--and opening it to the West.

Since

1985, significant change in Soviet domestic politics has

occurred.

Similarly, "a revolution is under way in

Soviet foreign policy greater than any in the postwar
period," one which is "altering the assumptions by which
the Soviets explain the functioning of international

politics and from which they derive the

Jerry Hough, "The End of Russia's 'Khomeini'
Period," World Policy Journal 4 (Fall 1987): 588.
11

concepts underlying the deeper pattern of their
actions

" 12
.

Gorbachev's actions and statements, particularly
since the Twenty-Seventh Communist Party Congress in

February /March 1986, suggest that his foreign policy

perspectives differ fundamentally from those of his
predecessors and are reshaping the ways in which Moscow
deals with the outside world.

A number of remarkable

statements and actions--acceptance of the U.S. "zero
option" on the INF issue, acceptance in several arms

control fora of intrusive on-site verification,

delinking the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan
from the character of the Kabul government, the quick

settlement of a decades-long boundary dispute with

Sweden in January 1988, a major declaration of support
for the United Nations and its peacekeeping activities,
as well as the announced unilateral reduction of the

Soviet armed forces by 500,000 men

— suggest

the scope of

change in Soviet foreign policy attitudes under
Gorbachev.
The "new political thinking" may be seen as a

determined effort by the Gorbachev leadership to
redefine the nature of the international environment

Robert Legvold, "The Revolution in Soviet Foreign
Policy," Foreign Affairs 68 (Winter 1988/89): 82.
12
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the USSR.

The key elements of Soviet new

thinking on foreign and security policy may be
summarized as follows:
1) Nuclear war cannot under any circumstances
be won; nuclear weapons therefore cannot be an
instrument of policy.
2) Security cannot be obtained through
military means alone; further, security in the
nuclear age is mutual in character and must
rely strongly on political means.
3) The rejection of nuclear deterrence as a
durable guarantor of peace. Strategic parity,
seen as an historical success for socialism,
could cease to be a factor for stability in
the face of an unregulated arms competition.
4) A revision of the concept of peaceful
coexistence, which is seen less as a form of
class struggle
and increasingly as a
long-lasting condition in which states with
different social and political systems will
have to learn to live with each other for the
indefinite future.
5) Increasing recognition of the multipolar
and interdependent character of contemporary
international relations. 14
.

.

.

A number of factors and trends converged in the
mid-1980s which led to the "Gorbachevian synthesis"

“However it would be incorrect, argue some
analysts, to assume that these new ideas were originated
by the Gorbachev leadership. Many of the tenets of new
thinking found "lucid expression by influential Soviet
policy analysts in the pre-Gorbachev era." Indeed,
according to Allen Lynch, "the emerging Soviet world
view represents a synthesis of tendencies present in
Soviet policy circles since the Twentieth Party Congress
See Allen Lynch, The Soviet Study of
in 1956."
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), p. 19; see also William E.
Odom, "How Far Can Reform Go?" Problems of Communism 36
(November /December 1987): 18-33.
,

See also Ye. Primakov, Pravda,
in The Current Digest of the Soviet

“Lynch, p. xvii.

July 10, 1987, p. 4
Press 39 (1987): 1-4.
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referred to as Soviet foreign policy new thinking.
First

by the mid-1980s it was no longer possible for

,

Soviet leaders to ignore the economic crisis facing the
Soviet system.

Gorbachev euphemistically called the

situation a "pre-crisis phenomenon," meaning that the
survival of socialism was probably not in danger, but
the USSR's capacity to meet its domestic and foreign

policy objectives was.
At the ideological plenum of the Central
Committee on February 18, 1988 Gorbachev said
that, omitting the sales of oil abroad and of
alcohol at home from calculations of growth as
non-productive factors, "practically over four
five-year plan periods there was no increase
in the absolute increment of the national
income, and it even began to decline in the
early eighties." That is, for nearly a
quarter century the Soviet economy suffered
from progressively decreasing growth rates and
then, in the early eighties, plunged into a
defacto depression. 15

The Gorbachev leadership has thus concluded, and has

repeatedly made explicit to both foreign and domestic
audiences, that the USSR's international relationships
are not to be a distraction from the prime task of

modernizing at home and wherever possible should be a
positive inducement to it.

Foreign Minister Eduard

See also Abel Aganbegyan, "The
Lynch, p. xxii.
Economics of Perestroika," International Affairs
Mr Aganbegyan is
(London) 64 (Spring 1988): 179-185.
Head of the Economics Department of the USSR Academy of
Sciences and chief economic adviser to Mikhail
In this article Mr. Aganbegyan describes the
Gorbachev.
immediate and more long-term economic problems which
have prompted the need for fundamental reorganization in
the USSR.
15
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Shevardnadze has announced that the main requirement of
Soviet foreign policy
is that our country should not bear additional
expenditures in connection with the necessity
of supporting our defense capability and the
defense of our legitimate foreign policy
interests. That means we must seek paths to
the limitation and reduction of military
rivalry, to the removal of confrontational
moments in relations with other states, to the
clamping down of conflicts and crises. 16

Moreover, Gorbachev has been searching for structures of

stability in critical areas like arms control so as to
free scarce resources which can be devoted to the

domestic economy.
The need for such stability assumes double
importance for Gorbachev, since instability in
the USSR's foreign relations will affect not
only the politics of resource allocation but
the viability of Gorbachev's own political
position, which assumes that far-reaching
reform at home is consistent with the USSR's
geopolitical presence abroad. 17
Second, the Gorbachev leadership has concluded that
a favorable international environment can be created

only on a political basis with the leading industrial

Quoted in David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New
Thinking," Foreign Affairs 68 (Winter 1988-89): 78.
16

Interestingly, one of the ways
Lynch, p. xxiii.
Gorbachev has attempted to silence those critical of his
arms control proposals and his other actions aimed at
decreasing international militarization has been to
argue that the fundamental nature of imperialism may be
changing and that imperialism is restrained not merely
by Soviet power but also by processes internal to
imperialism. See Ibid, p. xxxiv; see also Margot Light,
(New York:
The Soviet Theory of International Relations
310-311.
Press,
1988), pp.
St Martin's
17

,
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powers

especially the United States.

,

According to

Gorbachev,
the character of present-day weapons leaves
any country no hope of safeguarding itself
solely with military and technical means, for
example, by building a defense system, even
the most peaceful one. The task of ensuring
security is ... a political problem, and it
can only be resolved by political means.
In the context of relations between the USSR
and the USA, security can only be
mutual. ... It is vital that all should feel
equally secure, for the fears and anxieties of
the nuclear age generate unpredictability in
politics and concrete actions. 18
.

.

.

Lynch argues that the Reagan administration's

opposition to detente with the Soviet Union

—a

position

shared by many on the political right and center

coupled with NATO's deployment of intermediate range
nuclear missiles after November 1983, left the Soviet
leadership with no other option but to attempt

accommodation with the U.S.
Traditional Soviet ways of countering U.S.
pressure, i.e., by appealing over the heads of
governments to populations and attempting to
play both halves of NATO against the other,
were clearly not working. What was to be
done? 19

With remarkable tenacity, Gorbachev sought to a
achieve a modus vivendi with the United States.

To

"The Political Report of the Central Committee of
the CPSU to the Party Congress of the CPSU, Moscow,
February 25, 1986," in Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Toward a
Better World (New York: Richardson and Steirman, 1987),
18

,

p.

159.
19

Lynch, p. xxi.
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achieve it, Soviet thinkers have revised the concept of
peaceful coexistence.
Key Soviet policy analysts now interpret
peaceful coexistence less as a form of class
struggle the traditional Soviet viewpoint
and more as a long lasting condition in which
states with different social and political
systems will have to learn how to live with
each other for the indefinite future. 20

—

Peaceful coexistence is no longer considered a
"breathing spell" in the international class struggle,
but rather is seen as a permanent condition of

international life which allows "global problems"

— the

arms race, ecological problems. Third World development-

-to be resolved on a collaborative basis.
"The time has come," Mikhail Gorbachev announced in

the Political Report to the Twenty-Seventh Soviet Party

Congress, "to realize thoroughly the harsh realities of
our day: nuclear weapons harbor a hurricane which is

capable of sweeping the human race from the face of the
earth." 21

Similarly, Americanologist Georgi Arbatov

argues that "in the past we did not realize, as we

realize now, the limited possibilities of the use of

military power," as a result, "our national security
policy overemphasized military means." 22

p.

20

Ibid., p. xxiv.

21

"The Political Report

,
.

.

157.
22

Quoted in Legvold, p. 92.
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in Gorbachev,

Since the rise to power of Gorbachev there has been
a major reexamination of security issues and an official

confirmation by Gorbachev and the Soviet military that
nuclear war cannot under any circumstances be won. 23

Security in the nuclear age is said to be mutual in

character and, given the destructive potential of modern
weapons, a common concern of all countries.

Moreover,

Soviet policy analysts and Gorbachev himself reject

nuclear weapons as a durable guarantor of peace.

They

claim that even nuclear parity, which they consider a
major historical achievement of socialism, could cease
to be a determining factor for stability in the face of
an unregulated arms competition between East and

West. 24

Lynch argues that

the promulgation of the Strategic Defense
Initiative in March 1983 appears to have
encouraged a reevaluation of the concept of
military-nuclear parity (and by extension of
defense sufficiency) by plausibly (to Soviet
observers at the time) threatening the
political significance of the USSR's
accumulated investment in nuclear-charged
For a more detailed discussion of new thinking
and Soviet security, nuclear weapons and disarmament see
Matthew Evangelista, "The New Soviet Approach to
Security," World Policy Journal 3 (Fall 1986): 561-599;
see also Gerhard Wettig, "New Thinking on Security and
East-West Relations," Problems of Communism 37
(March/April 1988): 1-14.
23

See Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Gorbachev, The New
Thinking of Soviet Foreign-Security Policy and the
Military: Recent Trends and Implications," in
Gorbachev's Reforms: U.S. and Japanese Assessments eds.
Peter Juviler and Hiroshi Kimura (New York: Aldine de
Gruyer, 1988), pp. 128-133.
24

,
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ballistic missiles.
Initially, many Soviet
observers embraced (for the first time) the
desirability of the condition of mutual
assured destruction, for the medium term, and
later began to question the relationship
between parity and stability. 25

Nuclear arms control has thus assumed priority as a
means of reducing the external threat, limiting resource

requirements for the military, and establishing a
framework of stability in East-West strategic
relations

26

The final factor leading to the rise of new

political thinking is Gorbachev's increasing recognition
of the multipolar and interdependent character of

contemporary international relations. 27

This view has

already reflected itself in a Soviet tendency to deal

directly with key regional actors, such as China and
Japan in the Far East, Egypt and Israel in the Middle
East, and Mexico in Central America. 28
25

Moreover, it

Lynch, p. xxi.

“See "Televised Speech on Foreign Policy, Moscow,
August 18, 1986," in Gorbachev, pp. 363-372.
“Alexander Dallin points out that "for a long time
[the term interdependence] and its implications (so
alien to the belief in the victory of one world system
over the other) had been rebuffed in Moscow, indeed, at
one point it had been denounced as a subversive Western
import. Now, on the contrary, it too serves to
are said to
.
underscore the shared priorities that .
or the
interests
class
struggle,
come before the class
Foreign
"Gorbachev's
Dallin,
class approach" (Alexander
v
Soviet
the
in
Thinking'
Policy and the New Political
Union," in Juviler and Kimura, p. 102).
.

“Lynch, p. xxv.
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was the recognition of global interdependence,

underlined in the starkest form by nuclear weapons which
threaten "the very survival of the human race," which
led to the redefinition of the Leninist concept of

peaceful coexistence. 29
The concepts of multipolarity and interdependence

have crystallized in Gorbachev's new thinking about the

Third World and have engendered what Elizabeth Kridl

Valkenier has called a "hands-off" approach to radical
change in the Third World. 30

The party program adopted

by the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in February 1986

illustrates that new thinking regarding the Third World
is taking place. 31

The new program replaces the 1961

text that was "suffused with Khrushchev's confidence" in

29

A rather obscure quote from an early
Lenin
draft
of a Party program has come to
(1899)
justify the new Soviet concern with interdependence.
Lenin wrote that the common interests of mankind are
higher than the class interests of the proletariat.
Gorbachev has adopted this assertion, and he himself has
argued in favor of "the priority of the interests of
social development, of all human values, over the
interests of one or another class." See Dallin, p. 102.
Ibid.

Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "New Soviet Thinking
About the Third World," World Policy Journal 4
30

(Fall 1987)

:

651-674.

Alvin Z Rubinstein argues however that the brief
treatment of the Third World at the Twenty-Seventh
Congress "a mere 150 words touched on Third World
issues, and two-thirds of these spoke of Afghanistan"
illustrates Gorbachev's greater concern with Soviet
domestic problems. See Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "A Third
World Policy Waits for Gorbachev," Orbis 30 (Summer
1986): 355-364.
31

.

—
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the Soviet Union's ability to break out of military

encirclement

,

to weaken the West, and to refashion the

world by supporting the grievances, aspirations, and
needs of the colonial peoples and newly independent

nations

32

In those days, the Soviets expected and

fostered a permanent revolutionary process in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
The 1961
program held that political independence was a
sham.
To be genuine, independence had to be
extended by the further struggle for economic
liberation and a progressive political system.
Capitalism, in all its forms and
manifestations, offered nothing but "suffering
to the peoples." Hence the future lay in
undertaking a "non-capitalist path of
development." The political power of the local
middle class was to be limited through the
establishment of a progressive national front,
the foundations of capitalism were to be
undermined by expanding the public sector and
nationalizing foreign investment, and
sovereignty was to be bolstered through close
diplomatic and economic cooperation with the
Soviet bloc. 33

Gorbachev's program, however, offers quite

different formulations of the historic role of the

developing countries, their domestic policies, and the
Soviet Union's support for these states.

Its thrust is

to raise doubts about the systemic, extremely

politicized assumptions regarding the utility of anti-

Western grievances in the Third World.

First, the

developing countries are not seen as an important

32

Valkenier, p. 652.

33

Ibid., pp. 652-653.
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revolutionary force; their role in the demise of

capitalism is not mentioned.

Moreover, the emphasis on

the ongoing process of national liberation has been

dropped altogether.

Instead, the 1986 program speaks of

the "liberated areas"

— an

expression meant to convey

that the tumultuous era of liberation is over and that

we have entered a new period in which nation building,
not combatting capitalism or imperialism, is of

paramount importance.
In terms of domestic politics, the 1986 program

does not assume that all developing countries will

eventually follow the non-capitalist path.

While

mentioning nations of "socialist orientation"
approvingly, following the non-capitalist path is not

touted as providing the answer for the entire Third
World.

Instead, the program acknowledges that some

states have chosen a socialist orientation while others
are "traveling the capitalist road," and makes no

prognosis about the future of either choice.

It merely

accepts that each state chooses its own system.

Also absent from the program are any statements
about Moscow's "international duty" to support Third

World strivings.

Only "profound fraternal solidarity

and sincere admiration" for the people who have

experienced colonial rule is offered.

These general

points about Soviet relations with the Third World
105

— all

more non-conunittal than the 1961 program— are followed
by an explicit disavowal of close Soviet identification

with the radical states.

Henceforth, the Soviet Union

will support states of socialist orientation "only to
the extent of its ability."

The program insists that

"every people create their material and technical

base

.

.

.

for building a new society mainly through

their own efforts." 34
These new principles of Soviet foreign policy

toward the Third World demonstrate that Moscow has come
to accept the fact of world-wide economic

interdependence
Instead of hoping to dominate the world
market, the Soviets now show more tolerance
for the economic map as it is drawn and a
sober respect for the power of the advanced
capitalist states not just the United States
but Japan and South Korea as well. They are
saying, in effect, "Hey, stop the world, we
want to get onl" 35

—

Such sentiments are caused by the demonstrable failure
of the original systemic approach to international

economics which saw the world as divided into two
.,"
See Ibid.; see also "The Political Report
in Gorbachev, pp. 83-203. Valkenier argues that these
points are exceedingly important, as they "explain,
guide and justify Soviet foreign policy." Moreover they
"were not plucked out of thin air. They had been
carefully and painstakingly phrased by reform minded
academic and political experts, often against the
acrimonious opposition of dogmatists. Gorbachev
is legitimizing a way of thinking that has been maturing
for at least a decade." Valkenier, pp. 653-654.
34

.

.

.

35

Ibid.

,

p.

655
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separated and hostile world markets.

This understanding

led the Soviet Union to pursue policies in the Third

World that demonstrated the superiority of the socialist
system

— charging

lower interest rates than the West,

financing industrialization projects, promoting the

expansion of the public sector, and encouraging an

import-substitution development model.
Soviet rhetoric claimed that socialist
policies and development advice promoted
economic liberation, a claim borne out by
India's state steel sector and Algeria's oil
industry.
In practical terms, these measures
were expected to expand the Soviet Union's
presence and influence in the Third World. 36

These politically aggressive and economically

generous policies proved to be quite successful for a
while; however, for a variety of reasons, this favorable

situation began to unravel by the mid-1970s.

Faced with

an array of challenges, the Soviets began to modify

their theories about international economics and to

implement different policies.
Moscow abandoned the
During the 1970s
doctrine of two competing world markets,
stressing, instead, the existence of a single
world economy over and above its socialist and
[S]oviet economic
capitalist components
policies became less systemic as well. The
South began to be treated more openly and
purposefully as a source of raw materials and
commodities that were either in short supply
Soviet
or too expensive to produce at home.
development theory changed accordingly
[and] ... a mixed economic model was
recognized as offering better prospects for
.

.

.

.

36

.

Ibid.
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advancement than the easing-out of private
capital in the name of socialism. At the same
time as its economic relations with developing
countries became increasingly pragmatic,
Moscow became less generous with its aid,
especially to its radical clients. 37
Under Gorbachev there are no signs of reversal of

these trends, in fact there has been an advance in de-

ideologizing Soviet theory and behavior.

A concerted

effort to become part of the international community has

supplanted earlier competition with the West.

There is

also a much more pronounced emphasis on extracting

maximum benefits from exchanges with developing
countries, with little regard for how this squares with

socialist principles.

In fact, Soviet economic

relations with the Third World today "dispense with the
fiction of altruistic socialist aid and instead reflect
the belief that aid and trade should help to develop the

Soviet economy." 38

In general, the Third World is no

longer used as an example of the ravages of capitalism,
but rather is treated as an area contributing to

international instability.

In order to create greater

stability the Soviet Union has acknowledged the value of

capitalist institutions like private trade and land
ownership, and has counseled developing countries to

open themselves to market forces.

37

Ibid., pp. 656-657.

38

Ibid., p. 658.
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Soviet economists now

maintain that many of the countries that relied on the
free market have approached the level of development

achieved by the Soviet Union, while those that chose

socialism go hungry. 39
Just as the failure of events to conform to

projections has prompted a reevaluation of Soviet
economic theory and practice in the Third World, so,
too, it is affecting the political and diplomatic

spheres.

This is evident from discussions now taking

place around three key issues: the relevance of Marxist

theory to the Third World; the appropriateness of
radical political models for developing countries; and,
the promise of the Non-Aligned Movement, once an

important component of Soviet anti-imperialist
campaigns.

In each area confident activism is being

replaced by doubts that argue for creating distance,
reducing commitments, or taking new departures. 40
Current thinking about the Third World's political
future no longer revolves around the question of whether

developing countries are ready for socialism.

Some

authors now are even asking whether Marxist analysis has

much validity as applied to the Third World.

Experts

are now being urged to study the particular

See Bill Keller, "Soviet Article Doubts Economic
Line," New York Times May 9, 1987, p. 4.
39

,

40

Valkenier, p. 660.
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characteristics of Third World development as opposed to
universal principles of development valid for all
countries
In general , since 1980, Third World culture has

been singled out increasingly as the prime obstacle to
the patterns of political development described by Marx.

According to Valkenier,
specialized studies and roundtable discussions
express grave doubts about the prospects of
linking the radical aspirations of developing
countries with Marxism
[noting] a lack
of congruity between the Western tradition of
41
Marxism and the Eastern experience.
.

.

.

.

.

.

Moreover, other specialists argue that the unexpected

twists and turns in Third World development can best be

understood not by systemic analysis, but by coming to
terms with the diversity of Third World experience.
"From this fact these experts proceed to question

whether the traditional Marxist preoccupation with the
laws governing the life of nations is appropriate." 42

41

Ibid., p. 662.

Valkenier continues there is no exact
Ibid.
counterpart in political pronouncements to such candid
thinking, but some movement in that direction is
evident, as we have seen, in the new Party program,
which, rather than proclaiming a single non-capitalist
future for all developing countries, acknowledges the
existence of both capitalist and socialist oriented
states a distinct step toward recognizing current
realities and outgrowing the Marxist compulsion to
predict the future in conformity with a predetermined
scheme
42

—
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In addition to questioning the relevance of Marxist

theory to developing countries, Soviet experts are also

taking another look at traditional notions of Third

World progressive political development and raising
doubts about the utility of Third World radicalism for
Soviet diplomacy.

Before the ascendence of Gorbachev,

some Soviet analysts were arguing that socialist

orientation is not irreversible and that a country can
revert to capitalism

— "an

admission

.

.

.

that could be

interpreted to mean that the Soviet Union was not fully

committed to the defense of socialist oriented
states." 43

Putting distance between socialist-oriented

states and the Soviet Union has continued under

Gorbachev.

At the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress, the

general secretary made no mention of socialist
orientation, rather he referred to the "unstoppable

process of socioeconomic transformation," carefully

avoiding any more explicit formulation.

Together with

the fact that the new Party program acknowledges the

existence of both socialist- and capitalist-oriented
states in the Third World and pointedly calls for the

former to build socialism through their own efforts, the

Valkenier s assertion is based on
Ibid.
p. 667.
her reading of Socialist Orientation in the Liberated
Countries, (1982), with contributions by Karen Brutents,
Rostislav Ulianovsky, Eugenii Primakow, and Anatolii
Gromyko. The stature of the contributors leads her to
posit that the volume is an authoritative pronouncement
on the issue.
43

'

,

Ill

Soviets no longer seem to be claiming that socialism is
the wave of the future in the Third World, nor that

capitalism in the Third World is temporary and
transitional
Further, the Soviets are putting the Third World on

notice that they no longer wish to finance the building
of socialism in these countries. 44

Of course radical political regimes will
continue to exist Moscow cannot and would not
hope otherwise.
Some will be allied with the
Soviet Union and claim to be practicing some
form of socialism; others will seek Soviet
support and advice. But there are likely to
be fewer free lunches. 45

—

Valkenier also argues that evidence exists that
since the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress, Soviet

leadership has reversed gears and is now sanctioning a

regression from vanguard parties to united fronts
arguing that socialist-oriented states are best governed
by a broad united front composed of all progressive
forces, including the petty and medium sized

Most analysts would agree with Rajan Menon who
argues that "because of the economy's problems, the
Soviet leaders may try to avoid commitments in the Third
The goodwill exhibited by the Soviet Union
World.
toward states of socialist orientation and its
frequently voiced commitment to assist the spread of
socialism must not obscure a basic point: domestic
political stability, national security, and the state of
the Soviet economy are far more important in the
official Soviet scheme of things than ventures in the
Third World" (Rajan Menon, Soviet Power in the Third
World [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986],
44

.

.

.

.

p.

157
45

)

.

Valkenier, p. 668.
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bourgeoisie

— and

democracy. 46

from revolutionary to national

While discussions of this sort may be

difficult for Westerners to decipher, Valkenier argues
that they have real practical implications as they
P rov ide theoretical justification for pressuring

radicals to pursue a more moderate, conciliatory

economic and political course

—a

course that not only

increased their chances of survival but also decreases
the likelihood of Washington's support of

counterinsurgencies and of requests for Moscow's
support

47

Moreover, recent reassessments of the Non-Aligned

Movement illustrate a growing dissatisfaction with the

movement and an increasing perception that its interests
are not congruent with Soviet interests.

From 1979 to

1983, when the Movement was headed by Fidel Castro,

Moscow offered uncritical support of the organization.
Then, on the eve of the 1983 Non-Aligned summit, when

the chairmanship passed to India, criticism of the

Movement's lack of unity and the resulting diffusion of
its anti-imperialist efforts, appeared. 48

Dissatisfaction has become more pronounced under
Just prior to the Twenty-Seventh Congress,

Gorbachev.
46

Ibid

47

Ibid.

48

Ibid.

,

p.

669

See also Light, pp. 229-233.
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Brutents noted in Pravda that anti-imperialism was

entering a new phase.

He observed,

the post-colonial period of the liberation
struggle's development, when anti-imperialism
continued to draw strength primarily from the
problems, emotions, and memories of the
colonial days ... is coming to an end, [and
he warned that the] readiness of developing
countries to play an active part in the
struggle against imperialism should not be
taken for granted. 49

From the Soviet perspective, the rise of virulent

Third World nationalism and the Non-Aligned Movement's

preoccupation with economic, rather than security,
issues challenge Soviet policy in the Third World.
The Iranian revolution and the obstinate
counterinsurgency in Afghanistan have aroused
concern not just about Islamic fundamentalism
but also about the status of Third World selfidentity generally. Inasmuch as [the NonAligned Movement] sees little difference
between Western and Soviet policies and does
the
not ascribe imperialist behavior to
West alone, it has seriously undermined the
diplomatic posture of those developing
countries that traditionally have leaned in
the direction of Moscow. 50
.

.

.

Karen Brutents proposes dealing with this challenge not
on the basis of old assumptions about common Soviet-

Third World aims but with an awareness that elemental
national feelings fuel today's anti-imperialism.

Brutents warns against arousing "the deep-rooted.

Karen Brutents, "The Liberated Countries and the
Anti-Imperialist Struggle," Pravda, January 10, 1986,
Quoted in Valkenier, p. 669.
pp. 3-4.
49

50

Valkenier, p. 670.
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spontaneous

,

anti imperialist feelings of the masses,"

urging, instead, reliance on mature "political

forces." 51

This could be a reference either to

national communist parties or, more likely, in view of
the insignificance of these parties in most developing

countries, to stable, well-established states. 52
The Soviets see the Non-Aligned Movement's

increasing preoccupation with economic grievances as
another example of Third World self-absorption and

indifference to the broader issues that concern Moscow,

especially arms control and disarmament. 53

Moreover,

Moscow no longer supports the Third World's demands for
a New International Economic Order, claiming that it no

longer corresponds with Soviet aims and interests.

When

the program was first presented at the United Nations,
the Soviets endorsed it as a "progressive code of rules

by which states should be guided in their economic

relations." 54

By the late 1970s, however, the Soviets

had become openly critical of the NIEO, arguing that it

was too exclusively centered on concessional

arrangements for developing countries.

"Moscow

expressed its preference for an economic order that
51

Brutents, quoted in Ibid.

52

Valkenier, p. 670.

53

Ibid

54

Pravda, April 12, 1974, p.
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in Ibid.

would 'democratize' international trade by abolishing
restrictions and trade barriers affecting the socialist
states as well." 55

Indeed, at the Twenty-Seventh

Congress, Gorbachev proposed convening a world congress
on problems of economic security where the Soviet Union

would launch a program that would compete with that of
the non-aligned states.

"What is important here,"

Valkenier argues, "is not that the Soviet Union would be
promoting reforms beneficial to the bloc but that
Gorbachev's Soviet Union, in offering its own vision of
a new economic order,

is not worried about aggravating

relations with the Third World." 56

Such a move is

clear indication that Soviet interests and Third World
claims against the West no longer coincide.

Perestroika and foreign policy new thinking, and
the massive changes they have ushered in
fall of Eastern Europe

— have

— including

the

altered the context in

which Latin American revolutionary movements function.
The response of these movements to perestroika and new

thinking and the implications of these Soviet policies
for the revolutionary Left in Cuba, Nicaragua and El

Salvador will be studied in subsequent chapters.

See also Light, pp.

55

Ibid, p. 671.

56

Valkenier, p. 671.
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132-134.

CHAPTER

4

PERESTROIKA AND THE POLITICS
OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

If perestroika signals a "conceptual revolution" in

Soviet foreign policy toward the Third World, and if
former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was correct
in asserting that the main requirement of the new

foreign policy is that the Soviet Union should not bear

additional expenses in the defense of its legitimate
foreign policy interests, what will this mean for Cuba?
Cuba has been a favored ally of the Soviet Union for the
past three decades and the political and economic ties

between the two are strong.

Since the enunciation of

perestroika however, a new tension has entered the
bilateral relationship as President Castro has made it

clear that he disapproves of Gorbachev's reforms and has
no intention of initiating similar policies.

Castro's

harsh anti-perestroika views have led to increased

isolation of his regime, even among its erstwhile
friends and supporters, and have brought into question
the Soviet Union's continued support.

Many ask how a

Soviet government engaged in momentous social, economic
and political transformation can continue to provide

subsidies, which in 1988 totaled nearly $7 billion in

hard currency, to an old-line "Stalinist" state.
leads to the equally important question of whether
117
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Castro can survive without these subsidies, for in

weighing the costs and benefits for both sides in the
bilateral relationship, it is clear that Cuba is far
less important to the Soviet Union than the Soviet Union
is to Cuba.

As the Soviet Union's closest ally in Latin

America, Cuba has enjoyed a special relationship with
the USSR.

Cuba's economic survival is dependent upon

the maintenance of this special relationship.

Measured

in 1987, Soviet economic and military aid to Cuba

exceeded $4 billion annually or about $10 million each
Cuba runs a large trade deficit with the USSR; its

day.

debt to the Soviet Union and other bloc nations exceeded
$22 billion in 1987.

1

Moreover, The Soviet Union and

Eastern European countries shelter the Cuban market from
the fluctuations of the world market by purchasing sugar
The USSR also sells oil to

and nickel at fixed prices.

Cuba at bargain prices, enabling Cuba to resell some at
a profit on the world market.

In 1985 Cuba earned half

2
of its hard currency from the resale of Soviet oil.

In a 1985 interview with Playboy magazine Fidel argued

that

U S . Department of State, Soviet Influence
Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda,
1986-1987 p. 66.
X

.

,

2

Ibid.
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Frankly the United States has fewer and fewer
things to offer Cuba.
If we were able to
export our products to the United States, we
would have to start making plans for new lines
of production to be exported to the United
States, because everything we are producing
now and in the next five years has already
been sold to other markets. We would have to
take them away from the other socialist
countries in order to sell them to the United
States, and the socialist countries pay us
much better prices and have much better
relations with us than does the United
States
,

3

In return for their extensive economic assistance,

the Soviets have acquired, in Cuba, a major military

asset in the Western Hemisphere, one which has played a

unique role in promoting Soviet political and strategic
interests especially in the Third World.

Among

communist nations, only Vietnam and East Germany have
received more military aid from the USSR, and Cuba has
become a "key maritime strategic piece on Moscow's
global chessboard." 4

As Robert Pastor notes:

Cuba is a small country with a big country's
foreign policy. No other developing nation
maintains more diplomatic missions,
intelligence operatives, and military advisors
and troops abroad than does Cuba, not even
oil-producing states that can afford it. The
gap between its internal resources and its
external capabilities is filled by the Soviet
Union, not because of altruism, but because

3

"Playboy Interview," Playboy Magazine

,

August

179.

1985,

Raymond Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba
York: Praeger, 1985), p. 7.
4
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(New

the Soviets are assured that what the Cubans
do abroad will serve their purpose. 5

Moreover

,

Soviet assistance to Castro's Cuba has

provided the Soviets with the largest intelligence
collection facility outside the USSR.

The Lourdes

facility near Havana enables the Soviet Union to monitor

sensitive U.S. maritime, military and space

communications as well as telephone communications in
the United States.
The development of a special relationship with Cuba

since the victory of the Fidelistas has aided the Soviet

Union in its transformation from a continental power

whose military focus was the defense of the homeland and
whose military reach was limited to regions contiguous
to its own borders, to a global power with world-wide

naval deployments and a military position in every major

region of the globe. 6

Similarly, Cuba's economic

dependence on the Soviet bloc and the extensive military
assistance which flows from it has helped give the
Soviets extensive influence in the management and
Robert Pastor, "Cuba and the Soviet Union: Does
Cuba Act Alone?" in The New Cuban Presence in the
Caribbean Basin ed. Barry B. Levine (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1983), p. 207.
5

,

See Melvin A. Goodman, "The Soviet Union and the
Third World: The Military Dimension," in The Soviet
Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades eds.
Francis Fukuyama and Andrzej Korbonski (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1987), pp. 46-66, for a discussion of
the development of Soviet global military power over the
past three decades.
6

,
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direction of Cuba's affairs.

Yet, it would be incorrect

to think of Cuba as simply a Soviet-controlled surrogate
for the USSR in the Third World.

Perhaps the most important way in which Castro has

expressed his autonomy recently is through his

denunciations of Soviet perestroika and the changes it
has ushered in.

Castro has argued that Gorbachev's

reforms seek to "build capitalism" in the USSR, yet
"nothing and nobody will make Cuba deviate from the

socialist path."

Castro has called on the Cuban people

to defend "the ideological and military trenches of the

revolution," insisting that in Cuba it will be

"socialism or death!"
These sentiments and Castro's unwillingness to

reform at a time in world history when socialism around
the world is in retreat, has led to increased political

isolation of the regime.

Erstwhile friends of Cuba in

Eastern Europe have begun to abandon Castro's regime.
In March 1990, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and

Bulgaria voted with the U.S. in the United Nations Human
Rights Commission to place Cuba on its list of nations

which violate the human rights of its citizens.

7

Similarly, in February 1990 the Czechoslovak government

served notice that it no longer wishes to act as Cuba's

See "UN Votes, Local Dissenters Gaoled," Latin
American Weekly Report 22 March 1990, p. 3.
7

,
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protecting power," and host to its interest section, in
Washington.
Cuba's relations with Spain, its most important

Western European trading partner, have also deteriorated
recently in a dispute over asylum seekers. 8

In his

speech commemorating the thirty-seventh anniversary of
the assault on the Moncada Garrison, President Castro

castigated the Spanish government for having, "through
arrogance and pride," collaborated with "U.S.
imperialist aims." 9

Finally, with the electoral defeat

of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, Cuba is now the only

Marxist regime in the hemisphere and one of the few
governments whose mandate is not based on open
elections
This chapter will, first, examine the impact of

Gorbachev's reforms on Soviet-Cuban relations.

I

will

demonstrate that reduced levels of Soviet aid to Cuba

coupled with the changes set in motion by perestroika

,

especially in Eastern Europe, are increasing Cuba's
economic woes and may have political ramifications in
Second, the Castro

the not-too-distant future.

Cuba owes Spain approximately US$900 million; the
In 1989
only larger creditor is the Soviet Union.
Madrid granted Havana US$260 million worth of loans and
commercial credit. See "Blowing Hot and Cold on Spain,"
Latin American Weekly Report 9 August 1990, p. 3.
8

,

See text of President Castro's address in Granma
Weekly Review 5 August 1990, pp. 3-5.
9

,
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government's response to perestroika is analyzed.

I

posit that the Cuban government has devised a strategy
which, through limited political reforms for pro-Castro

loyalists and increased repression of dissidents, seeks
to maintain Castro-style socialism and Cuban Leninism in
an environment increasingly hostile to both.

The

chapter concludes with a discussion of the likelihood
that Castro's "survival strategy" will succeed.

Soviet-Cuban Relations
Much of the analysis in Western political science
of Soviet-Cuban relations since the Cuban revolution has

portrayed Cuba as a Soviet client which unquestioningly
hews to the policy line articulated by Moscow.

Such an

understanding of the relationship between these two
states has led some analysts to suggest that Castro's

harsh anti-perestroika remarks signal a new strain in

Soviet-Cuban relations which will lead the Soviet Union
to exert pressure on the Castro regime to tow the new
line.

Other analysts argue that such an understanding of

Soviet-Cuban relations is too simplistic and, in the
end, incorrect.

10

Peter Shearman argues that Soviet-

See especially, Edward Gonzalez, "Cuba, The Third
World, and the Soviet Union," in Fukuyama and Korbonski,
pp. 123-147; Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy,"
Foreign Affairs 58 (Fall 1978): 83-108; and, Peter
(London: Rout ledge
Shearman, The Soviet Union and Cuba
10

,
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Cuban relations over the past three decades have been

determined by individual leaders, ideological
perceptions and geostrategic considerations.

At times

the ideological perceptions and geostrategic concerns of
the Soviet and Cuban leaderships have meshed.

However

for most of the past three decades they have not and

bilateral relations have been tense.

The current rift

between Moscow and Havana is therefore not the first
between the two parties; however the current differences
are arguably more fundamental and of much greater

consequence than previous ones.
The previous disagreements have tended to revolve

around divergent perceptions of what constitute
fundamental issues in world politics, and, flowing from
these, differing foreign policy priorities and

strategies.

Through the 1960s the questions of Latin

American and Third World underdevelopment, economic
dependency, and "imperialist domination" were the most

crucial issues in world politics for Castro.

For

Khrushchev and Brezhnev the central issue was the
competition between the two superpowers.

Developments

in the Third World were viewed in the context of the

shifting correlation of forces and the changing
strategic balance between East and West.

Castro's

North-South perspective led to the view that there could

&

Kegan Paul, 1987).
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be no compromise with imperialism: it was the duty of

the revolutionary to make the revolution, and the duty
of the international revolutionaries to assist other

guerrilla movements in their struggles for liberation.

Khrushchev and Brezhnev, on the other hand, advocated a
policy of peaceful coexistence in which some

accommodation with the U.S. was necessary in order to
avoid a direct confrontation that could lead to nuclear
war.

As detailed in the previous chapter, these

differences in perceptions and strategies caused
tensions in the bilateral relationship during the first

decade of Castroism in Cuba.

By the late 1960s Castro

had condemned peaceful coexistence as "an imperialist

modus vivendi" and had accused the Soviets of being an
"accomplice of imperialism." 11
In the early 1970s Castro toned down his rhetoric
of guerrilla warfare, institutionalized a Marxist-

Leninist system, changed his perspective on inter-

American relations and began to foster diplomatic
relations with Latin American states.

The Soviet-Cuban

relationship became more harmonious, cooperative and
cohesive, with both states now pursuing similar policies
in different regions which served the interests of

These changes may have

leaders in Moscow and Havana.

See Granma Weekly Review
19 March 1967, p. 1.
xl
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,

7

July 1968, p.

1,

and

been due, in part, to restrictions emanating from the

dependent nature of the bilateral relationship with the
USSR. Castro himself, in the wake of Soviet cutbacks in

oil deliveries which forced him to institute rationing
in January 1968, acknowledged the Soviets' ability to
a PPly pressure on Cuba.

12

However, the changes were

also a response to other domestic, regional and

international factors.
Che Guevara's death in the Bolivian jungle
symbolized the weakness of the revolutionary
movement in Latin America. The emergence of a
radical leftist military regime in Peru
provided evidence of alternative challenges to
imperialism in the North-South struggle.
Domestic economic problems and the seeming
permanency of the U.S. economic embargo and
U.S. hostility to Castro's Cuba, and the
beneficial trade terms offered by the Eastern
bloc, led to Cuba's application to join the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance which
was accepted in 1972. 13

—

The 1970s witnessed cooperative military ventures
in Angola and Ethiopia.

Cuba's participation in both

civil wars was perceived by many as an example of Cuba

acting as "Soviet puppet," or "surrogate" in Africa in
order to further the geostrategic interests of the
Soviet Union.

However, this interpretation ignores

Cuba's active policy in Africa which can be traced back
to the early 1960s.
12

Indeed, in 1960, before diplomatic

Granma Weekly Review

23 March 1968, p.

,

1.

Peter Shearman, "Gorbachev and the Restructuring
of Soviet-Cuban Relations," The Journal of Communist
Studies 5 (December 1989): 71.
13
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relations had been established with the Soviet Union,
Cuba sent military and medical supplies to the Algerian

Liberation Front.

Moreover, while it appears that in

Ethiopia the Soviets and Cubans, through a series of

meetings in the mid-1970s, were able to coordinate a
policy of support for Ethiopia in its confrontation with
its socialist neighbor, the same coordination did not

occur earlier in Angola.

Unlike Soviet support for the

MPLA in Angola, Cuba's support was based on a sense of
revolutionary duty and international solidarity.

Cuban

support never wavered, nor was it tempered by the level
of tension existing between the East and West. 14
It was the Soviet-Cuban cooperative interventions

in Angola and Ethiopia that had the greatest negative

impact on detente between the superpowers, leading to
U.S. distrust and suspicion of Soviet behavior and

intentions in other Third World theaters.

With the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, an action which
served to confirm the worst fears of many concerning
Soviet behavior and intentions, detente was abandoned
for "the second Cold War."

With the advent of "the second Cold War," Castro
must have felt that the Soviet commitment to his nation
was indestructible.

However, with the rise of new

See especially Shearman, The Soviet Union and
pp. 33-56.

14

Cuba

,
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leaders after the death of Brezhnev in 1982, the rapid

disintegration of the Soviet economy, and the radical
restructuring of Soviet domestic and foreign policies,

especially since 1985, Soviet-Cuban relations have
entered a period of uncertainty.
Since the death of Brezhnev, but especially since
1985, there have been changes in leadership, ideology,

and in geostrategic concerns in the Soviet Union

— in

all

the three factors that have been central in determining

Soviet foreign policy toward Cuba.

As Jerry Hough

argues, the rise to power of Gorbachev and the various

personnel shuffles he has accomplished since 1985 signal
the rise of a new generation of Soviet leaders who are

most concerned with modernizing Soviet society and

increasing Soviet integration with the West. 15

In

terms of ideology, as detailed in the previous chapter,

Soviet theorists are currently questioning the

applicability of traditional Marxist notions of
development in the Third World and are even advocating
the adoption of capitalist market mechanisms.

Moreover,

Soviet foreign policy New Thinking abandons the notion
of the division of the world into two hostile camps in

favor of a notion of global economic and political

interdependence.

Revolution in the Third World is de-

Jerry Hough, "The End of Russia's 'Khomeini'
Period," World Policy Journal 14 (Fall 1987): 583-604.
15
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emphasized, if not actively discouraged.

Similarly, the

U.S. is still seen as being central to Soviet

geostrategic thinking but now as a partner rather than
an implacable adversary.

In addition, when Gorbachev

came to power in 1985, his most pressing problem was the

critical state of the Soviet economy.

Growth rates had

been declining yet Gorbachev was faced with rising

expectations from the Soviet population that the system

could not expect to satisfy without radical structural
reform.

These economic problems were having a "ripple

effect" through Soviet society leading to increased

alcoholism, drug addiction, and crime. 16

Given Cuba's economic dependence on the Soviet
Union, its tight integration into the CMEA, continued
U.S. antagonism to the Castro regime, and Castro's own

clear antipathy towards the Gorbachev phenomenon, the
fundamental changes in Soviet priorities and concerns
are certain to result in changes in the Soviet-Cuban

relationship.

Glasnost and perestroika have engendered

greater public scrutiny of Soviet foreign policy, and
the Soviet press has began an unprecedented questioning
of Moscow's traditional foreign policy commitments,

including its commitment to Cuba.

The pages of Soviet

publications, especially Moscow News

,

have served as a

Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for
(New York: Harper and Row,
Our Country and the World
16

,

1987), p. 8.
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forum for the growing debate over Soviet foreign policy,
a debate which expresses an increasing unwillingness to

sustain the costs of empire when the Soviet economy is

experiencing severe problems.
Writing in 1989, Andrei Kortunov of the Institute
of the USA and Canada stated that Moscow had given more

than twenty-five percent of its foreign aid to Cuba in
1988-1989.

He noted that the Soviet Union's total

foreign aid budget was almost six times greater, on a
per capita basis, than that of the U.S. and asked why
aid was being given to Third World countries that are

dictatorships and engage in "adventurist" foreign
policies. 17

Moscow News also quoted a Moscow deputy to

the Soviet Congress of Peoples Deputies as saying, "We

can't tolerate that sort of situation when our own

people have to get ration cards for soap and sugar and
can't find a decent cut of meat in the stores." 18

Similar concerns have been voiced by Professor

Aleksandr Sharkov of the CPSU in a roundtable discussion
of perestroika and Soviet foreign policy published in

International Affairs in July 1988.

The pattern

"Soviet Foreign Aid Questioned," The Current
Digest of the Soviet Press 42 (February 1990): 15.
17

Quoted in Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Cuba's Cloudy
Future," Foreign Affairs 70 (Summer 1990): 116. See
also "Castro: Beleaguered Champion of Socialism," The
Current Digest of the Soviet Press 42 (November 1990):
18

20 - 21
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developed under Khrushchev and Brezhnev of exporting oil
to Cuba at below world market prices and importing sugar
at prices well above the world market price is

unacceptable, he argues, as it has "amounted to

exporting our national product without compensation." 19
Also, the New York Times reported on March

8,

1990 that

"in a striking break with the traditional courtesy shown

to other communist countries," the Soviet press has
"this week opened up on the Cuban leadership with a dose
of withering scorn."

Times reporter Bill Keller points

to a feature story in the March

8,

1990 Moscow News

which describes Cuba as an "impoverished police state

mimicking Brezhnev-era Communism" and which noted with
approval the growth of a small dissident movement on the
island as evidence that pressure is growing to alter

Soviet-Cuban relations and that, in fact, highly-placed
members of the Soviet leadership desire a change in

bilateral relations. 20

See the roundtable on "Perestroika, The
Nineteenth Party Conference and Foreign Policy,"
International Affairs (July 1988): 3-18.
19

,

Bill Keller, "Soviet Press Snaps Back at Castro,
Painting an Outdated Police State," New York Times
Keller argues that "articles
8 March 1990, p. 1.
would almost surely have required
Castro
Mr.
criticizing
yet one must question if in this
clearance,"
high level
internal debate, the
increased
era of glasnost and
are indeed shared by the
News
opinions quoted in Moscow
Soviet leadership.
20

,
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It is clear, given Cuba's dependence on the USSR

for economic survival, that Gorbachev has it in his

power to use economic leverage should he wish to

persuade Castro to reform the Cuban economy and polity.
As of yet, however, there has not been a significant

reduction in Soviet aid to Cuba.

Many Western analysts

thought that the April 1989 meeting of Gorbachev and

Castro in Havana would be a clash of communist titans in

which the reformer from Moscow would chastise the anti-

perestroika Castro.
fight on his hands

"Gorbachev appears to have another
.

.

.

with one of the last living

legends of the Communist world," wrote the Boston Globe

;

"When Mikhail Gorbachev touches down in Havana on

Sunday, it will be to meet a man at the foot of the

gangway, Fidel Castro, who stands for everything

Gorbachev is against," argued the Miami Herald

21
.

At

the very least, many U.S. journalists seemed to think,

Gorbachev "the smooth salesman of new Communist
pragmatism" would surely distance himself from the

"khaki-clad revolutionary." 22

Gorbachev's visit to

Havana provided little in the way of signs of the

political rift expected by many.

Although there is

speculation that behind closed doors President Gorbachev

Quoted in "Gorbachev in Havana: A Reporter's
Notebook," Cuba Update 10 (Summer 1989): 11.
21

22

Bill Keller in the New York Times quoted in Ibid.
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had given Castro some form of stern warning, this

requires either discounting or ignoring public
statements by the Soviet leader.
In his address to the Cuban National Assembly on

April

4,

1989 Gorbachev called the Cuban experience "an

original and important part of the world experience in

building socialism."

He said,

the cooperation between our countries and
Soviet-Cuban ties are of a stable nature
[since] they are based on the principles of
equality of rights and emphasize respect for
independent action, understanding of mutual
responsibility and of the need for
international mutual assistance.
[The
significance of these principles] is not
diminished in the least by differences in the
approach to any of the questions related to
the particular features of our countries'
historical development and cultures nor by the
different tasks ahead of them or by their
international situation. 23
.

.

.

.

.

.

Moreover, Gorbachev continued, while in the USSR
we are condemned to achieve victory in
we do not see our approaches
perestroika
and solutions as a universal prescription. On
the contrary, problems may be similar but each
party solves them in an independent manner on
the basis of each country's conceptions and
peculiarities 24
.

.

.

Gorbachev reiterated this when, in

a news

conference

after his address, he said,
this visit was preceded by a lot of
speculation, as though instead of old friends.
Full texts of the addresses by Castro and
Gorbachev are found in Cuba Update Supplement 1 (Summer
1989): 1-23.
23

24

Ibid.
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we are practically enemies. This was pure
invention. We are friends. No country is
like another.
Dogmatism is harmful. We agree
on socialism.
No one could expect anything
else, knowing us.
Each country solves its own
problems according to its own history and
experiences. Our methods in the USSR aren't
necessarily the same as Cuba's, but we all
agree on socialist principles. 25
In addition to the reassuring rhetoric, the meeting
of the two leaders also yielded a Treaty of Friendship

and Cooperation Between the Republic of Cuba and the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the first of its
kind between the two nations. The treaty reasserts their

"fraternal and indestructible friendship and solidarity,

based on a common ideology
identical objectives.

.

.

.

.

." 26

.

internationalism and

More importantly, on

April 17, 1990, after a week of negotiations in Havana,

Cuba and the Soviet Union signed the largest trade

agreement in their three decades of commercial
relations.

The 1990 accord is worth $14 billion, an

increase of 8.7 percent over 1989 volume.

Key aspects

of this year's trade package include:

-The Soviet Union will continue to supply Cuba
with oil annually some 13 million tons
according to Moscow—cereals and other
foodstuffs, raw materials, equipment and
replacement parts for industry.
-The level of Cuban sales to the Soviet Union
at mutually acceptable prices will be

—

25

"

Reporter

'

s

Notebook," p. 12.

A full text of the treaty appears in Cuba Update
Supplement 1 (Summer 1989): 24-25. See also Granma
Weekly Review 29 April 1990, p. 1.
26

,
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maintained in key exports such as nickel,
sugar, citrus and chrome.
-Increased Cuban export of non-traditional
goods, especially medical equipment and
medicines
-The two countries have agreed to set up a
working group to prepare for the next round of
negotiations and to consider new and more
flexible trading models. 27
At a press conference before his departure from
Cuba, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin, a

signatory to the agreement, said the USSR has no
intention of using its economic links with Cuba to

pressure the island's government into following the path
of perestroika

He said the Soviets intended to fully

.

respect the direction the Cuban leadership has taken

while admitting that the Soviet Union's decision to turn
to a regulated market economy would have implications
for its trading partners.

But, in the case of Cuba,

Vietnam and Mongolia, Abalkin said, other factors also
come into play. 28

Alexander Baryshev, Deputy Editor in Chief of the
Latin American Journal of the USSR's Academy of
Sciences, has written that "Fidel Castro's concern that
the Soviet Union might discontinue aid to Cuba is

unfounded

.

.

.

the Soviet Union will never refuse help,

See Gail Reed, "Weathering The Storm," Cuba
Update 11 (Summer 1990): 19.
27

See also "Leonid Abalkin: We Value our
Friendship with Cuba," in The Current Digest of The
Soviet Press 42 (December 1990): 20.
28

Ibid.
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within its capabilities, to those who need such help, be
they socialist or capitalist." 29

Although Soviet aid

to Cuba has not yet decreased, the odds are good that it

will be cut significantly in the coming years given the
Soviet's decreasing economic capabilities and the

increasing public pressure on the Gorbachev leadership
to reconsider foreign policy commitments. 30

Moreover,

as Susan Kaufman Purcell argues, as the cold war winds

down, Havana's value to Moscow has declined.

Technological advances have reduced Cuba's
importance for intelligence gathering and even
as a military base.
In addition, because
Gorbachev's policies no longer involve active
support of "wars of national liberation" in
the Third World, Cuba's continued support of
Marxist guerrilla groups in Central America
and elsewhere directly challenges Gorbachev
and undermines his efforts to change the
Soviet Union's international image. Finally
Cuba's revolutionary foreign policy
jeopardizes the growing rapprochement between
the Soviets and the United States, since
Washington holds Moscow accountable for
Havana's behavior. 31

Alexander Baryshev, "A Soviet View: U.S. -Cuban
Warming Overdue," The Times of the Americas
21 February 1990, p. 21.
29

,

The Times of the Americas reports that the Soviet
Union is hinting it may scale back its economic and
"Although [Bush administration]
military aid to Cuba.
officials warned the statements made by Soviet
representatives were vague, they said the indications
were good that the Soviets would cut back their aid to
Castro" ("Soviet Aid May Be Cut," The Times of the
Americas, July 11, 1990, p. 3).
30

Susan Kaufman Purcell, pp. 115-116. See also
Wayne S. Smith, "Washington and Havana: Time for
Dialogue," World Policy Journal 7 (Summer 1990): 55731

573.
136

Even without a shift in the Soviet's policy toward
Cuba, Soviet -Cuban trade has become increasingly

unpredictable since 1988 when, as part of perestroika

,

Soviet enterprises obtained the right to trade directly
on foreign markets.

This has meant that Cuba has had to

deal directly with individual Soviet enterprises, which

prefer to sell to customers who pay in hard currency.

According to V. Zaikin, Head of the USSR Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations Department of Economic

Cooperation with the Republic of Cuba, "Today, if Soviet
enterprises have alternatives, they are not interested
in supplying goods to Cuba." 32

The impact of these new arrangements on Cuba was

clearly visible by the spring 1990, when a delay in a
shipment of Soviet wheat and flour forced President

Castro to cut the bread ration and increase some food
prices.

The relatively short delay in the shipment of

wheat and flour

— ships

scheduled to arrive in December

1989 were unable to complete their deliveries until

January 22, 1990

— forced

the Cuban government to buy

20,000 tons of wheat from western countries for hard

currencies. 33

While some have argued that these delays

See "There's Plenty of Experience," The Current
Digest of The Soviet Press 42 (November 1990): 26.
32

See also "Who's at Fault?"
See Purcell, p. 117.
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 42 (February
1990): 26-27.
33
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constitute Soviet pressure on Cuba to soften its anti-

perestroika stand and abandon its "Stalinist" policies,
others attribute the delays to management decisions to
use ships for more profitable business before attending
to Cuba's needs. 34

Jorge Dominguez concurs.

"The

trade breakdowns are caused by the accumulating economic

incapacities of the Soviet Union.

There is no proof of

intent to pressure Cuba politically." 35

Regardless of

intent, the fact that a brief delay in the arrival of

wheat and flour was so quickly translated into

widespread shortages, rationing and price increases
highlights Cuba's extreme vulnerability to the ripple
effects of perestroika.
Similarly, even without a change in Soviet-Cuban

economic relations, the collapse of communism in East
Europe will eventually prove more destabilizing to Cuba
in the short run than will Soviet perestroika

.

In

January 1990 the Soviet government announced that

beginning in 1991 all of Cuba's transactions with CMEA
members would be conducted in hard currency at world-

See Paul Lewis, "As Shipments of Soviet Grain
Lag, Cuba Reduces Daily Bread Ration," New York Times
See also "Problems Looming With
7 February 1990, p. 3.
Weekly Report
America
Latin
Partners,"
Old
4.
22 February 1990, p.
34

,

,

35

See Paul Lewis, p.

3.
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prices.

This development coincides with a

Soviet call for a radical restructuring of the CMEA

which would introduce market relations and "bring our
economic ties more closely in line with world
conditions."

N.

I.

Ryzhkov, speaking at the forty-fifth

session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in

January 1990, proposed a radical restructuring of the
entire system of economic cooperation which would entail
[a] shift to economic methods, [and]
market relations, [and] the use of freely
convertible currency in the settlement of
accounts, and of world market prices in
reciprocal trade.
[T]his would make it
possible to put cooperation within the CMEA on
a new economic basis and to bring its
conditions closer to those that are generally
accepted in world practice, a step that would
be in keeping with the reforms being carried
out in the CMEA countries and would make
possible their effective inclusion in the
international division of labor. 37
.

.

.

.

.

.

Given Cuba's extreme dependence on the CMEA a

restructuring which would introduce market forces could
be devastating.

Cuba's Vice Chairman of the State

Council and Council of Ministers, C. R. Rodriguez, has

agreed with the need to restructure the CMEA.

However,

he argues that the introduction of market forces must

This has prompted Ramon Gonzalez Vergara, former
Cuban vice-secretary to the CMEA to ask "Will Castro
Survive if Cuba is Forced to Pay Its Bills?" Wall
Street Journal 28 September 1990, p. 15.
36

,

See "A Historic Rethink is Afoot in CMEA," The
Current Digest of The Soviet Press 42 (January 1990):
12-13.
37
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not mean that market forces usurp the principles on

which the CMEA is based. 38

Exacerbating Cuba's

economic woes is the fact that "in contrast to the
Soviet Union, the new Eastern European governments feel
no gratitude or responsibility toward Cuba." 39

In

January 1990 President Castro acknowledged this new
reality, telling the Sixteenth Congress of the Central

Organization of Cuban Trade Unions that
for decades our five-year and annual plans
were based on the existence of a Socialist
with which we established extensive
camp
economic relations. The socialist camp today
does not exist politically. We will not lie
to ourselves. We hope that some of the
existing trade agreements will still be
honored
[but] we have no security and
can have no security. 40
.

.

.

.

.

.

Susan Kaufman Purcell reports that the impact of

Eastern Europe's democratic revolutions is already being
felt in Cuba.

Factories have closed; transportation and
construction which depend on imports from
Eastern Europe are in decline; workers are
having difficulty getting to their jobs and,
if and when they arrive, they often remain
idle because some crucial import or spare part
is unavailable; consumer goods such as
toothpaste and razor blades are in short
See "'New Model' CMEA Wins General Acceptance in
Principle," The Current Digest of The Soviet Press 42
(January 1990): 14.
38

39

Ibid.

A full text of Castro's speech to the Sixteenth
Congress of the Central Organization of Cuban Trade
Unions on 28 January 1990 is found in Granma Weekly
Review 11 February 1990, p. 2.
40

,
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supply, and interminable waits for television
sets awarded to model workers have become

commonplace

41

Moreover, in a recent speech outlining what might lie
ahead, Castro acknowledged that an agreement with

Bulgaria for 12,000 tons of poultry had not been signed.
The same is true with an agreement with Czechoslovakia
to provide barley.

Castro added that buses and spare

parts from Hungary may not arrive and that Cuba could
not count on receiving parts for their Czechoslovak

thermoelectric plants. 42
In order to cushion the economic blow, Castro has

been actively pursuing other trading partners,

especially in Latin America.

In 1989 Cuba increased its

trade with Mexico (a new economic cooperation agreement
was signed in October 1988 which covered 149 projects,

including almost all economic areas as well as education
and research), Venezuela (in January 1989 Cuba signed a

three-year trade agreement with Venezuela, the first
between the two countries), Brazil (trade between Cuba
and Brazil has grown from virtually zero to $80 million
in the past two years, almost all of which consists of

Brazilian exports to Cuba)

,

and Peru (a one-year

renewable agreement was signed with Peru in August 1989

41

Purcell, p. 118.

42

Ibid.
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which commits each nation to seek balanced trade at a
level of $10 million each). 43

Cuba has also begun to woo Japanese investors in
the hope of securing Japanese supplies of raw materials

and spare parts to reopen idle industrial plants as well
as Japanese investments in tourism. 44

And with China

the Castro regime has discovered a renewed affinity:

opposition to the reforms of the USSR and Eastern
Europe.

"This is already emerging as the basis for

better trade links: over the past year Chinese goods
have been appearing more frequently on Cuban shop
shelves." 45

Moreover, in late March 1990 the PRC

agreed to provide Cuba with a ten-year interest-free
loan to aid "simple projects easily implemented." 46

Despite these moves towards economic

diversification, as long as the U.S. economic embargo of

Cuba survives it will be difficult for Cuba to end its
economic dependence on the USSR and Eastern Europe.
This means that even without a conscious Soviet policy

See Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report:
Cuba nos. 1-4 (1989). This process of diversification
was praised by President Gorbachev in his April 1989
trip to Cuba.
43

,

See Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report:
Cuba, no. 2 (1989): 31-32.
44

45

Latin America Weekly Report

.

22 February 1990.

"China Gives Cuba Ten-Year Interest-Free Loan,"
Granina Weekly Review 2 April 1990, p. 1.
46

.

142

to alter Soviet-Cuban economic relations, the economic

changes set in motion by perestroika will increase the
economic isolation of Cuba and may increase domestic

pressures within Cuba for economic reform.

History may

prove that because of the "other factors" to which
Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin referred

when in Cuba in April 1990--f actors such as socialist
solidarity and, perhaps more importantly, the

institutional interests of the Soviet military in not
losing their strategic outpost in the Western

Hemisphere

— the

Gorbachev leadership may not

dramatically alter Soviet relations with Cuba in the
short run. 47

However, one must wonder how long a

revolutionary state convinced of its historical mission
will continue to enjoy the largess of a superpower which
no longer speaks in universal terms, seeks accommodation

with the United States, and is rapidly turning its
attention from adventurism to internal rebuilding.

Gillian Gunn, a senior associate of the Carnegie
Endowment and a Cuba specialist, posits that "however
warm the Moscow-Washington relationship has become, it
is unlikely that Gorbachev could convince his military
to sacrifice its valuable assets in Cuba in the near
future" (Gillian Gunn, "Will Castro Fall?” Forei gn
Policy 79 [Summer 1990]: 135).
47
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Castro's Response To Perestroika

From the perspective of the Cuban leadership, the

world has become an increasingly hostile place.

Former

a lli e s in the socialist world are accepting reforms or

being thrown out of office; the Soviet Union is

withdrawing from its commitment to socialist
internationalism; U.S. -Soviet relations have improved

without a commensurate warming of U.S. -Cuban relations;
and Cuban-Americans are confident that the fall of the

Castro regime is imminent. 48

The Cuban perception is

that the socialist world is in crisis largely due to the

success of a long-term imperialist strategy of

undermining socialism from within.

This has been

compounded by "some errors that might have been
committed which, in Cuba, [are] being eliminated through
the process of rectification of errors and negative

tendencies." 49

Castro has made it clear, however, that

while nations "[have] the right to evolve from socialism
to capitalism

.

.

.

nothing and nobody will make Cuba

deviate from the socialist path." 50

In his New Year's

address to the Cuban people in January 1990 Castro
0n this latter point see David E. Pitt, "Dreaming
of an End to Castro, Cubans in Miami are Abuzz," The New
York Times 19 February 1990, p. 1.
48

,

Quoted in "Developments in Eastern Europe put
Cuba's Castro on the Defensive," Latin American Regional
Reports: Caribbean 25 January 1990, p. 1.
49

,

50

Ibid.
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declared that "if fate were to decree that one day, we

would be among the last defenders of socialism

...

we

would defend this bulwark to the last drop of blood." 51
In general, Fidel Castro's response to Soviet

perestroika and to the changes it has engendered has
been characterized by bravado and contempt for the

reformers in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Behind this harsh rhetoric however, one can discern a

multi-faceted strategy which attempts to defuse or
repress demands for reform of the island's Castro-style

socialism and Marxist-Leninist political structures.
Castro's response to perestroika begins with the

creation of a siege atmosphere at home which is used to
both justify the refusal to liberalize politically and
to demand greater sacrifices from the Cuban people.

This is coupled with a potent mix of appeals to

revolutionary idealism and Cuban nationalism, increased
"democracy" for pro-Castro loyalists, heightened

repression of dissidents, and an active policy on the
part of the maximum leader of going to the people in

order to bolster morale and improve his image.

A common theme which runs through the public
pronouncements of President Castro, especially since
December 1989, is that his island nation is at imminent

“Quoted in Michael D. Barnes, "A Visit to Havana,"
The Times of the Americas, 21 February 1990, p. 20.
145

at the hands of either the United States or the

nation

s

erstwhile friends and allies.

This siege

atmosphere is created to justify both the refusal to
liberalize politically and the demand for greater

popular sacrifice.

In late 1989, on the occasion of the

return of Cuba's dead from its African campaigns, Castro

equated their death in the service of the revolution

with the effort now required of Cubans to defend the
revolution.

"They died for socialism," Castro declared.

"We will be able to follow their example.

.

.

.

Socialism or deathl" 52
Most often the threat to the revolution is

described as emanating from the United States.

At a

press conference for Cuban and foreign journalists given
on April 3,

1990 President Castro asserted that

the U.S. government ... is experiencing a
great euphoria stemming not just from the
events in Panama or Nicaragua, but stemming
from the events that took place in the Eastern
European countries. The United States can't
contain its idea at this time, its feeling of
They
being the master of the world.
can't hide their euphoria. That's what led
The United States
them to invade Panama.
One day it decides
is intervening everywhere.
that Libya must be bombed, so it bombs Libya.
Another day it decides that Lebanon must be
It's no longer a
bombed, so it bombs Lebanon.
matter of U.S. philosophy implying the right
to intervene in Latin America, but the right
[W]e
to intervene anywhere in the world.
know that as a consequence of all that, we're
now forced to confront some dangers, because
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

“Quoted in Gunn,

p.

140.

146

.

.

the U.S. policy toward Cuba has lately grown
more aggressive and more threatening. 53

On July 26,

1990,

in an address commemorating the

thirty-seventh anniversary of the assault on the Moncada
Garrison, President Castro made his case even more
strongly, arguing that "Cuba is a country constantly

threatened by the imperialists.

..."

For President

Bush, Cuba is "a sick obsession."

Cuba is everywhere. When Bush has breakfast
in the morning there must be a Cuba in his
coffee, in the water or the bread.
He never
forgets Cuba neither awake nor asleep.
It's a
sick obsession and a disgrace for the world.
Even the allies of the United States in Europe
ask how far these crazy people will go? But
their intentions are obvious. 54

With the increasing friendship between the U.S. and
the USSR, Castro believes that the U.S. "sees Cuba as
the enemy par excellence."

Cuba, he argues, "stands in

the way" of U.S. plans for the hemisphere and for the

Third World in general.

Cuba is "the irritating thorn,

the bone in [the U.S.] throat."

Hence,

"more than ever

before [the United States] harasses Cuba, threatens
Cuba.

" 55

A full text of the press conference is found in
Granma Weekly Review 22 April 1990, pp. 2-5.
53

,

A full text of Castro's address is found in
Granma Weekly Review 5 August 1990, pp. 3-5.
54

,

See the transcript of President Castro's meeting
with Christian Base Communities in Brazil 17 March 1990,
reprinted in Granma Weekly Review 8 April 1990, pp. 755

,
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U.S. battleships and aircraft carriers keep
hovering around our country. The U.S. rulers
are arrogant and have gone mad; emboldened and
euphoric, they think socialism no longer
exists which makes them more aggressive, more
dangerous. This is the beginning of a new
era, a new stage.
These may be times of very
challenging tests for our people. 56
In the face of increased U.S. aggression, Castro

has called upon his people to defend "the ideological

and military trenches of the revolution."
If in the future we are given the role of
being one of the last bastions of socialism,
in a world in which the U.S. embodies Hitler's
imperialist dream, we will know how to defend
it.
[W]e prefer to die rather than be
slaves and go back to being dominated by the
United States.
Cowards surrender, not
revolutionaries.
[Hence] Cuba won't be
as easy to overcome as the United States
thinks 57
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Castro has blamed the "half-hearted" condemnation
by Latin American countries of the U.S. invasion of

Panama for Washington's growing "arrogance, prepotency,
and aggressiveness."

But it is not only sworn enemies

of the revolution that appear to be conspiring against

Castro has been enraged by the "repugnant

Cuba.

attitude" of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and even

Bulgaria in voting with the U.S. in the United Nations
Human Rights Commission to put Cuba on its watch list.
Speech given by President Castro to the Sixteenth
Congress of the Central Organization of Cuban Trade
Unions, January 28, 1990. Full text is found in Granma
Weekly Review 11 February 1990, pp. 2-4.
56

See transcript of Castro's meeting with Christian
Base Communities, Granma Weekly Review 8 April 1990.
57
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He has said that these "ex-Socialist countries" will be

responsible for the bloodbath if the U.S. invades
Cuba. 58

Cuba's declining economic conditions have led the

island's maximum leader to call for increased sacrifices
by the nation's people, justifying these as necessary in
an increasingly hostile world.

The government's recent

decision to conserve Cuba's fast-diminishing oil stocks
by closing the Ernesto Guevara nickel plant in Moa and

cutting by 50 percent the supply of petrol and diesel
oil to both the state sector and private consumers was

justified in light of the "[uncertain] conditions under

which we will receive oil in the future." 59

Similarly,

in August 1990 Castro warned his countrymen that

draconian austerity measures would have to be imposed if
the USSR was no longer willing or able to go on

supplying an annual 90 million barrels of subsidized
petroleum.

By early August 1990 the Soviet Union was

See "Friends Become Foes as Cuba Refuses to
Accept Moscow's s New Thinking'," Latin American Regional
Reports: Caribbean 5 April 1990, p. 1.
58

The indefinite shutdown of the Ernesto Guevara
nickel plant in Moa will cause a major disruption of
supplies of the metal to the Soviet Union, which
normally takes the entire production of the plant, some
See "Special Measures for Fuel
15,000 tons a year.
Shortage," Granma Weekly Review 9 September 1990, p. 9;
and "Production Halted at Moa Nickel Plant," Latin
American Regional Report: Caribbean 4 October 1990,
59

p.

7

.
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already 50 percent behind the agreed quota of 13.3 tons
of oil for 1990. 60

President Castro has argued that in this period of
economic hardship Cubans "have to implement more than
ever that principle of the Three Musketeers: One for all
and all for onel" 61

Cuba's deteriorating economic

relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe
are what the imperialists are hoping for, it's
one of their great hopes.
[0]ne of the
imperialists' biggest hopes is that the
Eastern European problems or the problems of
the Soviet Union will deprive Cuba of
resources that are essential, that are
indispensable for development.
[However]
the imperialists underestimate us if they
believe that the Revolution can be defeated in
any field: in the military or the economic
field. ... I believe that seldom before,
probably never, have our people made bigger or
more resolute efforts in the history of the
.

.

.

.

Revolution

.

.

62

60

See "Politics and Diplomacy: Blowing Hot and Cold
on Spain," Latin American Weekly Report 9 August 1990,
Some austerity measures already adopted include:
p. 3.
-asking office workers to switch off their air
,

conditioners
-replacing tractors with oxen in some areas of
the countryside
-extending the tours of duty for military
draftees in order to help the army become
self-sufficient in food
-ordering the halt of all housing construction
projects
See also "Special Measures Taken Because of Fuel
Shortage," Granma Weekly Review 9 September 1990, p.
,

9.

See speech given by President Castro at the
ceremony to present the Bias Roca Construction
Contingent with the National Vanguard flag, 3 June 1990.
Text found in Granma Weekly Review 17 June 1990, p. 3.
61

,

62

Ibid.
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These same concerns with imminent imperialist

attack on the Revolution are used to justify Castro's

unwillingness to engage in meaningful democratic reform.

While President Castro's position traditionally has been
that elections are unnecessary in revolutionary Cuba
since "In Cuba

...

we have our own type of

elections," 63 he has recently been more vocal in his

denunciations of the world-wide movement toward
increased political pluralism.

In a January 28,

1990

address to the Sixteenth Congress of the Central

Organization of Cuban Trade Unions Castro lamented the
growing fragmentation in "societies that are

.

.

.

going

down the beaten path of western and capitalist
philosophy." 64

This fragmentation, he asserts, plays

into the hands of U.S. imperialism.
How wonderful for U.S. imperialism
that
our societies are fragmenting into a thousand
pieces
How wonderful to keep us backward,
oppressed, exploited and dominated
What
would the imperialists give to divide our
How
people into two, three, or 100 fragments
easy it would then be for them to land here
and then trample underfoot the hearts of our
How wonderful it would be for
people
Imperialism if this small country which has
opposed it in such a resolute, courageous and
determined manner for so many years could be
[However]
easily defeated and occupied
in these times, when it seems like a crime to
talk about socialism, and even more of a crime
there can be no
to talk about communism
.

.

.

I

1

1

1

1

.

.

.

.

.

.

See "Quayle Chides Castro but Fidel Gets
Limelight," Los Angeles Times 16 March 1990, p. 2.
63

,

64

Granma Weekly Review

.
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February 1990, p.

2.

doubt about [Cuban unity] around revolutionary
ideas around the most just social concept
ever known to humanity, that of socialism and
65
communism.
,

.

.

,

Castro's concerns have been echoed by Carlos
Aldana, secretary of the Cuban Communist party's central

committee, who in June 1990 confirmed that multiple

political parties will not be tolerated in Cuba.

"Cuba

cannot afford the luxury of opposition parties knowing
that, on our own soil, they will represent the interests
of the United States." 66

In a similar vein, the

Communist party's political bureau issued a statement on
June 23, 1990 in which it reaffirmed "the idea of a
sole, Marti-style and Marxist-Leninist party," and

rejected "the new reactionary dogma that there is no

democracy and renovation without multiple parties."

After all, a multi-party system was "used by imperialism
to apply its neo-colonial dominance" in the past. 67
In this context of increased danger President

Castro has appealed to the revolutionary idealism of the
Cuban people and has increasingly equated Castroism with
Cuban nationalism.

Castro's appeals to revolutionary

idealism can be traced back to the Communist party's

65

Ibid.

“Quoted in "Castro Regime not prepared to discuss
Imperialist Multi-Party System," Latin American
Regional Reports; Caribbean 26 July 1990, p. 1.
v

'

,

67

Ibid.
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1986 decision to "rectify" the "methods and principles"

applied in the running of the economy. 68

Cuban

rectification did away with the limited market

mechanisms previously introduced into the economy and
called for movement away from the "bourgeois liberal"
tendencies of the last ten years and for a
"moralization" of the domestic economy.

To this end the

politburo, meeting in emergency session, approved new

measures which include:
-The end of private construction and sales of
homes
-A clampdown on artists, painters, craftsmen
and tradesmen selling their work privately,
as well as on street vendors, lorry owners and
unofficial restaurants;
-A police clampdown on "anti-social" elements;
-The creation of an official ministry charged
with the elimination of corruption and
inefficiency from the economy;
-A revival of moral incentives and voluntary
work. 69

68

For a detailed discussion of Cuban Rectification
policies see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981);
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two
Decade Appraisal
(Albuquerque
University of New
Mexico Press, 1981); Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Cuban
Economy in the 1980s: The Return of Ideology," in
Socialist Cuba: Past Interpretations and Future
Challenges ed. Sergio Roca (Boulder: Westview Press,
1988), pp. 59-100; Andrew Zimbalist and Susan Eckstein,
"Patterns of Cuban Development: The First Twenty-Five
Years," in Cuba's Socialist Economy: Toward the 1990s
ed. Andrew Zimbalist (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987), pp
,

:

,

,

,

7-21.

See "Politics: Liberal Reforms Outdated," Latin
American Regional Report: Caribbean 24 July 1986, p.
69

,
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4

President Castro argued that these measures were
essential if the mistaken course of the revolution,

which was leading Cuba not toward socialism and

communism but "to a system worse than capitalism," was
to be corrected. 70

Castro asked for popular support

against "people who are apparently great Marxists, well

versed in Marxism, but who have a capitalistic or petty
bourgeois soul," Marxists who have "a blind faith in
economic mechanisms and [a belief] that socialism can be

built with mechanisms" rather than trusting moral
incentives and the revolutionary spirit of the
population. 71

More recently, President Castro has been

quick to praise the revolutionary idealism of workers
and young people.

In separate addresses to construction

workers in May and June 1990 Castro emphasized the need
for continued hard work in order to defend the

revolution in an increasingly hostile international
"All of you are like a flag flying high

environment. 72

in these heroic and glorious times

.

.

.

you are the

Speech given by Fidel Castro at the close of the
Deferred Session of the Third Congress of the Communist
Party of Cuba on December 2, 1986 reprinted in Granma
Weekly Review 5 December 1986.
70

,

71

Ibid.

See "Bias Roca Construction Contingent Awarded
High Labor Distinction," Granma Weekly Review
10 June 1990, p. 9; and "Fidel In The Inauguration of
the Paradiso And Sol Palmeras Hotels," Granma Weekly
Review 2 7 May 1990, pp. 2-3.
72

,

,
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proof of what socialism is, of what socialism can be, of
the superiority of socialism," said Castro in closing
the ceremony to present the Bias Roca Construction

Contingent with the 1989 National Vanguard Flag, awarded
by the construction workers' national trade union. 73

Similarly, in an address to the second meeting of the

Young Communist League on April 28, 1990, President

Castro urged young people to continue to make
ideological work their top priority, for, in the words
of General of the Army Raul Castro,

the upsetting world situation has heightened
the tension for our Revolution in all fields
and represents a great challenge that requires
of us
profound reflection and a
thoughtful, creative response. 74
.

.

.

Castro is also working hard to equate his version
of socialism with Cuban nationalism.

In a December 1989

speech Castro argued that "In Cuba, revolution,

socialism and national independence are insolubly
linked.

If capitalism returned some day to Cuba,

our

independence and sovereignty would disappear forever.
We would be an extension of Miami." 75

In making his

case that "if the Revolution were defeated

...

it

Granma Weekly Review
See "Bias Roca...
10 June 1990, p. 9; and "Fidel Speaks to Bias Roca
Contingent," Granma Weekly Review 17 June 1990, p.
73

,

,

See "Young Communist League's Work Must be
Profound and Dynamic," Granma Weekly Review
13 May 1990, p. 5.
74

,

75

Quoted in Gunn, p. 140.
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3.

would mean the end to our country's independence

...

[since]

Revolution, independence and sovereignty

are inseparable in Cuba," 76 Castro has also invoked the

images of revered Cuban nationalists.
[We are] on the eve of critical tests.
If
those tests come, we can tell Marti that now,
more than ever, we need his thoughts, his
ideas and his virtues. To Marti, Maceo and
all the others like them we also say that now,
more than ever, we are proud of being their
followers, of being their faithful,
unconditional disciples, and we reaffirm two
immortal slogans which link Marx, Lenin and
Engels with Marti, Maceo, Cespedes and all the
other heroes of our independence and freedom:
Socialism or Death
Patria o Muertel
Venceremos 77
l

1

Another aspect of Castro's strategy designed to

ward off the political changes associated with
perestroika is to increase "democracy" for his
supporters by providing them with increased channels to
express their views while staying within the limits of

Castro's own vision of a communist order. The new
initiatives are an attempt to make the state and party
structures more efficient and responsive to the concerns
of those loyal to the existing system.

They are not

designed to accommodate the concerns of dissidents or to
See the text of the speech given by Castro during
a meeting with Brazilian intellectuals in Sao Paulo,
Brazil, on 18 March 1990, reprinted in Granma Weekly
Review 15 April 1990, pp. 2-5.
76

,

See Castro's speech at the closing session of the
Sixteenth Congress of the Central Organization of Cuban
Trade Unions on 28 January 1990, reprinted in Granma
Weekly Review 11 February 1990, pp. 2-4.
77

,
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create additional space for free market mechanisms.

Evidence of this new element of Castro's strategy
appeared in January 1990 when Cuba announced that

henceforth delegates to local Communist party
organizations in workplaces would be chosen by secret
ballot from candidates to be selected by the workers
themselves.

Previously delegates had been chosen from a

list drawn up by the party with a show of hands. 78

In

February 1990 the Central Committee announced it would
begin a process of "perfecting" institutions while

maintaining a "single, Leninist party based on the
principles of democratic centralism." 79

According to

Cuban sources, one of the "formalities" that may be
"eradicated" is the tendency of the National Assembly to

rubber-stamp party decisions.

Also under consideration

is the direct election of Assembly delegates. 80

This movement toward limited liberalization was

furthered in June 1990 when the Political Bureau of the

Cuban Communist Party issued a long note which spoke of
the "exceptionally difficult and dangerous situation"

78

Gunn, p. 141.

"Cubans Outline Plan to 'Perfect' Communist
Rule," New York Times 18 February 1990, p. 9; "HardLine Cubans Consider Reforms," Boston Globe
18 February 1990, p. 2; "Impending Change:
'Participation' with Strict PCC Control," Latin American
Regional Report: Caribbean 1 March 1990, p. 4.
79

,

,

,

80

Gunn, p.

141.
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faced by the Revolution under present circumstances of

unprecedented ideological and psychological pressure and
ca lled for a broad national debate to achieve "ever more

democratic operations of political and state
institutions." 81

While positing that the nation's

commitment to "a single party based on Marti and

Marxism-Leninism

.

.

.

can't be questioned," the

Political Bureau's memo states that
our firmness in the defense of socialism
doesn't mean being closed-minded or resisting
an analysis of logical transformations for
which conditions have matured in the political
life of the country. We want to get different
ideas, suggestions and views which can later
be matured and enriched.
The debate may
cover any aspect of the internal functioning
of the Party such as recruitment, ways of
joining, methods of choosing candidates and
the election of leading bodies with the clear
purpose of finding more democratic
alternatives which assure greater support by
The value of
members for their leaders.
a well-founded and objective national debate
of political clarification is that it will
enable the Party to understand much more
objectively the true state of feelings,
opinions and concerns existing in the country.
Therefore, we should not express regret if
views which until now were inhibited or
repressed come to the fore, and we have the
possibility and opportunity to discuss,
provide evidence and put an end to confusion
and errors. Nor should we be surprised if
tendencies dominant in the catastrophe in
Eastern Europe emerge in one way or the other
will help us
This
in the debates.
democracy,
of
concepts
clarify essential
freedom. 82
and
rights
social justice, human
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

"Communist Party Promotes Broad National Debate,
Granma Weekly Review 1 July 1990, p. 1.
81

,

82
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In early October 1990 the leadership of the Party

announced that it would introduce direct, secret voting
and multiple candidates in elections for municipal and

provincial party committees scheduled to be held between

November 1990 and February 1991.

Arguing that it could

not wait for the coming fourth party congress in early
1991 to introduce the changes, the national leadership

also announced that it was slashing national and

provincial party posts by fifty percent and reorganizing
the powerful Central Committee Secretariat.

The party

should in this way be an example of rigorous application
of the principle of not using a single employee more

than is strictly necessary. 83

Increased Castro-style "democracy" for loyalists is

being balanced by more intense repression of dissidents.
On March 12, 1989 the Cuban security police rousted at

least eleven human-rights advocates from their beds in a

series of early-morning raids, searching homes and

confiscating papers and books.

The Cuban leadership

asserted that seven of the dissidents were arrested
because they sent a congratulatory letter to the United
States delegation to the United Nations Human Rights

Committee hailing the passage of a resolution that
implicitly criticized the Castro Government for acts of
"Cuban Communist Party is Moving to Slash its
Bureaucracy by Half," New York Times 7 October 1990,
83

,

p.

9
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political repression. 84

Cuba has also admitted that

approximately 30 people who testified to the UN Human
Rights Committee that visited Cuba in September 1988
have been detained or imprisoned.

Among the most notable recent detentions are
four members of Cuba's Union of Communist
Youth, who were arrested after they complained
about the lack of democracy in Cuba and
Castro's "personality cult"; the head of the
Cuban Party for Human Rights, Samuel Martinez
Lara, jailed for nine months following his
attempt to organize a demonstration in favor
of perestroika during Gorbachev's visit to
Havana in the spring of 1989; human rights
activist Elizardo Sanchez, imprisoned for two
years and two of his colleagues for one and a
half years each, after they criticized the
trial and execution of Ochoa. 85
A final element of Castro's strategy may turn out
to be the most important, but it is also the hardest to

quantify.

Castro is seeking to enhance his image by

making almost frequent appearances all over the island.
"His bantering, irreverent style is well received by

some Cubans who still regard him as the revolutionary

who forced out a corrupt dictator, who guaranteed
education, health care, and basic food and housing and

who turned Cuba into a mini-power." 86

While tarnished

abroad, Castro hopes that his rule is still considered

legitimate by many at home and that Cubans are committed
David E. Pitt, "Cuba Said to Seize 11 Rights
Advocates," New York Times 13 March 1990, p. 3.
84

,

85

Gunn, p. 142.

86

Ibid.

,
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to him as maximum leader and embodiment of the

Revolution.

Conclusions

Castro's survival strategy, which combines

increased political participation for loyalists,

heightened repression of dissidents and the use of
rhetoric which harkens back to earlier periods in the

revolution's history and demands sacrifices like those
that were necessary to protect the Revolution in its
first years, attempts to maintain the island's Castrostyle socialism and Marxist-Leninist political

structures in an increasingly hostile environment.

The

success of the strategy may depend upon two interrelated
factors: the extent of the hardship engendered by Cuba's

economic isolation and the severity of the austerity

measures imposed by the Castro government; and the
degree to which President Castro is able to use his

charismatic leadership to mobilize the nation in support
of the Revolution.

The Cuban economy has for years been plagued by

inefficiency and bureaucracy.

Consumers have had to

contend with long lines, shoddily produced goods and
frequent shortages of items.

The recent changes in the

socialist world have exacerbated these problems and

brought these long-standing shortcomings to a head.
161

From the perspective of the revolutionary government,
this already bleak situation is intensified by the fact
that Cubans rarely compare their economic conditions

with those of Dominicans or Haitians.

Their main point

of reference "is the United States, particularly their

relatives in Miami." 87

Another reference point is the

recent past, yet in the last few years the standard of
living has deteriorated. 88

Eugenio Balari, head of the

Cuban Institute of Internal Demand, the government
agency charged with researching consumer needs, asserts
that "we are no longer talking about increasing levels
of consumption.

1984 levels." 89

Our goal now is to hold the line at
Moreover, the dramatic drop in Eastern

European trade and the new economic relations between
Cuba and the Soviet Union have required the adoption of

87

Medea Benjamin, "Things Fall Apart," NACLA:
Report on the Americas 24 (August 1990): 15.
88

Andrew Zimbalist attributes the decline in the
Cuban economy in the mid-1980s to "low sugar prices,
plummeting petroleum prices (Cuba's re-export of Soviet
petroleum provided roughly 40 percent of its hard
currency earnings during 1983-1985), devastation from
Hurricane Kate, several consecutive years of
intensifying drought, drastic dollar devaluation, the
tightening of the U.S. embargo and growing protectionism
in Western markets, [which] all combined to reduce
Cuba's hard currency earnings by 337.1 million, or 27.1
As of 1986 Cuba was unable
percent" (quoted in Ibid.
to make further payment of its debt to the West. New
loans dried up, and Cuba cut Western imports
drastically. Cuba was forced once again to depend on
the socialist CMEA.
)

89

.

Quoted in Benjamin, p. 15.
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severe austerity measures which further deteriorate the

standard of living of the majority of Cubans.

The Cuban

government is bracing its people for a "special period
in peacetime

,

"

a period which will require wartime

economic measures, a period which may bring a

precipitous decline in living standards.
Juan M. del Aguila argues that the popular unrest

engendered by the economic crisis will be bolstered by
increased "social fatigue and political disillusionment
[as well as a growing sense of not]

'being on the right

side of history'" as Cubans discover the changes

occurring elsewhere in the socialist world.
Despite government efforts to censor reports
of what is happening in parts of the communist
world, information about it reaches the public
via the Voice of America's Radio Marti and
other outlets.
It is impossible to
determine what impact this information has on
the political elite or sophisticated
technocrats and other policy makers, but there
is no doubt that comparisons between the
situation in Cuba and transformations underway
in the communist world force individuals to
rethink why the Cuban system is stuck and
where it is headed. 90
.

.

.

These developments have led many within the Cuban
exile community as well as significant numbers of

commentators in the mainstream press to assert that it
is only a matter of time before Castro falls in an

Juan M. del Aguila, "Cuba: Guarding the
Revolution," in Glasnost. Perestroika and the Socialist
Community eds. Charles Bukowski and J. Richard Walsh
(New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 79-80.
90

,
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Eastern Europe-style popular uprising.

However, the

link between economic deprivation and popular revolt may
not be so clear-cut in the Cuban case.

The optimism

expressed in the popular media and among exiles is based
on the incorrect assumption that communism in Cuba is as

despised as it is in Eastern Europe.

This is not the

case, in large part because while communism came to

Eastern Europe on the point of Soviet bayonets, in Cuba

communism was the result of revolution.

Samuel P.

Huntington posits that
revolutionary governments may be undermined by
affluence; but they are never overthrown by
poverty. Material deprivations, which would
have been insufferable under the old regime,
are proof of the strength of the new one. The
less their food and material comfort the more
the people come to value the political and
ideological accomplishments of the revolution
for which they are suffering so much. 91
Hence the importance of economic deprivations in

creating popular anti-regime unrest is dependent upon
the degree to which the Cuban people continue to value
and support the Revolution and its charismatic maximum

leader
There is no doubt that the rapid changes that swept

through Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in late 1989
and 1990 have left many Cubans feeling isolated and

confused.

"It's as if we spent our whole lives

Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968),
pp. 309-310.
91
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believing in God, then suddenly we woke up one day and

discovered that God didn't exist," explains a Cuban high
school teacher. 92

The demise of communism has also had

a sobering effect on the revolutionary leadership as

evidenced by the movement toward increased political

participation and "democracy," albeit within the
framework of a one-party system.

Similarly, Castro's

hard-line position appears to have had the effect of
increasing dissent within Cuban society.
Much of the evidence employed to make the case that

anti-Castro sentiment is on the rise is anecdotal.
Gillian Gunn reports that
the U.S. Coast Guard says it picked up five
times as many refugees in the waters between
Cuba and Florida in 1989 as in 1988. Juvenile
delinquency is rising, and last year it was
reported that in a Havana cinema youths began
to hum the song "This Man is Crazy, He Thinks
He Rules The World" when a newsreel showing
Castro was shown. 93
In a similar vein, Medea Benjamin reports that "bitter

sarcastic underground jokes" are circulating through
Cuba. 94

Compounding these feelings of dissent is the

92

Quoted in Medea Benjamin, p. 23.

93

Gunn, p. 144.

0ne has Fidel, his brother Raul and a pilot
"I think I'll throw out a 20 peso
flying over Cuba.
"Why don't
happy," says Fidel.
Cuban
some
make
and
bill
Cubans
two
make
and
bills
peso
two
10
you throw out
"Or I could throw out four 5
happy?" suggests Raul.
peso bills and make four Cubans happy," responds Fidel.
The pilot turns around and says "Why don't you throw
yourselves out and make 10 million Cubans happy"
94
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lasting impact of the "Ochoa scandal."

In July 1989

Major General Arnoldo Ochoa and three other officers

were found guilty of drug trafficking and were executed
by firing squad.

"For years the United States had been

accusing Cuban officials of drug dealing, and we yelled
and screamed that it was just Yankee propaganda to

discredit the revolution," explained a Cuban who had
fought for two years in Angola under Ochoa's command.
You can imagine how we felt when we discovered
some of those accusations were truel
And Cuba
is not like the United States, where you can
separate individuals from the government
because the government changes every four
years.
Here those individuals are the
government, and their activities reflect on
the system as a whole. 95

Juan M. del Aguila argues that there exist antiCastro, pro-reform factions in Cuba's top elite however
he provides no proof that such figures exist.

Similarly, he posits that dissent within civil society
is increasing and that an "underground political

subculture," which often works through human rights
groups and associations, survives in an atmosphere of

great hostility. 96

On the other hand, the State

Department has reported few overt signs of
dissatisfaction.

There are no mass anti-government

(Benjamin, p. 24).
95

Quoted in Ibid.

96

del Aguila, p. 74.
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demonstrations
graffiti.

nor is there even anti-government

,

The lack of overt protest can be explained by

the intense repression of dissidents and by the

ambivalence of many of Castro's critics.

Even

del Aguila, in his discussion of dissent in civil

society

,

concedes that "It is impossible to determine

whether the values of this subculture reject socialism
as such, or only its blatantly dictatorial practices

under the Castro regime." 97
Indeed, Cuban society appears to be increasingly

polarized between a shrinking number of what the
government calls "revolutionaries" and a expanding
number of "counterrevolutionaries."

The former take

solace in the image of David fighting the Goliath

superpowers 98

,

while the latter

are not necessarily sympathetic to democratic
capitalism
[and while] reject [ing]
Marxism-Leninism
do so from a
nationalistic and anti-imperialist posture,
looking to the teachings of Jose Marti for
their inspiration. 99
.

.

.

.

97

Ibid.

,

p.

.

.

75.

"Medea Benjamin describes the views of "Roberto,"
a proponent of this view: "When I asked if he was
worried about a possible cut-off of Soviet trade,
Roberto laughed. "You know us Cubans, we've got more
cojones than the Soviets and the Yankees rolled
together. We thumbed our nose at both superpowers
during the missile crisis and we're still here. Our
cojones got us where we are today, and they'll see us
through the next round" (Benjamin, p. 26).
"del Aguila, p. 75.
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Caught in the middle are the majority of Cubans.

They

recognize the benefits of the revolution and consider

themselves socialists, but have many complaints about
their system.

The majority of Cubans are, therefore,

quite unlike Eastern Europeans and Soviet communists for
they still perceive the Cuban Communist Party led by

Fidel as legitimate, albeit in need of reform.

Will this political center hold?

Will Castro

continue to benefit from Cubans who recognize the
benefits of the revolution but who are increasingly in
favor of reform and liberalization of the regime's

dictatorial rule?

Much depends on which of the two

patterns now discernable in Cuba wins out: the

intransigence of "socialism or death 1"; or the gradual
political opening and liberalization?

Political change

in Cuba is inevitable given the radical transformations

shaking the socialist world.

The question that remains

unanswered is will this change come with the PCC in the
lead, directing a gradual Cuban-style perestroika and

glasnost

,

or will the shaky pro-revolution coalition

currently backing Fidel crumble in the face of growing
hardship and centralized political control.
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CHAPTER

5

PERESTROIKA AND THE SANDINISTA
REVOLUTION IN NICARAGUA

Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, in an interview

with the official FSLN newspaper Barricada

.

was asked to

discuss the influence Soviet perestroika has had on the

Sandinista revolution.

"I do not see

how perestroika

can exert any influence on the Nicaraguan revolution,

which has its own characteristics," he replied.

Vice

1

Coordinator of the FSLN Executive Committee Bayardo Arce
has put it more directly: "We welcome [the USSR's] new

phase of development

perestroika." 2

Unlike the other Marxist-Leninist regime in the
Caribbean, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, has

never adhered to an orthodox Marxism.

theorists

— from

Rather, FSLN

Carlos Fonseca to Daniel Ortega

— have

stressed the need to shape Marxism to a nation's unique
conditions.

Hence, from the Sandinista perspective

"perestroika is the answer to a socialist regime 70

years after its revolution

.

.

.

[it]

is the result of a

socialist regime with 70 years of experience." 3

"Daniel Ortega on Peace, Economy, Politics,
Plans," Barricada 31 December 1987, p. 1.
1

"Arce Hails Soviet Revolution, Assistance,"
Latin America 9 November 1987, p. 22.
2

3

FBIS-

Daniel Ortega in Barricada 31 December 1987, p.
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2.

Sandinista theorists posit that no one could, or should,
expect socialism to take the same form everywhere.
As will be discussed below, Sandinista theorists
see socialism coming to Nicaragua, because of its unique

conditions, in a two-stage process.

Interestingly, many

of the developments one associates with Soviet politics

under Gorbachev

glasnost

,

with its freedom to criticize

one's superiors and communicate with one's leaders;

economic liberalization in which private enterprise,

albeit limited, is valued and seen as a key to the
nation's development; increased levels of democracy

— are

present also in the first phase of Nicaragua's

Sandinista revolution. 4

Hence, unlike Castro in Cuba,

the Sandinistas, even more pro-Soviet members of the

Frente like Minister of Planning Henry Ruiz, seem not to
be threatened ideologically by the changes in the Soviet

Union and the socialist world. 5
The assertions of President Ortega and other

members of the FSLN notwithstanding, perestroika and the
changes it has brought to the socialist world have had
serious implications for the FSLN.

With "the demise of

According to Daniel Ortega: "Many of the elements
being handled within perestroika were already part of
the Nicaraguan revolution, given the character of our
process." Ibid.
"Foreign Cooperation Minister Ruiz on
Perestroika," FBIS-Latin America 19 January 1990,
pp. 19-21.
5

,
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Communism" the flow of aid to the Sandinistas from the

socialist world declined, which in turn, exacerbated the

economic downturn which was crucial in the Sandinista 's

electoral defeat in February 1990.

Moreover, Soviet

foreign policy "new thinking's" emphasis on the

interrelated issues of improving relations with the
United States and resolving regional conflicts, coupled

with the USSR's unwillingness to bankroll another client
state in the distant Western Hemisphere, led the USSR to

stress the limits of their support for the Nicaraguan

revolution.

This increased the isolation of Sandinista

Nicaragua and had the effect of pressuring the FSLN to
pursue peace with the Contras and their U.S. backers. 6

The FSLN and the Sandinista Revolution

The FSLN was founded in Tegucigalpa, Honduras in

July 1961 by three friends and former university
students: Carlos Fonseca Amador, Tomas Borge and Silvio

Mayorga.

Fonseca, who had discovered the writings of

Augusto Cesar Sandino early in his student years and
would champion Sandino 's thought among his fellow
revolutionaries, and Borge were introduced to Marxism as
high school students in the provincial town of Matagalpa
Not surprisingly, both nations deny that any
pressure was exerted on the FSLN. See "Press Club News
Conference," FBIS-Latin America 13 November 1987,
pp. 13-20 and "Soviet Ambassador Comments on Relations,"
FBIS-Latin America 19 December 1989, pp. 17-18.
6

.

,
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in the early 1950s and read Lenin as students at the

national university in Leon.

Both joined the youth

organization of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN)
Nicaragua's pro-Moscow Communist party.

Fonseca later

became a member of the PSN and visited the Soviet Union
in 1957 as Nicaragua's only delegate to the Sixth Youth

and Student Festival in Moscow.

Upon his return Fonseca

wrote "A Nicaraguan in Moscow," a pamphlet extolling

socialism and giving an idealized account of what he had
seen

7

Back in Nicaragua, Fonseca renewed his political
activism, now working to have his friend Borge, who

along with other student leftists was arrested after the
1956 assassination of Somoza Garcia, released from

prison.

Fonseca was arrested several times and then in
The victory of Fidel

1958 was deported to Guatemala.

Castro led Fonseca to Cuba in 1959, and thereafter
Fonseca began traveling surreptitiously among Cuba,

Costa Rica, Mexico and Nicaragua, organizing

revolutionary opposition to the Somoza regime.

The

Cuban revolution also reconfirmed to Fonseca, Borge and

Mayorga the central importance of the armed struggle in

Sahily Tabares Hernandez, "Biografia de Carlos
Fonseca Amador , " in Sandino: Guerrillero Proletario
ed. Carlos Fonseca Amador Comision Evangelica Latino
Americana de Educacidn Cristiana: Lima, 1979), pp. 5-12,
(New York: Basil
and Denis Gilbert, Sandinistas
1-19.
Blackwell, 1988), pp.
7

,

(

.
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the mountains and the need to build sympathetic support

among the local peasant population.

Put differently,

the Cuban revolution reconfirmed the correctness of

Sandino's guerrilla war and the incorrectness of the
PSN's cautious strategy of peaceful change.

"For us,"

wrote Tomas Borge, "Fidel was the resurrection of
Sandino

.

.

.

the justification of our dreams." 8

The neophyte Sandinista guerrillas attempted to

transplant the Cuban experience to Nicaraguan soil, and
from 1962 to 1967 actually practiced Castro's "foco"
strategy.

In 1963, a first, unsuccessful guerrilla

"foco" was started in the Coco and Bokay River regions
in north-eastern Nicaragua.

Living conditions at the

FSLN base on the Rio Coco on the Honduras-Nicaragua

border were appalling.

According to Tomas Borge:

There was nothing to eat, not even animals to
There was no salt.
It wasn't just
hunt.
hunger that was terrible, but constant cold 24
hours a day, because we spent all our time in
the river. We were always wet through with
the clinging rain of that part of the country,
the cold a kind of unrelieved torture,
mosquitos, wild jungle animals and insects.
No shelter, no change of clothes, no food. 9

Worse still, the non-Spanish speaking Miskito
Indian inhabitants of the region did not supply the

®Tomas Borge, Carlos. El Amanecer Ya No Es Una
Tentacion, (Managua: SENAPEP, 1979), p. 23. Quoted in
George Black, Triumph of the People (London: Zed Press,
,

1981)

,

9

p.

76.

Quoted in Black, p. 78.
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support the FSLN expected.

"To the Miskitos, the

difference between the FSLN and Somoza's Guard was hazy.
Both wore olive green uniforms and carried guns; neither

could communicate with the sparse local population." 10
The 1963 clash between the FSLN "foco" and the National

Guard dealt the guerrillas heavy casualties and caused

them to retrench militarily for nearly three years in
order to develop better urban and rural support systems.
In 1967 another "foco" was launched in the area

around the Pancasan mountain, approximately thirty miles
east of Matagalpa.

Although the Sandinistas received

active support from local peasant sympathizers, the

outcome for the Sandinistas was inevitable.

At the end

of August 1967 Somoza's forces located the Pancasan

"foco" and the National Guard succeeded in decimating

much of the FSLN's rural organization, killing

13

senior

members of the leadership, including Silvio Mayorga, as
well as their peasant collaborators.

Yet unlike the

1963 uprising, the fighting in 1967 spurred worker and

student solidarity protests which helped bolster the

political authority of the FSLN within Nicaragua. 11

10

Black, p. 78.

n A detailed discussion of FSLN tactics at this
time is found in Donald C. Hodges, Intellectual
Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1986), pp. 218-224. See also
Black, pp. 80-82.
,
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In the wake of this defeat the FSLN abandoned its

foquismo” in favor of the Vietnamese-inspired strategy
of "protracted people's war," with its greater emphasis

on the complementary character of military action and

political work among the masses.

In 1970 the FSLN's

national leadership ordered that the organization go

underground and only enter into combat as a last resort.
Between 1970 and December 1974, when the Frente began a
new offensive, the FSLN concentrated on organizing its
supporters.

In urban factories,

in the universities and

in the countryside, the FSLN gained new recruits and

collaborators, so that by the Managua earthquake of

December 1972 the rebels were in a stronger position to

continue their struggle against the Somoza dictatorship.
The 1972 earthquake set off a political crisis that

gathered momentum through the remainder of the decade.

Rising labor unrest, high inflation, disquiet among the
economic elite and growing political dissatisfaction

because of Somoza 's attempts to engineer his return to
the presidency characterized 1973 and 1974.

Indeed, the

Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), the

country's leading business organization, became one of
the regime's most tenacious critics while Catholic

Church authorities clashed with Somoza over his control
of crucial relief supplies.
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In 1974 the FSLN resumed the military offensive,

now backed by a stronger organizational network in the
cities and countryside and with a seasoned military arm.
The return to the offensive began December 27, 1974 with
an assault on a party in honor of U.S. Ambassador

Turner B. Shelton at the house of Jose Maria Castillo
Quant, a wealthy cotton exporter and former Minister of

Agriculture.

At 10:50 p.m., shortly after the departure

of Ambassador Shelton, a well-drilled assault team of

thirteen Sandinistas attacked and took the entire party
hostage.

Following several days of intense negotiations

mediated by Archbishop Obando y Bravo, the hostages were
released in return for a $2 million ransom, the release
of eighteen Sandinistas held prisoner by Somoza, and the

publication of lengthy communiques from the FSLN in La
Prensa, El Centroamericano

.

and the government paper

Novidades as well as their broadcast on Nicaraguan radio
stations

12

The hostage-taking of 1974 gave the FSLN a huge

symbolic victory, won the freedom of several key

Sandinista leaders (including Daniel Ortega Saavedra)
and raised a large sum of money, and in its wake the

FSLN stepped up both its urban and rural actions.

The

hostage-taking was also a humiliating defeat for Somoza,
one which did not go unanswered.
12

Black, pp. 86-88.
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A state of siege was

declared

,

and for 33 months the nation suffered under

martial law and press censorship.

"If Somoza was unable

to pull the fish out of the water," wrote a Nicaraguan

author describing the state of siege, "he would try to
empty the pond or poison it." 13
Somoza ordered the Guardia's best counterinsurgency troops to comb every inch of the
mountains where the guerrillas operated most
freely.
To accompany these "search and
destroy" missions, aircraft of the Nicaraguan
airforce bombed the area, resorting in many
cases to the use of napalm and defoliants.
Peasant huts were burned out and their crops
destroyed, women raped.
Half a dozen
concentration camps were set up in Matagalpa
and Zelaya and another in Chinandega.
In
April 1976, 100 peasant families disappeared
from three northern hamlets, and in November
1977 Nicaraguan and American church sources
listed a further 350 peasant disappearances.
The number of those who died in the 33 months
of the state of siege can never be calculated,
but 3000 is a frequent estimate. 14
The ferocity of Somoza 's repression kept the FSLN

pinned down in its rural strongholds, and it seemed

momentarily as if the movement might have been
destroyed.

The government's suffocating pressure led to

parts of the Frente being isolated from each other as
rural guerrilla forces were cut off from urban cadres
and as much of the leadership fled the nation or was in
hiding.

This in turn, engendered a splintering of the

13

Quoted in Ibid., p. 88.

14

Black, p. 89.
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FSLN into three distinct factions or "tendencies," each

espousing different tactics.
The Proletarian Tendency (TP) was the first to
appear, this group emerged from the urban guerrilla

front in 1975.

Influenced by the intellectual Jaime

Wheelock Roman, the Proletarian Tendency sought to
broaden the movement's mass base by organizing unions in
factories, in poor neighborhoods, and among new classes

emerging from industrialization.

The TP's adherence to

a "traditional Marxist line" would be criticized by the

other factions. 15
The Guerra Popular Prolongada (Popular People's

War

— GPP)

faction has its roots in the original FSLN

rural organization.

After the defeat at Pancasan, the

GPP abandoned the "foco" strategy and preferred the

cautious accumulation of forces advocated by Mao TseThe other factions criticized

Tung and Vo Nguyen Giap.

15

For example, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, of the
Terceristas, in 1978 said of the TP: "They really don't
represent the traditions and the content that have
The [TP] doesn't transcend
characterized the FSLN.
propagandism" (quoted in John A. Booth, The End and the
Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1985), p. 313).
Excellent discussions of the Proletarian Tendency
are found in Hodges, pp. 233-239; Black pp. 92-94; David
Nolan, FSLN: The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the
Nicaraguan Revolution (Coral Gables, FL: Institute of
Interamerican Studies-Graduate School of International
Studies, University of Miami, 1985), pp. 50-59;
"Interview With Jaime Wheelock Roman," Latin American
Perspectives 20 (Winter 1979): 121-127.
.

.

.

,

,
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the GPP as being too cautious militarily and prone to

isolate itself from the daily life of the people. 16
The Terceristas (Third Force) faction appeared in
1976-1977.

The Terceristas' leaders, including former

GPP members Daniel and Humberto Ortega Saavedra, relaxed
the original FSLN's requirement for Marxist-Leninist

orthodoxy and rapidly increased their ranks with social
democratic, social Christian and bourgeois recruits,

while the leaders remained Marxist-Leninists

.

The

Terceristas were bolder that the other factions in 19771978 and they pressed the urban and rural insurrection

with vigor.

The other tendencies criticized them for

excessive boldness if not adventurism, and for a lack of
ideological purity. 17
The FSLN was saved from splitting entirely by the

rapid escalation of popular opposition to the Somoza
dynasty.

As hostility to the regime grew, the

internecine battles diminished.

In early 1978 mass

protests against the killing of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro

0f the GPP Daniel Ortega said, "They have gone
along proposing the accumulation of forces, [but] they
go into the jungle and isolate themselves from the daily
struggle of the masses" (quoted in Booth, p. 313). See
also Black, pp. 94-95; Nolan, pp. 32-49; "Interview With
Henry Ruiz ('Modesto')," Latin American Perspectives 20
(Winter 1979): 118-121.
16

Booth pp. 143-144; Black, pp. 95-97; Hodges,
pp. 239-255; Nolan, pp. 60-84; "Interview With Daniel
Ortega," Latin American Politics 20 (Winter 1979): 11417

,

118.
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and the spontaneous rebellion in Monimbo "revealed a

popular revolutionary animus far greater than most FSLN
leaders had expected." 18

Again in August, more

spontaneous popular uprisings occurred in Matagalpa,

Jinotepe and in other cities.

By the beginning of

September 1978 Tercerista leaders concluded that the
revolt was coming with or without them and that they had
best put themselves at the head of the movement.

September

9

On

Tercerista fighters launched a national

urban insurrection which was quickly joined by thousands
of lightly armed volunteers as well as GPP and TP

regulars, despite their initial resistance to the plan.

Somoza responded to the insurrection with heavy
shelling, bombing and strafing attacks which allowed the

Guard to retake each rebel controlled city.

These

attacks also had the affect of confirming in the minds
of most Nicaraguans the view held by Archbishop Obando y

Bravo that Somoza "will not go accept by force." 19
This in turn, heightened the political authority of the

Sandinista rebels.
The insurrectionary activities of the Nicaraguan

people coupled with the expectation of success drew the
FSLN back together.

On March 3, 1979 representatives of

the three Sandinista factions signed a formal
10

Booth, p. 144.

19

Quoted in Gilbert, p. 11.
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reunification agreement.

Whatever reservations the

other factions may have had about the Tercerista tactics
to which the document committed them, they were not

willing to risk being left behind by history.

The

agreement established a nine man National Directorate,

with three representatives from each faction.

The

members, who would guide the FSLN for years to come,

were Daniel and Humberto Ortega and Victor Tirado for
the Terceristas; Borge, Henry Ruiz and Bayardo Arce for
the GPP; and Wheelock, Luis Carrion and Carlos Nunez for
the TP.

The Directorate functioned as a collegial body

without a single leader. 20
During the months between the September

insurrection and the Final Offensive of May-July 1979,
the FSLN was able to train and arm thousands of

guerrilla fighters.

According to Humberto Ortega:

Though 150 of us took part in [the September
1978] insurrection, from that moment on we
quickly multiplied into greatly superior
numbers three or four times that number and
with the potential to recruit thousands more.
Thus we grew in men and we grew in armament,
because we seized [weapons] from the enemy. 21

—

The Sandinistas also benefitted from a steady flow
of munitions donated by Venezuela and Cuba or purchased

on international markets and channeled through Panama

20

Black, pp. 142-154; Gilbert, p. 11.

21

Booth, p. 145.
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and Costa Rica. 22

The shipments included some heavy

arms which would later allow the FSLN to conduct

conventional warfare on some fronts.

In urban barrios

the FSLN was creating a network of civil defense

committees

,

to support guerrillas and meet the emergency

needs of the civilian population.

Somoza was, at the

same time, rearming and expanding the National Guard and
in guns and numbers the Guard remained superior to the

FSLN.

But the odds were improving.
At the end of May the FSLN began its "Final

Offensive."

The business-led, moderate opposition,

operating through the Broad Opposition Front

(

FAO

backed the uprising with a general strike that closed
down enterprises across the country. 23

Volunteers

rapidly expanded the ranks of the insurgents and by
22

Family

Shirley Christian, Nicaragua; Revolution in the
(New York; Random House, 1985), pp. 79-81.
.

23

The FAO included middle and upper-middle class
reformist opponents to Somoza who called for political
democracy, an end to political corruption, freedom to
organize, a mild agrarian reform, and broadened social
welfare guarantees. The FAO actively sought a
negotiated settlement with Somoza from September 1978January 1979, encouraged by the U.S. and the OAS.
Internal concessions to Somoza, his Liberal Party and
the National Guard split the FAO in late 1978-early
1979.
The growing military power of the FSLN and the
FAO's failure to settle with Somoza further hurt the FAO
and by early 1979 it had lost its status as the rebel's
main political front to the United People's Movement and
the National Patriotic Front. The latter, which
included unions of various sorts, student groups and
lower and middle-class Nicaraguans, were more clearly of
the radical left and their agendas were much closer to
the FSLN's. See Black, pp. 100-141.
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earl y June the Sandinistas controlled much of the north
and were mounting a strong attack with a conventional

army from the south.

After weeks of brutal combat, the

government managed to dislodge Sandinista forces from
their stronghold in the militant, working class

neighborhoods of east Managua.

But the FSLN continued

to advance from the north and south so that by mid-July

they controlled most of the country and were poised for
a final drive on the capital.

On July 17 Somoza, his son Tachito and half-brother

Jose (both Guard officers), and a few other ranking

officials boarded a plane for Miami.

The caretaker

government they left in place survived for two days

before its leaders followed the Somozas into exile on
July 19, the official date of the revolutionary victory.
The demise of the FAO and the circumstances

surrounding Somoza 's departure further undermined the

political authority of Nicaraguan moderates and of the
United States.

Neither had been able to move Somoza.

Their loss was the FSLN's gain.

Sandinista strategy,

determination and courage had achieved what
demonstrations, prayers and diplomatic pressures could
not.

An organization whose membership numbered fewer

than 20 militants in 1961 had become the core of a mass
24
movement without precedent in Nicaraguan history.

24

Booth, p. 147.
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Its military forces were soon to become the national

army and its leaders the nation's top officials.

FSLN Ideology

The ideology of the Frente Sandinista has its roots
in two sources: the life and thought of Sandino, and

Marxism-Leninism.

Sandino 's patriotism, his

identification with the masses, his ingenious guerrilla
tactics, his triumph over an elaborately equipped

foreign army and his martyrdom at the hands of the first

Somoza made him the subject of a powerful national myth.
It is Sandino 's image and his myth,

which are important to the FSLN. 25

less so his ideas,

Years of repression

under various Somozas nourished the myth so that for

Nicaraguans of diverse ideological inclinations,
"Sandino and the dynasty became historic poles of

political good and evil, national pride and shame." 26
Only the Marxist left, misled by its own orthodoxy,
seemed indifferent to him.

Fonseca was an exception

among Marxists and he spent hours convincing his fellow

A detailed and intriguing discussion of the ideas
On
of Sandino is found in Hodges, pp. 1-160 especially.
(New
Sandino
Selser,
Gregorio
see
Sandino
of
life
the
York: Monthly Review Press, 1981) and Karl Bermann, ed.
Sandino Without Frontiers (Hampton, Virginia: Compita
Publishing, 1988) which includes Sergio Ramirez's essay
"The Lad From Niquinohomo, " pp. 13-46.
25

,

.

“Gilbert, p. 20.
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revolutionaries that their "National Liberation Front"
should be "Sandinista

.

27

Fonseca and other FSLN writers portray Sandino as a

revolutionary and staunch anti-imperialist with social
ideas verging on Marxism.

But the conception of Sandino

as a proto-Marxist is forced and largely based on

selective quotation.

Sandino was unreceptive to

Communists like the Salvadoran Agustin Farabundo Marti,
who, in Sandino' s words,

have tried to twist this movement of national
defense, converting it into an essentially
social struggle.
I have opposed this with all
my might. This movement is national and antiimperialist. 28

Moreover, while Sandino observed that "Only the workers
and peasants will go to the end, only their organized
force will attain victory" 29 it is often forgotten by

contemporary Sandinistas that the victory he sought was
over the North Americans, not over the bourgeoisie.

The

victory sought was one of national independence, not of
socialism. 30
Black, p. 76, and Bernard Diederich, Somoza and
the Legacy of US Involvement in Central America (New
York: Dutton, 1981), p. 68.
27

,

28

Quoted in Gilbert, p. 21.

Augusto Cesar Sandino, "Manifesto,
February 26, 1930," in Bermann, p. 77.
29

This point is abundantly clear when one reads the
selected writings compiled by Bermann, pp. 48-105. See
especially "Political Manifesto, 1 July 1927," pp. 4830

51.
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There is no doubt about Sandino 's anti-imperialism.
He was profoundly offended by U.S. manipulation of his

country's affairs, disgusted with Nicaraguans like
Somoza who staked their careers on U.S. power, and

preached Latin American solidarity in the face of Yankee
domination of the hemisphere. 31

”[T]he sovereignty of

a people is not to be debated but to be defended with

arms in hand," he argued. 32
In defending the sovereignty of the Nicaraguan

people Sandino consistently opted for the poor against
the privileged.

"His views reflected his own early

experience of poverty and his conviction that the selfserving rich (vendepatrias

'country-sellers,' he called

them) were responsible for American domination of his

country." 33

Sandino condemned both the foreign company

that abused its workers and the moneylender who coveted
an indebted family's land.

His army seized the

possessions of rich landowners who cooperated with the
enemy and distributed them to the poor.

Sandino favored

a national program of agrarian cooperatives for landless

peasants.

But he did not see the need to expropriate

existing landholdings in land-rich Nicaragua for this
purpose.

Moreover, Sandino had no systematic objection

31

See Bermann, pp. 48-105.

32

Quoted in Gilbert, p. 21.

33

Gilbert, p. 21.
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to capitalism:

"Capital can play its part and grow; but

the worker should not be humiliated or exploited." 34

Sandino 's anti-imperialism, his insistence on

defending his cause with "arms in hand," and his

populism are consistent with the thinking of the
Sandinistas.

The frequent invocation of Sandino has

allowed the FSLN to connect themselves with a tradition
of popular rebellion and anti-imperialism and has also

allowed the movement to associate itself with a

charismatic figure without risking personalistic
leadership.

What is missing in Sandino however, is a

systematic understanding of class conflict and the role
of the revolutionary party.

For this the Sandinista

leadership turned to Marxism.
The leaders of the FSLN were Marxists before they

became Sandinistas and therefore they read Sandino

through Marx.

Victor Tirado, one of the few survivors

of the movement's early years, later explained the

relationship between Marx and Sandino in the evolution
of Sandinista thought.

Marxism for the Sandinistas was a complete
revelation the discovery of a new world. And
the first thing we learned from it was to know
ourselves, to look inside our country into our
people's heritage toward Sandino. Through
Marxism, we came to know Sandino, our history,
and our roots. This is, among other things,

—

—

34

Quoted in Ibid., p. 22.
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—

the teaching we received from Marx reading
him, as Fonseca said, with Nicaraguan eyes. 35

The FSLN has not treated Marxism as a fixed canon
but as a body of insights that they can adapt to their
own needs and Nicaraguan conditions.

Sandinista

ideology starts from the Marxist premise that class

conflict is inevitable in most societies and a source of
progress in human history.

A pamphlet written by

Fonseca in 1968 and directed at students the FSLN
declared,

historical experience
teaches that there
can be no peace between millionaires and
workers
that there can be no situations
other than the following: either the rich
exploit the poor or the poor free themselves,
eliminating the privileges of the
millionaires 36
.

.

.

.

.

.

Similarly, the FSLN's "General Political-Military

Platform (May 1977)", an internal document issued by the
dominant Tercista leadership, declares that the working
class, synthesized and guided by the Sandinista

vanguard, the FSLN, "will be the leaders of the

revolution."

The same document asserts that "The

dialectical development of human society entails the

Victor Tirado Lopez, "Karl Marx: The
International Workers' Movement's Greatest Fighter and
Thinker," in Nicaragua: The Sandinista People's
Revolution ed. Bruce Marcus (New York: Pathfinder
Press, 1985), p. 105.
35

,

Carlos Fonseca, Obras, Volume
Nicaragua, 1982), p. 69.
36
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,

(Managua: Nueva

progress from capitalism to socialism." 37

These

statements suggest faith in Marx's Marxism.

However

Sandinista thinkers from Carlos Fonseca to the current
leadership have understood that classical Marxism does
not fit Nicaraguan conditions very well.

According to the Sandinistas, Nicaragua in the
1970s was a nation whose economic and political growth

was distorted by imperialism.

Imperialism distorted the

development of the economy through its emphasis on the

production of primary exports consumed by developed
capitalist economies.

"Our function," observed

Sandinista agricultural minister Jaime Wheelock, "was to
grow sugar, cocoa and coffee for the United States; we
served dessert at the imperialist dinner table." 38
Similarly, U.S. intervention into the political realm
has created a bourgeois state which serves the interests
of imperialism.

39

The Sandinistas concluded that the dependent

character of the Nicaraguan economy and the imperialist
"General Political-Military Platform of the FSLN
for the Triumph of the Popular Sandinista Revolution
(May 1977)" in Conflict in Nicaragua: A Multidimensional
Perspective eds. Jiri Valenta and Esperanza Duran
(Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 301-304.
37

,

Stephen Kinzer, "Nicaragua: The Beleaguered
Revolution," New York Times Magazine 28 August 1983,
38

.

p.

17.

Carlos Fonseca Amador, "Nicaragua: Zero Hour," in
Sandinistas Speak ed. Bruce Marcus (New York:
Pathfinder Press, 1982), pp. 13-22.
39

,
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control of the state had stymied the historical

development of Nicaraguan society.

The national

bourgeoisie had accepted its own subordination within a
system of imperialist domination, thereby losing the

opportunity to play a progressive role in Nicaraguan
history. 40

Sandinista theorists dated the

bourgeoisie's surrender of its historic responsibilities
precisely from the day in 1927 that the Liberal
oligarchy abandoned the fight against the American-

backed Conservative regime, leaving Sandino to confront
the American intervention on his own.

The Sandinista

revolution would not be a bourgeois revolution since

"...

our country's bourgeoisie

— which

liquidated and

castrated itself as a progressive political force by
clearly surrendering to the interests of Yankee

imperialism and by cooperating with the most reactionary

Nicaraguan forces on May

4,

1927

— is

not and will never

be a vanguard in the struggle against tyranny and in the

democratic-revolutionary process

.

41

If the bourgeoisie was unequal to its historic

role, so was the proletariat.

Nicaragua's dependent

capitalism did not create a substantial working class.
See especially Chapter III of the "General
Political-Military Platform of the FSLN " "Various
Fundamental Tenets of the Popular Sandinista
Revolution," in Valenta and Duran, pp. 302-311.
40

,

"General Political-Military Platform of the
FSLN," in Valenta and Duran, p. 303.
41
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Most of the salaried labor force in export agriculture

worked seasonally and depended on subsistence
agriculture or marginal urban employment between
harvests; there was little opportunity to develop a
sense of class identity.

Despite these difficulties the Sandinistas managed
to cling to their revolutionary optimism and to adapt
the theory of progressive classes to their needs.

Sandinista theory overcame the inadequacies of the

proletariat by stretching the definition of the class
base of the revolution and by emphasizing the vanguard
role of the party.

The FSLN came to conceive of itself

as a leader of a "worker-peasant alliance," a notion

championed by the Tercerista tendency.

The FSLN's 1977

"General Political-Military Platform" proposes a

coalition "composed of the worker-peasant class allied
to the petit bourgeoisie (especially students and

intellectuals)" as "the motor forces of the Sandinista
Revolution.

" 42

The 1977 "Platform" also proposes
the creation of an ample Anti-Somocista Front
that will cluster in one way or another, all
the anti-Somocista sectors, parties and mass
organizations throughout the country,
43
including the opposition bourgeoisie
.

"General Political-Military Platform of the
FSLN," in Valenta and Duran, p. 303.
42

43

Ibid.

,

p.

315
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This enlargement of the movement, which proved a key

element in Sandinista strategy, did not signal a demise
in the influence of the FSLN in the revolutionary

struggle as the bourgeoisie was regarded as a partner in
a coalition in which the Frente would be "hegemonic." 44

Indeed, the "Platform"

Somocista Front
alliance." 45

...

posits that the "Broad Anti[is a] tactical and temporary

In an interview conducted a year later,

Daniel Ortega refers to the platform and employs

virtually the same language.

The broad anti-Somocista

front is "tactical and temporary," and despite the

alliance with bourgeois progressives, the FSLN's program
is tied to the "proletarian, peasant, and middle

classes

" 46
.

Sandinista theorists posit that the same distorted

pattern of national development that required broadening
the social base of the revolution has also required that

The Platform states that "political hegemony in
the Front will be obtained and maintained by the
The opposing bourgeoisie thereby will not be
FSLN.
allowed the political leadership of the Anti-Somocista
Front: the struggle will be planned and conducted
according to the guidelines set forth by the FSLN ..."
Ibid.
44

.

(

.

.

)

45

Ibid.

"Interview with Daniel Ortega," Latin American
Perspectives 6 (Winter 1979): 117-118. For a discussion
of the role of the bourgeoisie and the middle sectors in
revolutionary Nicaragua see Orlando Nunez Soto, "The
Third Social Force in National Liberation Movements,"
Latin American Perspectives 8 (Spring 1981): 5-21.
46
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a historically conscious elite acting in the interests

of the oppressed classes, a vanguard party,

revolution.

lead the

The vanguard concept is Lenin's most

important contribution to the ideology of the FSLN

According to FSLN leader Dora Maria Tellez, in 1979 the
Sandinista movement was comprised of
men and women who
contain within
themselves the dignity of all the people.
They are examples to all of us. And then,
through struggle, the people as a whole
reclaim the strength and dignity shown by a
a few

.

.

.

few. 47

The FSLN, as vanguard party, sees itself as acting
on behalf of an ideologically backward working class or
as a substitute or stand-in for the proletariat. In 1979

the FSLN National Directorate declared that
[the] FSLN exercises the control of power in
the name of the workers and the other
oppressed sectors, or, what would in effect be
the workers control power
the same,
through the FSLN. 48
.

.

.

The FSLN vanguard sees itself as the leader of a

two-stage revolution in which national liberation is
followed by social liberation.

According to the 1977

"Platform,

To break the chains that bind our country to
the yoke of foreign imperialism is the
determining factor in our struggle for
national liberation. Breaking the yoke of

Margaret Randall, Sandino's Daughters:
Testimonies of Nicaraguan Women in Struggle (Vancouver
New Star Books, 1981), p. 53.
47

,

48

Quoted in Gilbert, p. 32.
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exploitation and oppression imposed by the
dominant reactionary forces over our masses
determines our process of social liberation.
Both historical enterprises will advance
together, indissolubly, if there exists a
Marxist-Leninist cause and a solid vanguard to
direct the process.
Our struggle should
never be left midway, even if conciliatory,
bourgeois forces should strive for such a
goal.
The popular-democratic phase should be,
for the Sandinista cause, a means used for
consolidating its revolutionary position and
organizing the masses, so that the process
moves unequivocally toward socialism. 49
.

.

.

The first phase would focus on defeating Somoza and

freeing Nicaragua from the clutches of imperialism while
laying the groundwork for the social revolution phase.
This was to be accomplished through the Broad Anti-

Somoza front, and, after July 1979, a new government in

which the FSLN would be "hegemonic."

The key objective

of the new government, the FSLN National Directorate

agreed in March 1979, would be the "neutralization" of

potential internal and external enemies, while

accumulating the military and mass forces that
"guarantee the continuity of our [revolutionary]

process

" 50
.

The second phase of the revolution has as its goal
the creation of socialism.

"

[0]ur great objective,"

"General Political-Military Platform of the
FSLN," in Valenta and Duran, pp. 301-302.
49

FSLN-DN, "Documentos de Unificacion ," p. 108,
quoted in Gilbert, p. 37. See also Henri Weber,
Nicaragua: The Sandinista Revolution (London: Verso,
1981
pp. 61-85
50

,

)

,
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wrote Fonseca in 1969, "is socialism." 51

Sandinista

documents and pronouncements have reiterated Fonseca's
assertion that socialism is the final aim of the
revolution.

Yet, despite the FSLN's commitment to

socialism there is no consensus within the organization,
beyond the view that their actions would be dedicated to

pursuing "the logic of the majority," the interests of
society's poor and marginalized, as to what socialism

would entail.
A key party document published in 1980 asserts
that
The objectives of the Revolution are none
other than to fight until it guarantees the
well being of all workers. Instead of the
shack, decent and humane housing.
Replace the
floor with a bed to which the producer of
social wealth has a right. 52

Others see Nicaraguan socialism grounded in the creation
of a "new man," who has overcome the self-serving values

promoted by capitalism.

In 1979 Carlos Tunnermann, then

Minister of Education, observed:
The new Nicaragua also needs a new man who has
stripped himself of egotism, who places social
interests before individual interests. A new
man who knows that the contribution that each
individual can make to the community is very
important and that the individual is most

51

Quoted in Gilbert, p. 38.

FSLN -Secretaria Nacional de Propaganda y
Educacion Politica "El Sandinismo no es Democrat i smo
quoted in Ibid.
52

,
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,

fulfilled when he works within a
collectivity 53
Yet Humberto Ortega appears to reject completely the

notion of a "new man."

His vision of the future focuses

more on everyday essentials.
[We want to] escape underdevelopment and
create wealth so that the people will be happy

and not just further socialize our poverty.
We want to see the day when all our people can
eat ham and they can have television sets and
take vacations. 54
The second stage of the revolution would also be
one characterized by a direct, participatory form of

democracy, in which the interests of the majority would
be ensured.

As is made clear in the 1977 "Platform,"

the realization of Sandinista democracy will require the

interim leadership of a conscious vanguard which will
create national institutions capable of defending the
interests of the majority.

Moreover, Sandinista

democracy will emphasize democratic results over
democratic process and popular participation over
electoral institutions.

Indeed, Sandinista theorists

argued that electoral democracy, which historically has
not served the interests of the majority, especially in

the developing nations, would have to await the

Carlos Tunnerman, Hacia Una Nueva Educacion en
Nicaragua (Managua: Distribudora Cultural, 1983),
p. 19, quoted in Ibid.
53

,

54

Quoted in Gilbert, p. 39.
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establishment of the national institutions capable of

defending the revolution. 55

The FSLN in Power

When the Sandinistas triumphally entered Managua on
July 19 they alone enjoyed immense authority and
prestige.

The Somocistas were in flight, the liberal

bourgeoisie was in significant disarray and the FSLN
enjoyed the support which could allow them to destroy
their real enemies and false allies alike.

Yet the

Sandinistas proved to be generous in victory.

penalty was abolished.

The death

The 7,500 captured Guardsmen had

the right to a normal trial and faced a maximum of

thirty years imprisonment.

The property and political

rights of the anti-Somoza bourgeoisie were preserved,
and in 1980 the private sector controlled 80 percent of

agricultural production, 75 percent of industrial

production and 45 percent of the service sector. 56
Moreover, COSEP representatives and their allies even
had a majority on the new Council of State until April

Jose Luis Coraggio, Nicaragua: Revolution and
Democracy (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 11-56.
55

,

Henri Weber, "Nicaragua: The Sandinist
Revolution," in Crisis in the Caribbean eds. Fitzroy
Ambursley and Robin Cohen (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1983), pp. 105-106.
56

,
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1980 when the FSLN expanded its size from thirty-three

to forty-seven. 57

The "generosity" of this early period of Sandinista

rule aroused some fears that the FSLN was too close to
the bourgeoisie and would mortgage "the revolutionary

future in order to cope with the immediate needs of

business and of the local treasury." 58

There were

however, good reasons for the FSLN steering clear of a

"maximum program" which would entail wholesale
nationalizations, renunciation of the huge foreign debt

contracted by the Somozas and assumption of all power.
First, FSLN commandantes realized that if the nation was

to rise from the ruin caused by years of Somoza neglect

and revolution they would need the technical, managerial
and administrative skills of the bourgeoisie, as well as

the confidence bourgeois participation would inspire in
57

Sandinista Nicaragua's first constitution, the
Fundamental Statute of 22 August 1979, created the
Council of State which shared legislative functions with
the Governing Junta of National Reconstruction JGRN)
The Council was originally slated to have thirty-three
representatives, with twelve from the FSLN and its
closest political allies, but the FSLN Directorate and
the JGRN later added fourteen new delegates, twelve from
pro-FSLN groups. This decision precipitated the first
serious political crisis of the new regime as Alfonso
Robelo, leader of the Nicaraguan Democratic Party,
immediately resigned from the government, followed a few
days later by Violetta Chamorro, widow of the antiSomoza leader murdered in 1978. David Close, Nicaragua
Politics, Economics and Society (London: Pinter, 1988),
(

,

p.

122.

James Petras, "Whither the Nicaraguan
Revolution?" Monthly Review 31 (October 1979): 15.
58
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Western financiers.

Hence the Sandinistas sought to

reactivate the private sector through the provision of
cre dits, enforcing labor discipline and moderating wage

increases, and by ensuring respect for their property

and their participation in high office. 59
Second, engaging in alliance politics with the

liberal bourgeoisie also allowed the FSLN a breathing
space to consolidate its position before moving on to
the socialist phase of the revolution.

During this

period the FSLN sought to extend the benefits of the

revolution to all areas of the nation and to spread the
growth of Sandinista popular movements.

Third, a period

of alliance politics was seen as necessary given the

ideological underdevelopment of the Nicaraguan masses.
Since the vast majority of Nicaraguans did not have the

ideological understanding of the vanguard, and since the

bourgeoisie did play an active role in the struggle
against the dictatorship, most Nicaraguans did not see
the irreconcilable conflict of interests between the

bourgeoisie and the people that the vanguard did.
Therefore,
one key function of the FSLN alliance policy
was precisely to enable the working masses to
grasp this conflict through their own
experience of the bourgeoisie's attitude on
the transitional phase; and to make this

59

Close, pp. 73-106.
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possible without endangering the process of
transition itself. 60
The FSLN strategy of alliance involved real

concessions to the bourgeoisie, however as with the
alliance politics which led to the overthrow of Somoza,
the Sandinistas were determined to maintain their

hegemony within the new society. 61

The FSLN leadership

had no illusion about the deep-seated conflict between

their own socialist perspective and the goals of the

Nicaraguan bourgeoisie.

Moreover, the leadership

understood that the two were bearers of radically
different social projects which they would eventually
seek to impose on one another.

In order for the FSLN

project to win out, the Frente set out to spread and

reinforce the structures of hegemony.

During the period

of alliance with the bourgeoisie guerrilla fighters were

organized into a Sandinista army and police force; the
FSLN secured a majority on the Council of State, and the

Sandinistas built a system of mass organizations.
national literacy crusade

— which

The

sent 100,000 volunteer

students and schoolchildren to the countryside in an

60

p.

Weber , "Nicaragua: The Sandinist Revolution,"

108.

FSLN comandante Jaime Wheelock summarized this
position by saying: "Let the bourgeoisie just produce
and limit itself, as a class, to a productive role. Let
it use its means of production to live, not as an
instrument of power [or] domination" (quoted in Close,
61

p.

74).
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e ff°rt to

eradicate illiteracy

— is

another example of

FSLN tactics in this period of alliance with the
bourgeoisie.

The volunteers' mission was to teach the

campesinos how to read, write and count, to give lessons
in the history of Nicaragua, and to help the

agricultural workers to organize unions and militias.
For six months, these 100,000 young people
shared the lives of "the wretched of the
earth." Most of them, FSLN leaders believe,
will be permanently marked by the experience,
and will know how to approach political
problems "starting from the class interests of
rural proletarians." Conversely, the
schoolchildren's arrival en masse to teach and
serve them did more than any material benefit
to convince the peasants that something
fundamental had changed "at the top," that
power belonged to them and no longer to the
senores 62
.

The FSLN's hope that the bourgeoisie would be

willing to help reconstruct Nicaragua while the Frente
strengthened its political position and pursued its
social project was soon proved untenable.

Class

polarization set in almost immediately after the July 19
triumph.

Many members of the privileged classes were

certain that totalitarian communism was just around the
corner.

Accordingly, some fled immediately to Miami

whereas others first illegally decapitalized their
industries, transferred money abroad, and then fled.

The process of class polarization was exacerbated by the

“Henri Weber, "Nicaragua: The Sandinist
Revolution," p. 112.
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resignations of Alfonso Robelo and Violetta Chamorro
from the Council of State in early 1980, the takeover of
La Prensa --the nation's largest independent daily--by a

conservative wing of the Chamorro family, and by the
election of Ronald Reagan in the fall 1980.

The

election of Reagan, who had campaigned on a platform
that "deplor[ed] the Marxist-Sandinista takeover of

Nicaragua" and promised to end all aid to that country,

accelerated the class polarization as many in the

privileged classes "then apparently saw even less need
than before to accommodate themselves to the new

revolutionary system." 63

From then on, tension mounted

rapidly as the conservative Catholic church hierarchy,
the opposition political parties, COSEP and La Prensa

—

"all working in obvious coordination with the U.S.

embassy"

— showed

less and less inclination to engage in

constructive dialogue. 64
As the Contra war began in ernest in 1982,

increased emphasis was placed on military preparedness
and certain human rights were gradually infringed upon
65
in the name of national security.

Moreover, on six

Thomas W. Walker, "Introduction," in Reagan
Versus the Sandinistas ed. Thomas W. Walker (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1987), p. 6.
63

,

64

Ibid.

,

p.

7

.

In December 1981 President Reagan signed a
directive authorizing the CIA to spend $19.8 million to
create an exile paramilitary force in Honduras to harass
65
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occasions

,

La Prensa was closed for two-day periods in

accordance with a law decreed by the original Junta (of

w hich La Prensa owner Violetta Chamorro was a member)
which calls for such an action when an organ of the
media is found to be disseminating material that is
false and destabilizing.

La Prensa would function under

censorship until April 1986 when editor Jaime Chamorro
published an op-ed piece in the Washington Post calling
for Congress to vote $100 million worth of aid to the

Contras.

Once the U.S. Congress passed the measure La

Prensa was closed.

The paper's owners rejected calls

from President Ortega to reopen, subject to the

emergency law, and an offer from Xavier Chamorro, owner
of the pro-government El Nuevo Diario

.

to buy them

out. 66

Accompanying the military and paramilitary efforts
to oust the Sandinistas was an escalating program of

economic strangulation.

The Reagan administration

blocked approval of Nicaraguan loan requests before the

World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank.
trade was initially drastically curtailed

U.S.

— the

Nicaraguan quota for exporting sugar to the U.S. was cut
by 90 percent in May 1983

— and

then, in May 1988,

Nicaragua. See "U.S. Said to Plan 2 CIA Actions in
Latin Region," New York Times 14 March 1982, p. 2.
,

66

Close, p. 131.
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embargoed completely.

The Reagan administration also

made an effort to pressure its allies to follow suit. 67

These activities, coupled with a sharp decline in

world prices of Nicaragua's export commodities and the
enormous direct and indirect cost of the Contra war

meant that by 1983 Nicaragua was having increasing
problems in servicing its debt.

In 1983 Venezuela

ceased supplying Nicaragua with oil. and in 1984 Mexico

drastically curtailed supplies of oil.

As a result, by

1984 and 1985 the Sandinistas were forced to turn to the

USSR for most of its petroleum needs.

The scarcity of

foreign exchange also meant severe shortages of imported
goods or of products manufactured in Nicaragua from

imported material or with imported machinery.

"Of

course, such shortages also triggered rampant inflation

and spiraling wage demands, which could not be satisfied

given the tremendous diversion of government revenues
into defense." 68

Social services were also adversely affected.

As

increased emphasis was placed on defense, government
spending on health, education, housing, food subsidies,
and the like, had to be cut back.

Further, the Contras

were deliberately targeting the social service
Michael E. Conroy, "Economic Aggression as an
Instrument of Low-Intensity Warfare," in Reagan Versus
the Sandinistas pp. 57-79.
67

,

68

Walker, p. 9.
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infrastructure and many government employees in health,
education, and cooperatives were kidnapped, tortured and
killed; schools, clinics, day care centers and grain

storage facilities were destroyed.
Both the Contra war and the U.S.-led economic

aggression against Nicaragua did not have the desired
effect of engendering sufficient discontent to overthrow
the Sandinista government.

Conversely, as Walker points

out, by 1984 popular support for the government

— as

measured by levels of membership in pro-Sandinista
grassroots organizations

— reached

its highest levels.

"By then, around half of all Nicaraguans aged sixteen or

older were in such voluntary support organizations." 69
Moreover, in the November 1984 election for President
and National Assembly the FSLN received 66.7 percent of
the presidential vote and 62.9 percent of the Assembly
vote. 70
69

Ibid.

Susanne Jonas and Nancy Stein, "The Construction
of Democracy in Nicaragua," Latin American Perspectives
66 (Summer 1990): 7.
Ninety-three percent of eligible voters registered;
although voting is not mandatory, 75.4 percent of
registered voters voted; 70.8 percent of registered
voters cast valid ballots.
In principle, no major tendency was excluded from
the electoral process. A total of six opposition
parties (ranging from rightist to Marxist-Leninist
participated in addition to the Sandinistas. All
participants were guaranteed equal resources (campaign
funding, supplies, and the like) and equal access to the
mass media. A number of emergency restrictions were
lifted so that no party was prevented from carrying out
70
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While the Reagan administration was quick to

denounce the Nicaraguan election as a "Soviet-style
sham,

the openness and fairness of the election was

"

recognized by foreign observers not directly linked to
the Reagan administration.

Americas Watch called it "a

model of probity and fairness" and reports in the

European press were almost uniformly favorable, as was
the report by a delegation from the European

Parliament. 71

Even U.S. observers outside of the U.S.

government, such as the Latin American Studies

delegation, as well as former diplomats and Congressmen,
judged the election most favorably. 72
In the wake of the 1984 election, the Reagan

administration explicitly threatened Nicaragua, saying
that the election constituted a "setback for peace
talks" in the region and would "heighten tensions" with
the United States and warned that it intended to

pressure Nicaragua to hold a "real election" as a

an active campaign or from holding rallies.

Americas Watch, Human Rights in Nicaragua:
(New York: Americas Watch,
Reagan, Rhetoric and Reality
"The Reagan
Gleijeses,
Piero
Ibid.
1985), quoted in
History
85
Current
America,"
Doctrine and Central
(December 1986): 401-404.
71

.

Latin American Studies Association, "Report of
the LASA Delegation to Observe the Nicaraguan General
Election of 4 November 1984," LASA Forum Winter 1985.
Wayne Smith, "Lies About Nicaragua," Foreign Policy 70
(Spring 1987): 166-182.
72

,
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condition for peace talks. 73

While continued U.S.

hostility was ostensibly aimed at pressuring the FSLN to

reform and democratize their nation, the true objective
was to overthrow the Sandinista government, or, falling
short of that, to "raise the cost" of having made a

revolution by causing the maximum amount of
destruction. 74

Angeles Times

As a Pentagon official told the Los
.

2,000 hard-core guys could keep the pressure
on the Nicaraguan government, force them to
use their economic resources for the military,
and prevent them from solving their economic
problems. 75

Similarly, according to former Contra chief Enrique

Bermudez in 1986, the aim of Contra attacks inside

Nicaragua was not to foster democratic reforms but to
"heighten repression." 76
By the end of the 1980s, the U.S. policies of

organizing and financing a counter-revolutionary war,

coupled with the economic embargo, including a blockade
of lending from the major Western multilateral agencies,

proved effective instruments of economic aggression.
73

New York Times

,

5

November 1984, p.

2.

An interesting discussion of the internal debate
over Reagan's policy toward the Sandinista government is
found in Kenneth Roberts, "The United States, Nicaragua,
and Conflict Resolution in Central America,"
International Security 15 (Fall 1990): 67-102.
74

75

76

Quoted in The Nation

,

1

May 1989, p.

Quoted in Jonas and Stein, p. 24.
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1.

Nicaragua's economy was in shambles: gross domestic
product per capita had fallen significantly in almost
each year of Sandinista rule, reaching in 1989 levels

below those Nicaragua knew in 1960; inflation had risen
almost every year since 1979 and had reached 33,000

percent for 1988; reported urban real-wage levels fell
to less than 10 percent of what they were at the start
of the Sandinista revolution; and international

indebtedness had grown to more than seven times the
level inherited by the Sandinista government. 77

Moreover, severe austerity measures implemented in

February 1988, adjusted in June 1988 and redoubled in

February 1989 led to a gradual elimination of virtually
all of the social programs that were the hallmark of the

revolution in its first years. 78

It was hoped that the

austerity measures, which were modeled on the "heterodox
shock" treatments that Brazil and Argentina pioneered in
1985 and 1986 as a means to halt rampant inflation,

would persuade the bourgeoisie to reactivate production,
accelerate the disarming and demobilization of the

Contras who had agreed to a cease fire in March 1988,
and better the Sandinista image outside of the country

Michael E. Conroy, "The Political Economy of the
1990 Nicaraguan Elections," International Journal of
Political Economy 20 (Fall 1990): 5-33.
77

78

Ibid.
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which would in turn, engender increased economic
assistance, especially from Western Europe. 79

Sandinista leaders hoped that the elections of

February 1990 would be a "final resolution" of the
debate over the legitimacy of the FSLN government led by
Daniel Ortega, raising hopes for an end to the Contra
war, peacetime reconciliation, and economic

reconstruction.

However, if as Walker argues, the

Sandinistas won in 1984 because the majority of the

electorate was enjoying an improved standard of living
and because the nation was clearly under attack from a

hostile force, in 1990 the standard of living for the

majority had plummeted and the nation was tired of war.
The economic problems detailed above were exacerbated by
FSLN adjustment policies which reduced public spending,

shrunk public employment by 50,000 persons, attempted to

reprivatize some state companies, and eliminated or

reduced government subsidies on food and public
transportation.

In general, it was

wage laborers, peasant farmers, and small
producers [who] had to assume the social cost
of the policies of adjustment; that is, it was
assumed by those who in the terminology of the
early years were called the driving forces of
the revolution. 80
Carlos M. Vilas, "The Contribution of Economic
Policy and International Negotiation to the Fall of the
Sandinista Government," New Political Science no. 18,
(Fall/Winter 1990), pp. 81-102.
79

,

80

Ibid.
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Similarly, with the signing of a cease-fire with the

Contras in March 1988 at the border village of Sapoa,
public opinion began to associate economic problems more

closely with the government's strategies and less

closely with the war. 81

Furthermore, by early 1990

most Nicaraguans would concur with Esmerelda Pareda,

interviewed by the Boston Globe in a small town
southwest of Managua as she waited to vote: "I have lost
a son and a brother to the war.
I

am here to vote for peace." 82

I

have suffered enough.

Clearly, many

Nicaraguans voted for peace; many voted against the
party which had been unable to end the Contra war and
for the UNO coalition which, because of its explicit

backing by the United States, gave the most credible
assurance of peace.

The USSR, Perestroika and Nicaragua's FSLN
The victory of the FSLN came as a surprise to the

Soviet Union.

Abraham Lowenthal, who visited the Soviet

Union in 1981, reports that Latinskaia Amerika editor,
Sergo Mikoyan, told him that "few could see the

John W. Soule, "The Economic Austerity Packages
of 1988 and Their Impact on Public Opinion," New
Political Science no. 18, (Fall/Winter 1990), pp. 10381

,

129.

Quoted in Alexander Cockburn, "Victory for
Violence," New Statesman and Society 9 March 1990,
82

,

p.

20
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possibility of a Sandinista triumph even in 1979" 83
The Soviet Union played no active role in the guerrilla

war against the Somoza dictatorship and gave no direct
aid to the FSLN.

Nicaragua's Moscow-oriented Communist

party, the PSN, was hostile to armed struggle and tried

to back U.S. efforts to find a replacement for Somoza

until 1979 when the FSLN was unified.

Its role in the

last few months of the war was confined to propaganda
support. 84

The Soviet Union took care to contain its

enthusiasm even after the triumph of the revolution.

An

article in the 19 July 1979 edition of Pravda which

reported the departure of Somoza from Nicaragua was very
low key, there was no acclamation of FSLN success and
the emphasis was heavily on the probability of U.S.

intervention. 85

However, as the Sandinistas began to

consolidate power, Soviet commentaries became more
positive.

In October 1980 leading Soviet ideologist

Boris Ponomarev described the Nicaraguan revolution as a
"major success," and in his speech to the CPSU Congress
of February 1981, Brezhnev stated that the revolutions

in Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Nicaragua were the most

Quoted in Nicola Miller, Soviet Relations with
(New York: Cambridge
Latin America, 1959-1987
University Press, 1989), p. 195.
83

,

84

Black, p. 145.

85

Miller, p. 196.
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important "new victories" since 19 7 6. 86

Similarly,

Soviet academic specialists noted that the FSLN had
steered clear of the mistakes made by Allende in Chile
and that the Sandinista model, with its proposed

incorporation of the private sector, is feasible and
could potentially be applied elsewhere in the Third
World. 87

Despite the enthusiasm among academic specialists,
at the official level Moscow was unwilling to grant

Nicaragua the official "socialist" status that would
command a major Soviet commitment to the Nicaraguan
revolution. 88

Indeed, even before the enunciation of

perestroika and foreign policy "new thinking," all
Soviet interactions with Nicaragua illustrate a desire
to aid the Nicaraguan revolution, thus making life more

difficult for the United States in its own "backyard,"

without turning Nicaragua into "another Cuba."
86

By

Ibid.

Sergo Mikoyan, "Las Particulardades de la
Revolucion en Nicaragua y sus Tareas desde el punto de
Vista de la Teoria y la Practica del Movimiento
Librador," America Latina (Moscow), no. 3 (1980): 10187

115.

Sandinista statements of adherence to MarxismLeninism notwithstanding, the USSR classified the FSLN a
"vanguard party" capable of leading a developing nation
toward socialism. Such parties are seen as
substantially inferior to Communist parties in the level
of the theoretical maturity of their cadres, in the
degree of their revolutionary influence on the working
people, and in their ideological, political and
organizational experience. Miller, p. 197.
88
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denying the Sandinista government official "socialist"
status the Soviets were able to show their solidarity

with revolutionary forces in Central America, while
avoiding the drain on its resources which identifying
itself too closely with the revolution would entail.

In

addition to avoiding the drain on material resources

which Cuba has been for over 30 years, this stance also
allowed the Soviet Union to assert that its intentions
in Central America are not offensive.

On October 18, 1979, when diplomatic relations were

restored between Nicaragua and the USSR, the Soviet

representative to the ceremony in Nicaragua, Yurii
Volskii, Soviet Ambassador to Mexico, was careful to

stress that "Soviet-Nicaraguan relations are not

directed against any third country and will not affect
anyone else." 89

Similarly, when asked in August 1982

how the Soviet Union would respond to direct aggression

against Nicaragua, Yurii Fonkin, Secretary-General of
the Soviet Foreign Ministry, replied, "We will support

Nicaragua politically in every way." 90

In private, one

Soviet official admitted that, "If the Americans invaded

89

Ibid., p.

198.

Morris Rothenberg, "Latin America in Soviet
Eyes," Problems of Communism 32 September /October
90

(

1983):

11.
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Nicaragua
Nothing

what would we do?

,

What could we do?

" 91
.

While the Nicaraguan revolution is a geopolitical

problem for the U.S. and therefore is worth defending,
albeit in a limited way, there are few positive

incentives for the Soviet Union to give their full
support to the FSLN.

The Nicaraguan revolution holds

out the prospect for only limited strategic and

political gains for the USSR.

First, even if the FSLN

had shown a willingness to provide the Soviet Union with
bases, it is difficult to see what strategic advantage

the Soviet Union would enjoy in Nicaragua which it does
not already possess in Cuba.

This has been implicitly

recognized by U.S. officials assessing their own
security needs in the Caribbean.

One U.S. diplomat put

it thus:
In the event of a war in Europe where we'd
have to reinforce NATO, we'd already have to
watch Cuba to guard the shipping lanes from
It's more trouble if we have
the gulf ports.
to watch Nicaragua too. That's
Compared to Cuba, Nicaragua could
it.
never amount to anything. 92
.

.

.

Second, contrary to Sergo Mikoyan's more optimistic

analysis, Soviet officials concluded that Nicaragua's

Jonathan Steele, World Power: Soviet Foreign
Policy Under Brezhnev and Andropov (London: Michael
Joseph, 1983), p. 220.
91

.

Allan Nairn, "Endgame: A Special Report on US
Military Strategy in Central America," NACLA R eport on
the Americas 18 (May/June 1984): 27.
92
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revolutionary power of example as a model of development
is almost exclusively confined to its economically

insignificant Central American neighbors. 93
The relatively more important position of Cuba led
the Soviet Union to adopt a "hands off Cuba" rather than
a "hands off Nicaragua" policy in the early 1980s.

In

an International Affairs article of January 1982 there
is an explicit condemnation of Washington's attempt to

"subvert socialist Cuba, as well as other progressive

Latin American states, such as Nicaragua and Grenada,"
but the declaration of Soviet support refers only to

Cuba
The Soviet Union has supported and will
continue to support the Cuban people in their
struggle to protect their sovereignty. All
progressive and peace-loving forces are coming
out in defence of Cuba and its
independence 94

Even in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Grenada, Soviet
support for the FSLN was still expressed in terms of
95
"unswerving solidarity" with the Nicaraguan people.

Soviet military support to the Sandinista

government has followed this pattern of limited support.
Since 1981, when Contra forces began attacks against the

93

Miller, p. 198.

Khachaturov, "Washington's Latin America
Policy," International Affairs (Moscow) 1
(January 1982): 61.
94

K.

95

New York Times

,

16

October 1983, p. A17
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FSLN, the USSR has been willing to supply the

Sandinistas with sufficient military equipment to keep
the Contras at bay but not enough for the Sandinistas to

become a potent offensive force in the region.

Throughout the 1980s the USSR confined its supplies to
defensive weapons and, moreover, allowed the U.S. to
define what it will accept as defensive. 96

Moreover,

Sandinista requests for quantitative and qualitative
increases in Eastern bloc supplies can be shown to be in

direct response to specific threats to the security of
the revolution.

Arms shipments from the socialist countries were

insignificant in 1979-1980.

They were estimated by U.S.

intelligence sources at $12-13 million worth, and
included Soviet ZPU light anti-aircraft guns, SA-7
surface to air missiles, RPG anti-tank grenades and East

German trucks. 97

At the end of November 1981 Defense

Minister Humberto Ortega spent one week in Moscow
seeking increased supplies in the face of the escalating

Contra war.

U.S. intelligence estimates put Soviet and

The controversy over shipments of Soviet MIG-2 Is
to Nicaragua is illustrative. The Soviet Union has
failed to supply these aircraft, even though five
members of the Nicaraguan airforce were trained in the
USSR to use them, largely because the United States has
stated that their acquisition by the FSLN would justify
a military response.
96

Marc Edelman, "Lifelines: Nicaragua and the
Socialist Countries," NACLA Report on the Americas 19
(May/June 1985): 49.
97
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Eastern European military aid to Nicaragua in 1982 at
$56 million,

"including about 20 more T-54 tanks,

BTR-60 armored personnel carriers,

6

12

105mm howitzers and

around 48 Z152 37mm anti-aircraft guns." 98

The

worsening military situation in 1983-1984 prompted the
Sandinistas to request increased support, and U.S.

administration sources estimate Socialist military aid
to Nicaragua in 1983 at double the 1982 figure, i.e.

over $100 million. 99

The 1983 level was slightly

increased in 1984 and 1985, when shipments were valued
at $115 million.

100

Soviet aid to Nicaragua increased

considerably in 1986 with over $600 million worth of
material shipped, according to the Pentagon.

An only

slightly lower level of aid was maintained over 1987 and
1988, reflecting a growing Soviet hope that U.S. policy

in Nicaragua could be defeated.

101

The Soviet Union's reluctance to be identified too

closely with the Nicaraguan revolution on a political
and military level was echoed by the slowness with which

economic relations were developed with the Sandinista
government.

Moreover, Soviet economic aid to the

Sandinista government became significant only once other
98

Miller, p. 202.

"Ibid.
100

Ibid.

101

Ibid.
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sources of assistance were no longer available to the
FSLN.

As with the provision of military aid, Soviet

economic assistance has been limited and has sought to

provide the revolutionary government with sufficient
resources to survive but little more.

Emergency aid

donated by Moscow in the aftermath of the revolution was
of negligible value and far overshadowed by

contributions by Western sources. 102

No significant

contacts were made between the Nicaraguan and Soviet

governments until March 1980, following the suspension
of U.S. aid on January 23,

1980 and the cancellation of

a $15 million credit on March 2,

1980, when a delegation

of Sandinista leaders travelled to Moscow.

"They

returned with a reciprocal most-favored-nation trading
agreement, a protocol on the establishment of trade

representations, an agreement on planning cooperation
and various other accords providing for Soviet

assistance in fishing, water power resources, mining and
geological surveys, along with a consular convention and
an agreement on air communications." 103
As Nicaragua's economic conditions deteriorated,

the Sandinistas stepped up the urgency of their search

The Soviet contribution apparently consisted of
donations of 1.5 million pencils, 1.5 million exercise
books, 1,000 transistor radios, 30,000 pairs of boots
Ibid., p. 205.
and ten cars.
102

103

Ibid.
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for Soviet support.

primary exports

However, the fact that Nicaragua's

— sugar,

coffee, cotton

— are

already

supplied by Cuba or other developing nations with which

Moscow wants to develop trade relations, limited the
economic activity between the two.

The move toward the

USSR vindicated the position of those within the FSLN,
like Minister of Planning Henry Ruiz, who argued that

integration with the socialist bloc was the best defense
against Washington, and as ties between Nicaragua and
the USSR grew, the FSLN moved away from a mixed economy

toward a more centralized model with emphasis on the
public sector.

Daniel Ortega visited Moscow in May 1982

and negotiated a $100 million Soviet credit for

deliveries of industrial machinery and equipment.

A succession of visits by Nicaraguan leaders to
Moscow in 1982-1983 yielded relatively little in the way
of economic assistance, and between 1979 and 1985 Soviet

aid to Nicaragua measured $300-400 million. 104

Soviet

aid increased in 1985 to an estimated $247 million and
105
in 1986 and 1987 to $250 million.

With the rise to power of Gorbachev and the

enunciation of perestroika and foreign policy "new
thinking," the Soviet policy of limited support to the

104

Ibid.

,

p.

208

By comparison, U.S. economic aid
Ibid., p. 209.
to El Salvador in 1987 was $502 million.
105

219

FSLN became more clear.

On the economic front,

assistance from the socialist countries has declined
every year since 1985, a development which proved a

crucial factor in Nicaragua's economic crises in 1987
and 19 8 8.

106

Since 1987, when hard-currency shortages

made the purchase of sufficient quantities of oil
impossible, the Soviet Union has made it clear that it

cannot be counted upon to supply Nicaragua with all of
its oil needs. 107

The Soviets have also expressed

distress over Sandinista mismanagement and inefficient
use of Soviet aid, and have pressured Nicaraguan

industry "to optimize the use of existing machinery,

increasing their efficiency, instead of seeking an
indefinite increase of available machinery." 108

These

same concerns led to the creation of a limited number of

Nicaraguan-Soviet joint ventures which will employ
resources in a more efficient manner. 109
Under Gorbachev, Soviet policy toward Nicaragua has

been characterized by strong support for both the

106

Conroy, "The Political Economy

107

Miller, pp. 214-215.

.

.

.," pp.

13-14.

i°8"ussr Trade Developing in 'Decisive Manner',"

Interview with Aleksandr Chirjrov, Chief Soviet
Commercial Representative. Barricada 16 March 1988,
,

p.

4

"Ruiz on USSR Trade, Aid," FBIS-Latin America
"Cooperation Agreements
January 1988, pp. 23-24.
21 January 1988, p. 23.
America
FBIS-Latin
Signed,"
109

,
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Contadora process and, when the Contadora process
collapsed in January 1987, the Esquipulas II treaty
signed in August 1987.

The emphasis on resolving

regional conflicts and improving Soviet-U.S. relations
found in Gorbachev's foreign policy led the Soviets to

back negotiations aimed at resolving the Contra war in
Nicaragua.

Further, in the spring of 1989, in an effort

aimed at "contribut ing] to a total and definitive
[

solution to the Central American solution," the Soviet

Union suspended delivery of heavy weaponry to
Nicaragua. 110

This was followed in October by

Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega's assertion that his
government will ask the Soviet Union to suspend its
shipments of light military equipment to Nicaragua "when
the Contra movement completely ceases its armed actions
in Nicaragua." 111

Prior to the rise to power of President Gorbachev,

limited support for Sandinista Nicaragua could be

explained in light of "the lessons of Cuba."

That is,

while the FSLN victory was an irritant to the U.S.
unlike Afghanistan for the USSR

— and

— not

thus was worthy of

"USSR No Longer Sending Weapons to Nicaragua,"
FBIS-Latin America 19 May 1989, p. 4.
110

,

m.’Ortega on USSR Weapons Shipments, GDR Visit,"
"More on
FBIS-Latin America 6 October 1989, pp. 7-8.
1989,
October
6
America
Ortega Statements," FBIS-Latin
6
America
"Arms Shipments to Halt," FBIS-Latin
p. 8.
October 1989, pp. 8-9.
,
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Soviet support, the USSR was unwilling to identify
itself fully with this new regime.

Since 1985 however,

the Soviet's less than total commitment to the

Sandinistas was intended to signal Washington that

Moscow would be prepared to negotiate a solution to the
conflict in Nicaragua.

Such an action would correspond

with the logic of perestroika and foreign policy new
thinking.

It may also have been a means of applying

pressure on the FSLN to be flexible on the negotiations

which resulted in the signing of the Esquipulas II
treaty and to be prompt and thorough in their compliance
subsequently. 112

It is certain, however, that Soviet

cognizance that the U

.

S

.

-Nicaragua conflict could

seriously complicate their own bilateral relations with
the U.S. has led the Soviets to stress the limits of

their commitment to Nicaragua.

Commentators Believe USSR Pressured Ortega,"
FBIS-Latin America, 14 December 1989, pp. 28-29.
112
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CHAPTER

6

PERESTROIKA AND THE REVOLUTION
IN EL SALVADOR

El Salvador's Farabundo Marti Front for National

Liberation (FMLN) has been considered one of the most
ideologically rigid guerrilla movements in Central
America.

The ideological dogmatism which prevented the

FMLN guerrillas from cooperating with certain

businessmen and progressive sectors within the Army in
order to end the country's control by a small oligarchic

group recently has been lamented by one of the FMLN's
leading military commanders and strategists.

Joaquin

Villalobos, long considered one of the more hard-core
leftists within the FMLN, has written that the movement
lost "a historic opportunity" to unite the country

around its cause in the early 1980s, "and our penance
has been these 10 years of war."

1

This ideological

rigidity notwithstanding, FMLN strategic thought has
shown an ability to adapt to changing realities and the

Front has exhibited an increased flexibility in

redefining its goals in accordance with new realities.
Beginning in January 1989 the FMLN launched a new
phase in its revolutionary struggle, one which redefines
FMLN goals in light of new realities.

^BIS-Latin America

,

10

The FMLN

October 1989, p. 28.
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describes the

"strategic counteroffensive" as a phase

in the war which combines military actions with various

proposals for a demilitarization of the nation and

negotiated settlement of the conflict.

Moreover, since

1989 the FMLN leadership has been eager to discuss its

vision of a rebel-led El Salvador.

"The FMLN is

proposing an open, pluralistic project, one which is
rooted in our domestic and geopolitical reality," writes

commander Villalobos.
What is fundamental is not its ideological
definition, but whether or not it resolves El
Salvador's problems.
In El Salvador, to
carry out an agrarian reform, parallel with
the development of a pluralist democracy which
benefits the majority, is to make
revolution. 2
.

.

.

Indeed, Villalobos has recently argued that his group

can no longer even be considered Marxist, and added that

one-party rule in El Salvador would be "absurd."
Instead, the FMLN now hopes to model El Salvador's

future on such prominent capitalist countries as
Germany, Japan and Costa Rica, which have no army and
are closely tied to the United States economy.

3

Similarly, in a recent article in Foreign Policy

,

Villalobos stresses that the future El Salvador is one

Quoted in Sara Miles and Bob Ostertag, "FMLN New
Thinking: Rethinking Peace," NACLA: Report on the
Americas 23 (September 1989): 37.
2

Mark A. Uhlig, "Top Salvador Rebel Alters His
Goals," New York Times 7 March 1991, p. 3.
3

,
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in which the FMLN shares power with other democratic

forces, in which private enterprise plays a significant

role in economic affairs, in which democratic elections

and political pluralism thrive, and, most important of
all, which is not a threat to the vital interests of the

United States. 4
The fact that these alterations in FMLN strategy
and goals have come at roughly the same time as the

global "demise of communism" has led some to wonder if
this is just another manifestation of the world-wide

disintegration of the communist Left.

Has the FMLN seen

the handwriting on the wall and reformed its ways, as

socialism has proven itself unworkable?

The FMLN

leadership says no.
If our revolutionary effort coincides with
perestroika in any respect, it is in the
struggle against the kind of dogmatism and
orthodox thinking that endeavors to transfer
mechanically to our country classic models of
revolution, party systems, or strategy.
Indeed, the struggle against dogmatism with
Latin American revolutionary thought predates
perestroika 5
.

Despite these denials, perestroika and the changes
it has engendered, has had an effect on FMLN thinking.

The "new thinking" of the FMLN is a result of a

confluence of important developments, or perceived

Joaquin Villalobos, "A Democratic Revolution for
El Salvador," Foreign Policy 74 (Spring 1989): 103-122.
4

5

Ibid., p.

113.
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developments.

Some of these are articulated in the

pronouncements and writings of FMLN commanders, while
others are left largely unspoken.

In the former

category one can point to FMLN assertions that the

correlation of forces within El Salvador has changed and
now favors the FMLN and its allies on the left.

Hence,

once the Salvadoran Right learns that the war is now a

stalemate and that its program is untenable,

negotiations leading to a peaceful resolution of the
conflict can proceed.
In the latter category, it is clear that the FMLN

has learned from the experience of the Sandinistas.

The

"lesson of Nicaragua" that has been learned by the FMLN
is that new policies are required to bring change to the

nation without engendering the wrath of the U.S.
Similarly, another largely unspoken reason for FMLN "new

thinking" is the increasing popular support for

democracy and peace in El Salvador.

This growing

sentiment makes it impossible for the left to continue
to advocate insurrection alone and expect large-scale

popular support.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the

composition of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front and then turns to examine the development of the

Front's strategic thought.

It concludes with a

discussion of the various forces which have led the FMLN
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to alter its strategy and now advocate a peaceful

resolution of the conflict.

The Composition of the FMLN
The Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation
(

FMLN

)

is a broad coalition of left forces composed of

five political-military organizations 6 each linked to

specific mass organizations and armed forces.

The FMLN

has its roots in two main sources: radicalized religious

activists, and the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS).

Vatican II and the 1968 Conference of Latin American
Bishops in Medellin, Colombia had a powerful impact on
the Salvadoran clergy.

7

Christian base communities

6

The terminology is that of Tommie Sue Montgomery,
Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and Evolution
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 119-157.
Formed in October 1980, the FMLN includes:
The Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS)
The Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)
The Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP)
The National Resistance (RN)
The Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC)
,

’Vatican II elaborated Pope John XXIII 's 1961 and
1963 encyclicals concerning the human right to a decent
standard of living, education, and political
participation. Vatican II set forth two key principles:
first, that the Church was of this world, and second,
that it was a community of equals. Pope Paul VI
inaugurated the Medellin meeting, where the Latin
American bishops adapted these principles to Latin
reality, setting the stage for many clergy to move
beyond purely religious concerns to political issues.
Penny Lernoux posits that Medellin was "one of the major
political events of the century: it shattered the
centuries-old alliance of Church, military and rich
elites" (Penny Lernoux, Crv of the People [Garden City
,
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were formed in many parishes and through the 1970s these

were important sources for activists and leaders of the

guerrilla-led mass "popular organizations." 8
Similarly, the political-military organizations that
split off from the Salvadoran Communist Party are also

comprised, to a considerable degree, of former
seminarians, radicalized members of the Christian base

communities, and young Christian Democratic Party

dissidents
In varying degrees, all of the political-

military organizations which form the FMLN are products
of a prolonged and turbulent struggle within the

Salvadoran Communist Party.

The PCS was founded by

Augustin Farabundo Marti in 1930, and two years later
organized a peasant revolt in the western departments
the first attempted revolution by a Latin American

Tommie Sue
1980], pp. 31-43).
Montgomery explains that "while four of the six members
of the Salvadoran hierarchy adhered to an institutional,
sacramentalist view of the Church's proper role in
society, the two remaining prelates, both in the
archdiocese of San Salvador (and Archbishop Oscar Romero
before his death) accepted and promoted the positions of
Medellin from the beginning" (Montgomery, p. 100).

NY: Doubleday,

Two of the best discussions of the links between
Christian base communities and the Salvadoran "popular
organizations" are Philip Berryman The Religious Roots
of Rebellion: Christians in Central American
Revolutions (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1984), pp. 91-162;
and Philip Berryman, "El Salvador: From Evangelization
to Insurrection," in Religion and Political Conflict in
Latin America ed. Daniel H. Levine (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1986), pp. 58-78.
8

,

,
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Communist Party.

In the repression which followed

Farabundo Marti and most of the other PCS leaders were
executed and the party was outlawed.
Ever since 1932 the PCS has formally adhered to the

policy of armed struggle as, according to the party
general secretary Shafik Jorge Handal, this is "the most

probable means of attaining victory." 9
hardly the case in practice.

Yet this was

A guerrilla uprising was

attempted in the wake of the Fidelista victory in Cuba.
It was easily suppressed by the military however, and

the party once more set itself firmly against the armed
struggle. 10

Instead, the PCS employed an electoralist

strategy which, initially, called for the party's legal
front, the National Democratic Union (UDN)

,

to

participate in elections, and after September 1971
placed it firmly behind the candidates of the centerleft National Opposition Union (UNO). 11

As late as

1980 Handal claimed that UNO "voiced the democratic

aspirations and structural changes" required by the

Quoted in Mario Menendez Rodriguez, El Salvador:
Una Autentica Guerra Civil (San Jose, 1980), pp. 1509

151.

James Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and
Revolution in El Salvador (London: Verso, 1982), pp. 8710

89.

n The National Opposition Union was comprised of
the PCS front organization the UDN, the Christian
Democratic Party (PDC) and the Revolutionary National
Movement (MNR)
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great majority of the people and forced "a polarization
in the electoral confrontation," and that the popularity
of UNO in the 1972 elections vindicated the electoralist

strategy of the PCS. 12

Rebellion against this strategy came in 1970 at the
Fourth Congress of the PCS.

While brewing for some

time, it was finally sparked by the party's support for

the "Soccer War" with Honduras. 13

In April 1970 then

PCS general secretary Salvador Cayetan Carpio, noting

that within the PCS there exists "a stubborn majority"
that at all costs blocked the advance toward "the

political-military strategy that the people need for
moving towards new stages of struggle," resigned from
the party, went underground with a small group of

comrades, and began building the Popular Forces of

Liberation (FPL)

.

Carpio, a former seminarian, argued

that while a political-military strategy was imperative,
"the armed struggle would be the main thread running
12

Ibid.

,

p.

87.

“According to Dunkerley, "Consistent with its
belief that there existed an industrially-based national
bourgeoisie which would challenge the power of the
landed oligarchy, the party leadership surmised that
this faction would head the campaign against Honduras on
the basis of defending national independence. The
oligarchy, on the other hand, which was distinguished by
its close links with imperialism and secondary interest
in inter-state feuds, would seek to avoid a conflict
which would only disrupt the rhythm of production in the
The major flaw in this interpretation was, as
campo.
argued by the opposition inside the PCS, the absence of
." (Dunkerley, p. 88).
any 'national bourgeoisie'
.

.
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through the people

'

s

revolutionary fervor and would

become in the process the basic element for the

destruction of the counterrevolutionary forces." 14
In 1972 a second political-military organization

splintered from the PCS.

The People's Revolutionary

Army (ERP) was established by former PCS members, young
dissidents from the Christian Democratic Party,
religious activists and students.

Like the FPL, the ERP

had a strongly militaristic conception of the

revolutionary struggle.

For the ERP the armed struggle

was all that mattered, and the party clung to that

belief for nearly a decade. 15

However, within the ERP

two tendencies were present from the beginning.

One, as

suggested above, thought the revolution could be won

principally through military means.

The other tendency,

which was led by poet, essayist and historian

14

Quoted in Montgomery, p. 120.

15

The reason for the split between FPL and ERP
dissidents within the PCS dates back to the Cuban
Revolution and the question of armed struggle.
According to Robert S. Leiken, "During the 1960s there
developed in the PCS currents that favored the Cuban and
Chinese criticisms of the Soviet line of 'peaceful
transition to socialism' which had repudiated armed
Sympathizers of the Cubans gravitated to the
struggle.
The Soviet invasion of
FPL; of the Chinese to the ERP.
Czechoslovakia and enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine-each in turn endorsed by Fidel Castro and repudiated by
the Chinese sharpened the divisions in the party as
well as among its dissidents" (Robert S. Leiken, "The
Salvadoran Left," in Central America: Anatomy of a
Conflict ed. Robert S. Leiken [New York: Pergamon,

—

,

1984]

,

p.

115)
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Roque Dalton Garcia, believed that political as well as

military action was necessary.
mass line

Dalton's insistence on a

that entails political and military work led

the more hardline faction to accuse him of being an

agent of the CIA, to try him in absentia, find him

guilty and condemn him to death.

On May 10,

1975 Roque

Dalton was assassinated, precipitating the final split

within the ERP and the formation of the National
Resistance (RN). 16
By 1978 each of the three main political-military

organizations headed a mass organization which formed
its support base.

Bloc (BPR)

,

The FPL-led Popular Revolutionary

created in 1975, was the largest, with nine

affiliated organizations and a membership of sixty
thousand. 17

Its main base was among agricultural

workers and peasants demanding wage hikes, reductions in
land rents and credits.

The BPR frequently led peasant

occupations of haciendas and uncultivated land.

The FPL

considered the peasantry the key element in a workerAccording to James Dunkerley, "it is something of
a political miracle that [the ERP] was able to survive
the event. Not only did the opposition take with it a
substantial part of the organization to set up [the RN],
but the remnants of the ERP found themselves isolated
with the left and devoid of links and credibility with
the mass movement. As late as 1977 Fidel Castro
denounced the ERP as 'another arm of the imperialist
police' [and] . . . outside of the country it was not
uncommon to hear the ERP referred to as in league with
the CIA" (Dunkerley, p. 94).
16

17

Leiken, p. 116.
232

peasant alliance for a "protracted people's war," and
argued that the mass organizations should provide the
recruits for protracted war. 18
The RN-led United Popular Action Front (FAPU)

created in 1974, focused on forming alliances with
progressive sectors of the church and political parties,

progressive labor unions, and elements of the private
sector.

This would soon become the official policy of

the FMLN/FDR.

The ERP-led 28th of February Popular

Leagues (LP-28) was founded by ERP sympathizers within
the National University in February 1978. 19

LP-28, the

third largest mass organization with about ten thousand
members, was considered by others on the left as having
the least well-developed political program, and was

created as a result of "a belated recognition by the ERP
that if it did not create its own mass organization it
was going to be left in the dust by the FPL and the
RN.

" 20

The fifth political-military organization, the

Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC)
developed from a different conception of struggle.

18

Ibid.

This date was the first anniversary of the
massacre that occurred when the National Police cleared
the Plaza Libertad of pro-UNO demonstrators protesting
the stolen election of 1977.
19

20

Montgomery

,

p.

126.
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Founded on January 26, 1976, its conception of struggle
was regional, and thus rooted in the history of Central
America.
party.

Until late 1980 the PRTC remained a regional
On October 29, 1980 the national units of the

party separated, although ties with each other were
maintained.

In 1979, the PRTC spawned the youngest and

the smallest of the mass organizations, the Popular

Liberation Movement (MLP)
As the above discussion shows, a prominent

characteristic of the Salvadoran left was its
sectarianism.

However by the end of 1979, in the wake

of the FSLN triumph in neighboring Nicaragua, the

differences among the various forces of the left
receded.

This reduction in sectarianism had many

manifestations.

For example, on January 11, 1980 a

press conference was called to announce the unification
of the mass organizations into the Revolutionary

Coordination of the Masses (CRM).

Similarly, on May 22,

1980 the political-military organizations announced the

formation of the Unified Revolutionary Direction (DRU),
which, with three commanders from each of the

organizations, represented a step forward in the
21
development of a unified military apparatus.

The

creation of the DRU did not signal however an end to
Enrique A. Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition
(Chapel Hills University of North Carolina Press, 1982),
p. 160-165.
21

,
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ideological problems among its constituents.

Indeed,

the decade-old debate over how to prosecute the struggle

continued into 1981, with the largest political-military
organization, the FPL, insisting on a prolonged people's

war while the others favored a strategy of popular
insurrection.

Moreover, conflict over the DRU's

decision to adopt the Leninist principle of democratic

centralism caused the RN to withdraw temporarily from
the Directorate. 22

Yet, despite these differences the

members of the DRU announced the formation of the FMLN
on October 10,

1980, creating a unified command for the

various political-military organizations.
The movement toward unity that began in early 1980

was furthered by the unfolding political events within
El Salvador.

The growing and uncontrolled repression in

the countryside, the inability of the junta to control
the security forces, and the junta's failure to carry
out reform, led to a split in the Christian Democratic
Party.

On March 9, 1980 the most progressive wing of

the party, led by Hector Dada and Ruben Zamora,

splintered off and almost immediately reconstituted
itself as the Popular Social Christian Movement (MPSC)
The assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero later in

March added to the momentum toward unity of the centerleft political groups.

“Montgomery

,

On April 11 of the same year a

pp. 130-133.
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coalition of political parties, professionals and
technicians, small business organizations, the National
University, six unions and union federations, and a

student association announced the formation of the

Democratic Front (FD)

.

Five days later this alliance

joined the CRM in creating the Democratic Revolutionary

Front (FDR), thus unifying all the opposition forces
from the center-left to left of the political spectrum.

FMLN Strategic Thought

The prehistory of the FMLN has left a legacy of

sometimes violent internal struggle as well as an

organic link to some very important mass
organizations. 23

The latter have provided not only a

reserve of guerrilla fighters and sympathizers, but also
the bulk of the militias which have played an important

part in the FMLN's military strategy and structure.
The strategic thought of the FMLN is characterized
by a remarkable ability to learn from its mistakes and
an increasing flexibility in redefining its goals in

accordance with new realities.

The years from 1981 to

1991 can be divided into four strategic periods, each of

which represents an adaptation to new realities
confronting the revolutionary leadership: the shortAn excellent discussion of the sometimes violent
internal struggles within the FMLN is found in Leiken,
pp. 111-130.
23
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lived general offensive; the period of rebel

concentrations and the creation of a revolutionary army;
the war of resistance; and, the strategic

counteroffensive
Bolstered by the victory of the Sandinistas in

neighboring Nicaragua, the FMLN in its 1980 Platform,

dedicated itself
to overthrow the reactionary military
dictatorship of the oligarchy and Yankee
imperialism, imposed and sustained against the
will of the Salvadoran people for fifty years;
to destroy its criminal political-military
machine; and to establish a democratic
revolutionary government founded on the unity
of the revolutionary and democratic forces in
the People's Army and the Salvadoran
people 24

With the creation of the FMLN, preparations for the

long-awaited general offensive began.

At 6:30 p.m. on

January 10, 1981, units of the FMLN commandeered radio
stations in San Salvador.

Salvador Cayetano Carpio, a

member of the FMLN General Command, issued the call to
battle
The hour to initiate the decisive military and
insurrectional battles for the taking of power
by the people and for the constitution of the
democratic revolutionary government has
arrived. We call on all the people to rise up
as one person, with all the means of combat,
under the orders of their immediate leaders on
all war fronts and throughout the national
The hour of revolution, the
territory.
.

.

.

"Platf orm of the Democratic Revolutionary Front
(April, 1980)," Quoted in Robert Armstrong and Janet
(Boston
Shenk, El Salvador: The Face of the Revolution
South End Press, 1982), p. 254.
24

,
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hour of liberation is here. The definitive
triumph is in the hands of this heroic
people. ... Revolucion o Muerte.
Venceremos 25
1

In the first hours of the offensive the FMLN had

the Salvadoran army on the run, however soon the tide

turned.

The failed attempt at urban insurrection was

followed by ferocious repression and the FMLN withdrew
from the cities to the countryside.

There a long and

difficult process of constructing a revolutionary army
and a defensible strategic rear guard, or "zones of

control

"
,

began

26

The war, although never ceasing to be a guerrilla

insurgency, acquired increasingly conventional

characteristics.

Starting in 1982, FMLN fighters were

grouped into larger and larger concentrations and
launched a series of spectacular actions aimed at making
the nation increasingly ungovernable.

These actions

culminate in 1984 with the destruction of the country's
largest and most heavily-defended bridge, the
Cuscatlan. 27

25

26

Quoted in Montgomery, p. 138.

For an insightful
aspects of this period,
1981-1984: La Dimension
Salvador: UCA Editores,

treatment of the political
see Mario Lungo, El Salvador
Politica de La Guerra (San
1985).

Sara Miles and Bob Ostertag, "Rethinking War,"
NACLA: Report on the Americas 23 (September 1989): 1627

17.
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In other smaller, yet more significant actions

during the same period, FMLN forces overwhelmed

government outposts in the "zones of control."

These

guerrilla victories eliminated government control in the
rebel "zones" and allowed FMLN forces to develop a new

relationship with residents of the areas.

Moreover, the

elimination of fixed government positions in large parts
of the country allowed the FMLN to train new fighters

and consolidate its political and logistical

structures
Yet despite the rebel victories during this period,

the increasingly conventional character of the war

between 1981 and 1984 played to the strengths of the

Salvadoran military.

The Salvadoran Armed Forces,

especially the air force, bolstered by escalating U.S.
aid, became ever more effective.

This advantage became

decisive and in order to maintain the tempo of the
fighting,

rebel cadre were pulled from irregular
structures such as militia and guerrilla units
to fill the ranks of the larger
concentrations. The transformation of the
FMLN into an encamped, full-time force meant
losing important day-to-day contact with the
rebels' civilian base of support, and meant a
political decline. Yet it was precisely such
organizing and daily contact which were needed
to replenish the "social reserve" that was
becoming exhausted. 28

28

Ibid.

,

p.

18
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In the end, the need to keep up with the dynamic of

escalation led to forced recruitment in some areas in
order to fill the holes left by the high casualty rate

conventional warfare entails.

FMLN leaders have since

publicly criticized this practice, 29 and when the
strategy became unsustainable the FMLN was forced to

restructure completely its strategy and forces.

The

result, after a difficult and prolonged period of debate

and trial and error, was the development of a new

strategic line--the war of resistance.

Beginning in 1984, the War of Resistance marked a
return to guerrilla war: military units were dispersed
and returned to a more irregular status, the "fish" were

mixed back into the "sea."

In place of the emphasis on

a permanent revolutionary army, clandestine organizing

of collaborators, militia and guerrillas was renewed and

strengthened.

Some fighters left the armed struggle and

returned to the city to work with the reemerging
workers' movement.

Others formed underground urban

commando cells, so that the next time the guerrillas
Francisco Jovel of the FMLN General Command has
argued that, "in 1983 and 1984 we committed errors.
Often comrades who had only joined recently, including
some who were forcibly recruited, were sent into combat
right off the bat. As a consequence we had desertions,
unnecessary deaths, people who had a very negative
psychological response to combat. We learned that the
only powerful guerrilla force is a voluntary one. We
have to involve people gradually, and never take a
guerrilla fighter away from his people" (quoted in
29

Ibid.

)
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launched an offensive the regime would be forced to

divide its troops between hitting the rebels in the

countryside and defending its own strategic rear guard
in the cities.

The core of the permanent forces that

remained became even more specialized.

An elite reserve

of "special forces" was developed and used only for

actions of strategic importance, such as the attack on
the headquarters of the Fourth Brigade at El Paraiso in
1988.

The objective was to become a more grass-roots,

multidimensional, and political force that could again

become self-sustaining.

At some future point, such a

force could launch an offensive against which the

conventional war waged by the Armed Forces would be
inadequate.

Meanwhile, new military tactics were

implemented to disperse and wear down the enemy while
the revolution adjusted to the transition: mine warfare,

economic sabotage, traffic stoppages, and a constant

harassment of the Armed Forces that caused greater

government casualties than had the spectacular actions
of the previous four years.

30

In an early 1983 communique, the ERP sought to
explain the rationale behind the FMLN's strategy of
"The Salvadoran dictatorship, its
economic sabotage.
30

armed forces and imperialism know perfectly well that
the economy is the basic pillar of political and
military power and that in every way the basic economic
areas are military objectives. The dictatorship is
always crying about the effects of economic sabotage and
what advantages it gives to the revolutionary movement.
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Political organizing became the crux of the rebel
plan during the 1984-1988 war of resistance.

The Armed

Forces moved in a similar direction, in line with the
"hearts and minds" approach pushed by U.S. advisors as

part of the low-intensity conflict strategy. 31
In the countryside, poder de doble car a

"double faced power"

)

(literally,

emerged as the principal form of

revolutionary organizing: the fostering of grass-roots
organizations which show a legal "face" to the regime

while also showing a clandestine, collaborative "face"
to the revolution. 32

Doble car

developed as a

response to several factors: the increasing ability of
the Armed Forces to bring the war to the guerrillas, the
1. Sabotage has a strong impact on the economy, which
reduces the dictatorship's capacity for continuing the
war.
Therefore, it reduces the offensive potential of
the armed forces.
2. It forces the army to disperse widely, deploying many
units to guard highways, bridges, transportation routes,
communications media, electrical wires and
installations, estates, etc. Thus we are also reducing
the army's offensive potential in this way.
3. The army's inability to control the situation is
demonstrated, and thus the state apparatus of the
dictatorship is destabilized.
Sabotaging the economy within the framework of a war is
It is a weapon used in any military
not terrorism.
confrontation" FBIS-Latin America 15 March 1983,
,

(

p.

15).

For a discussion of the development of the "lowintensity conflict" strategy on the part of the Armed
Forces and their U.S. advisors see Sara Miles, "The Real
War: Low Intensity Conflict in Central America," Report
on the Americas 20 (April/May 1986): 16-23.
31

The analysis which follows is based primarily on
Miles and Ostertag, "Rethinking War."
32
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dispersion of guerrilla forces, and an internal FMLN
debate on how to relate to its civilian supporters
(

masas

,

in Salvadoran political jargon)

The local masas served, in theory, as the rear

guard for the guerrilla army, providing them with food,
logistics, and intelligence.

In practice, they often

became a burden on the fighters, who were obliged to
care for and protect hundreds and even thousands of

people against army incursions, which grew increasingly

destructive as the government forces became more adept
at prosecuting the war.

These problems confronted the

FMLN in all its rear guard areas, but they were

particularly severe in the zones where "local popular
powers" had been organized.

"Local popular powers"

civilian governing bodies formed by some FMLN member
organizations during the period of guerrilla

concentrations

— were

intended as an open, formal

expression of dual power in the rural areas where the

Armed Forces had lost permanent control. 33

But the

particular characteristics of this form of organizing

A comprehensive description of the structure and
functioning of local "popular powers" can be found in
Jenny Pearce, Promised Land: Peasant Rebellion in
Chalatenanqo El Salvador (London: Latin American
See also Francisco A. Alvarez,
Bureau, 1986).
"Transition Before the Transition: The Case of El
Salvador," Latin American Perspectives 15 (Winter 1988)
33

,

78-91.
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exacerbated many of the difficulties the revolutionary

movement faced.
According to Mercedes del Carmen Letona ("Commander
Luisa"), one of the principal architects of the doble
cara strategy, in an FMLN paper on the topic,
the FMLN, by openly declaring its relationship
with these people, made them illegal, which
put them into confrontation with the
enemy.
But the masas were unarmed and
only had the options of running or hiding,
which in turn made them even more illegal. 34
.

.

.

Friction developed between rebel combat units and masas
in some areas, and

the masas became isolated from the rest of the
civilian population, who did not want to turn
themselves into military targets and who
preferred to maintain their subsistence
activities without being forced to live on the
run 35

Furthermore, the FMLN was now dispersing its

fighters throughout the country.

Instead of massing

combatants in a zone of control, where they would have
to be supplied by overt collaborators, the FMLN broke
its fighters up into small groups to carry out political

and military work on a much broader and more clandestine
basis.

Towns which had formerly seen a regular rebel

column pass through a few times a year now had a

Mercedes del Carmen Letona, ("Commander Luisa")
"El Poder de Doble Cara," internal FMLN manuscript,
Morazan, 1987. Quoted in Miles and Ostertag,
"Rethinking War," p. 21.
34

35

Ibid.
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continuing guerrilla presence.

These units, operating

in zones controlled by the Armed Forces, could not rely

on support structures which functioned only in areas of

rebel control.
In some areas,

been developed.

"popular power" structures had never

There, the FMLN experimented with

different forms of organization to define a more
flexible relationship between the rebels and their

civilian supporters.

As military pressure and political

problems threw the popular power structures into crisis,
these experiments gradually formalized into doble cara.
By working simultaneously above ground as legal

entities and underground as FMLN collaborators, doble
cara organizations are both more overt and more covert

that the "popular powers."

Doble cara is an ambitious

effort to develop more autonomous, self-determining mass

organizations which are not dependent on FMLN combatants
for political direction or military protection.

Unlike

the "popular powers," doble cara organizations involve

many people who are not sympathizers of the FMLN but who
nevertheless feel the organizations fight for their
interests.

Commander Luisa writes:

Our line is participation, in which the masas
debate ideas, and conduct, organize and decide
This means the real
on their own actions.
liberties, and we have
democratic
practice of
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to make an effort to have people understand
this. 36

While doble cara was emerging in the countryside,
the FMLN moved to create urban militia and "urban

commando cells."

In 1985 unions began to mobilize again

and the mid-1980s saw one of the largest strike waves in

Salvadoran history.

Moreover, with its reopening the

National University, closed since 1980, resumed its role
as an anti-government organizing center.

FMLN advances

came slowly, however, and urban organizing lagged behind
the rural insurgency.

Though most of the FMLN's clandestine organizing

remained invisible from the outside, by the end of 1986
FMLN commanders believed that the correlation of forces

were such that the revolution could be moved to the next
stage, the strategic counteroffensive.

An FMLN General Command strategy paper captured by
the Armed Forces shows how clearly the guerrilla

leadership, as early as 1986, discerned the path ahead:
1988 seems to be the best or most appropriate
moment for launching the strategic
counteroffensive. By that time, the party
structure of the FMLN will have developed
considerably, the experience accumulated by
the mass movement will be great, the
accumulation of insurrectional forces will
have isolated the regime, and elections will
have been shown to be unable to offer any
solution to even the most backwards elements.

36

Ibid.

,

p.

22

.
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The enemy will be encircled by its own
internal contradictions and hegemonic
disputes, exacerbated by the 1988 elections
for mayors and deputies and the search,
through the 1989 presidential elections, for a
new partner for the North American
government.
If the masses spontaneously move to more
decided struggles and show a willingness to
insurrect we must not hold them back. But we
must guard against provoking any artificial or
voluntaristic explosions. The situation is
entirely favorable and we must bring together
all the people, in the most widespread and
37
simultaneous way possible.
.

.

.

.

.

.

In early 1989, the FMLN announced that it had

entered the strategic counteroffensive phase in the war.
The first actions of the strategic counteroffensive

— the

enunciation of a peace proposal in January, accompanied
by various military actions

— are

indicative of how the

FMLN conceives of this new phase in the civil war.

Leaders of the FMLN see the counteroffensive as a
process of insurrection which entails "civic rebellion,"
or popular violence of various kinds which challenges

the authority of the Salvadoran state and its ability to

govern.

This will lead to either the military defeat of

the Salvadoran government by the rebels or a state of

ungovernability in the nation which will force the
government to negotiate with the FMLN.

"Fase Preparatoria de la Contraofensiva
Estrategica," identified as a document prepared for the
November 1986 meeting of the FMLN General Command.
Quoted in Miles and Ostertag, "Rethinking War,' p. 22.
37
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On January 23,

1989 the rebels,

repudiated earlier FMLN policy'

8
,

in a move which

committed themselves

to accept the results of the presidential election

scheduled for March 19, as long as the elections were

postponed to September 15.

The six month delay, it was

argued, would provide the time necessary for the FMLN

and the government to begin a dialogue leading to the

demilitarization of the nation.

In addition the FMLN

requested: the creation of a committee, which would

include foreign observers, to oversee the elections;

guarantees that the United States would "remain removed
from the electoral process, without backing any of the

political parties;" that Salvadorans abroad be able to
vote; and that the military immediately cease the

repression.

In return the FMLN pledged to respect the

government of Jose Napoleon Duarte until the elections,
to observe a five-day truce beginning two days before

The FMLN has traditionally rejected the electoral
process describing it as part of the government's
"The FMLN is not against
counterinsurgency plan.
elections in principle," says Joaquin Villalobos, "it is
against elections which are carried out under a state of
war and when the country is under the control of the
United States. It is the United States which in reality
makes decisions about the future of El Salvador. There
will be no real elections in El Salvador until national
sovereignty is guaranteed and there is a national
solution to the war" (Joaquin Villalobos, "Popular
Insurrection: Desire or Reality?" Latin American
Perspectives 62 [Summer 1989]: 25).
38
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and ending two days after the elections, and to accept
the legitimacy of the vote. 39

While President Duarte rejected the rebel plan,

claiming that the guerrillas must lay down their weapons

without conditions 40

,

the rebels have continued to

propose plans which seek to end the war through
negotiations and power sharing. 41

According to PCS

general secretary and FMLN commander Jorge Shafik
Handel
This is the time to search for a national
consensus to give substance to what will be
the rules of the game in El Salvador. The
FMLN does not believe at all that this is the
exclusive task of this organization. The FMLN
does not believe that it must impose its ideas
on the nation.
The FMLN makes contributions
in the form of efforts and programs. 42

These "efforts and programs" have gone hand-in-hand

with increased insurrection in the cities and the
countryside.

Indeed, FMLN strategists posit that the

39

See FBIS-Latin America 25 January 1989, p.
the full text of the rebel plan.
,

9

for

Salvadoran Defense Minister Vides Casanova also
weighed in. Citing the inviolability of the Salvadoran
Constitution which required elections on March 19, the
Defense Minister threatened a military coup should the
rebel plan be adopted. See FBIS-Latin America 14
February 1989, p. 15.
40

,

While these proposals and the responses they have
engendered are too numerous to discuss in detail here,
the FBIS-Latin America reports for the years 1989 and
1990 are excellent sources of the texts of these
proposals as well as the Salvadoran government
responses
41

42

FBIS-Latin America

,

16

November 1989, pp. 18-22.
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increased violence will beget peace since it is
imperative to correct "the arrogant and boastful

attitude of the government and military because of an

alleged weakness shown by the FMLN, which obstructs the

negotiation process." 43

Similarly, FMLN commander

Nidia Diaz has said that while the rebels favor
negotiations, "if the government does not want to
negotiate, then El Salvador could become another Beirut.

No one wants that.

No one would benefit from that."

Yet if the government does not accept negotiations "the

struggle will continue." 44
The strategic counteroffensive is also

characterized by an attempt to form what the Left refers
to as the frente amplio

—a

broad, multi-class coalition

in favor of a progressive political platform in which

the revolutionary Left can set the general direction but
not all of the content.

This aspect of the

counteroffensive has been the slowest to emerge and,
according to rebel leaders, the momentum of their
actions has to give sufficient urgency to the demand for
a negotiated solution before such a coalition could come

together
The initial outlines of a future pluralist alliance

began to emerge soon after the enunciation of the
43

44

May 1990, p.

FBIS-Latin America

.

3

FBIS-Latin America

.

30 November 1989, p.
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9.

5.

January peace plan.

The Christian Democratic-oriented

National Worker-Peasant Union (UNOC) and the leftist
National Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS) formed a

coalition to support the proposal.

It was quickly

endorsed by the Permanent Committee of the National
Debate for Peace, a forum of civic organizations called

together by Catholic Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas to
search for ways to bring the conflict to an end.

The

National Debate is a broad formation which brings

together 59 different organizations ranging from radical
unions, to religious, and pro-PDC groups.

With the electoral campaign in full swing no

candidate could afford to oppose the idea of peace.
Despite the strong opposition of the Armed Forces, all
13 of El Salvador's political parties flew to Mexico for

a highly publicized meeting with the rebel leadership.

For over a month, the Christian Democrats and the

National Republican Alliance (ARENA) kept the proposal
alive, as each vied to saddle the other with

responsibility for killing it. 45
The FMLN appears to have anticipated this, and
designed its strategy accordingly. In the words of FMLN
representative Ana Guadalupe Martinez, "Obviously we
knew ARENA would at first say no, since the polls gave
them a virtual certainty of victory. We thought the PDC
would speak of unconstitutionality, but would search for
a formula that would make them appear to be at least
considering it. ... And this is what happened. ARENA
said no, the PDC, without saying no, did not say yes,
and this facilitated the electoral game the other
parties played, which gave us the space to make another
45
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ARENA'S electoral victory on March 19, 1989 was a

blow to the FMLN attempt to create a frente amplio, and
since the FMLN has attempted, through insurrection, to

demonstrate that the ARENA project is not viable.
Again, this underlines a central hypothesis of FMLN

strategy: the two lines of insurrection and negotiated

solution are intimately connected.

The pursuit of

negotiations and a multi-class alliance can only develop
to the degree than an insurrectionary victory becomes a

realistic possibility, and is perceived as such by other
social and political actors.

At the same time, should a

broad consensus for a negotiated settlement acquire
actual political form and be frustrated by the Armed

Forces and ARENA, that very frustration will feed the

insurrectionary project.

The FMLN and the Demise of Communism

The transformation of FMLN strategic policy which

attempts to move the struggle from the battlefield to
the political arena has corresponded with the "demise of

communism,

"

prompting many to speculate about the

significance of the latter for the former.

While

perestroika and the changes it has engendered,
especially the increased pressure that has been put on

procedural proposal to keep the debate alive" (quoted in
Sara Miles and Bob Ostertag, "Rethinking Peace," p. 38).
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Cuba, have had an impact on the guerrilla's strategic

thinking, these may not be the most important in
ex pl a i n i n 9 the FMLN

'

s

"new thinking."

More germane for

the FMLN are: the perception of a shifting correlation
of forces within El Salvador; the "lessons" of

Nicaragua; and the growing public demand for peace and

democracy
In their public pronouncements leaders of the FMLN

have stated that perestroika

,

per se, has had little

impact on their strategic thinking or on the prosecution
of the war.

Paralleling the analysis of Fidel Castro,

FMLN commandantes have posited that there are numerous
ways of implementing socialism, and while perestroika

may be appropriate for the USSR, it is not for El
Salvador.

In this vein Joaquin Villalobos has argued

that "the pattern of our political strategy is in line

with our own model, irrespective of the crises and

whatever problems may exist in the socialist camp." 46
Villalobos has also written that, far from being
detrimental to the revolutionary left in Central
FBIS-Latin America 10 October 1989, p. 29.
Similarly, FMLN commander Ana Maria Guadalupe Martinez
in an interview published in La Republica (Italy):
"Question: You used to talk about revolution, now
you talk about democracy. How much has the crisis of
communism influenced your decisions?
"Guadalupe: The Front, as such, has never had direct
relations with the USSR. Obviously the new U.S.-USSR
relations have helped us to reflect also on the
significance of revolution in Latin America" FBIS- Latin
America, 21 November 1989, pp. 18-19).
46

,

(
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America

,

perestroika and the changes it has ushered in

are positive developments.

Perestroika, he argues, has

furthered an ongoing decline in U.S. militarism and a

reduction in the U.S. capacity for aggression.
Since America's defeat in Vietnam, U.S.
strategists have adopted the option of lowintensity warfare, which is an effort to
maintain a policy of intervention by other
means. They recognize that using U.S. troops
in El Salvador is not effective or in line
with political realities within the United
States.
In short, administrations running the
Vietnam War had a freer hand than those now
running the war in Central America. The
reduction in militarism and the shift from
policies of direct intervention permit
revolutionary movements formerly threatened
with siege and attrition, and facing
reversals, to receive more space to act in the
political arena. 47

While noting that "it cannot be said that interventions
are over and will not be repeated," Villalobos concludes
the conditions that enabled the United States
to intervene in -the Dominican Republic in 1965
and Grenada in 1983 or to isolate Cuba from
Latin America from the early 1960s on no
longer exist. 48

Perestroika has also hastened the development of

multipolar geopolitics, making it "impossible to reduce
49
today's world to capitalism versus socialism."

It is

Villalobos' expectation that these new conditions may
lead the U.S. to abandon its anti-communist ideology and

Joaquin Villalobos, "A Democratic Revolution for
El Salvador," Foreign Policy 74 (Spring 1989): 109.
47

48

Ibid.

49

Ibid., p. 111.
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its tendency "to see one's own society as a universal

model and to reject totally other models in a world of
great complexity among societies, each with distinct

historical determinants, each with its own pattern of

development

.

50

These upbeat public assessments of crucial changes
in world politics must be taken with a grain of salt.

FMLN commanders have been asked by the Soviets to modify

their militarism.

Moreover, FMLN commanders know that

if victorious they are unlikely to get much of a Soviet

subsidy. 51

However the FMLN assertion that Soviet

perestroika will not have a direct effect on the
guerrilla forces is correct.

What is of greater concern

for the FMLN is the impact of Soviet perestroika on

Since 1980 the Soviet Union has been restrained

Cuba.

in providing support for the FMLN, and Cuba and

Nicaragua have been the primary external sources of
support. 52
50

The economic crunch being felt by Castro's

Ibid.

James Le Moyne, "El Salvador's Forgotten War,"
Foreign Affairs 69 (Summer 1989): 105-125.
51

T ] he Soviet Union agreed to give practical
assistance to the FMLN at a meeting in Havana in
December 1979, organized by Castro. However, Moscow did
not switch completely to support tactics until the
spring and summer of 1980, which then amounted only to
the training of a few dozen recruits. Salvadoran
Communist Party leader Shafik Handal travelled to the
USSR and Eastern Europe in June-July 1980, but was said
to be disappointed with the low level of his reception,
particularly in the Soviet Union, where he met only
52

"

[
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Cuba has bolstered Castro's position that a political

settlement of the war is imperative. 53
Even more important than the counsel of Castro in

moving the FMLN to a strategy of negotiations is their
perception of a shifting correlation of forces within
the nation.

According to FMLN theorists, the economic

crisis that has devastated El Salvador throughout the
1980s coupled with the repression perpetrated by the

Armed Forces has proven the failure of the "pseudoreformism" of the PCD and ARENA.

The severity of the

crisis, which has been exacerbated by an expanding

Mikhail Kudachkin, deputy chief of the Latin American
section of the Central Committee's International Affairs
department. Handal apparently negotiated deliveries of
U.S.-made weapons from Ethiopia and Vietnam, and some
East European countries agreed to provide communications
equipment, uniforms and medical supplies. The only
commitment made by the Soviet Union was to help in
arranging the transfer of these supplies to Cuba"
(Nicola Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America
1959-1987
[New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989],
,

p.

189

)

53

Miller argues that Cuba, at least since 1984, has
been pressing the FMLN to negotiate an end to the civil
because of its own security
war.
"Cuba
considerations and because of its identification with
the Sandinista regime and the Salvadoran guerrilla
movement, is keen to promote a political settlement of
the region's crisis as rapidly as possible. Havana is
v
acutely aware that any military solution' can only
involve an escalation of the U.S. role to the point of
defeat for the revolutionary forces" (Ibid., p. 120).
For a more up-to-date discussion of the USSR, Cuba, and
Central America see Howard J. Wiarda, "The Soviet Union,
the Caribbean, and Central America: Towards a New
Correlation of Forces," in The Limits of Soviet Power in
the Developing World eds. Edward A. Kolodziej and Roger
E. Kanet (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1989), pp. 94-120.
.

.

.

,
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external debt, natural disasters, and corruption, is so
great that "Even if there had been no war

.

.

war

.

would inevitably have broken out, and even if the FMLN
had not existed, such a crisis would have spawned armed

struggle

” 54
.

The revolutionary potential engendered by the

objective conditions of poverty and repression are
furthered by the high level of mass organization

throughout El Salvador.

Villalobos posits that "The

Salvadoran people have a tradition of organization and
struggle,

[and] an ability to conspire," and during the

War of Resistance (1984-1988) trade unions, community
organizations, human rights groups, and the like, took

advantage of every political space available to them to
further their organization.

These groups, which are

often autonomous and genuinely representative of their

constituencies yet sympathetic to the aspirations of the
FMLN, have become a major force which highlights the

weak mass base of both ARENA and the Christian
Democrats

55

Therefore, Villalobos argues, by 1989 the concrete

reality was such that change would come to El Salvador
either through a popular insurrection or a negotiated
54

Villalobos, "Popular Insurrection," p.

8.

For further discussion, see Ibid, and William
Bollinger, "Villalobos on Popular Insurrection," Latin
American Perspectives 62 (Summer 1989): 38-47.
55
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settlement, and while the latter was preferable, the

former could not be forsaken until the government had

agreed to negotiations and a demilitarization of
society.

In effect, Villalobos has argued that it is

now time for the Salvadoran Right and its allies in the

United States to take off their ideological blinders and

develop a more realistic assessment of the war, and

consider entering into negotiations which would end the
conflict
The strategic thinkers in the FMLN stress that the

strategic counteroffensive illustrates the victory of

pragmatism and concern with objective realities, over
blind dogmatism.

"Each revolution must adapt to the

realities it faces and build on this basis its own
thinking." 56

Certainly the most significant

geopolitical reality confronting the FMLN is the

hostility of the United States to revolution in Central
America, and the strategic counteroffensive must be

understood as an attempt to bring revolutionary
transformation to El Salvador without engendering years
of U.S. hostility and economic sabotage.

While the FMLN

downplays the significance of low intensity conflict,
and claims that its offers to negotiate a settlement
that will safeguard vital U.S. interests stem from a

deep-seated commitment to democracy, what is clear is
56

Villalobos

,

"Popular Insurrection," p. 106.
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that the FMLN

does not want Salvadoran "contras"

attacking from Honduras, forcing the revolutionary
regime to squander scarce resources on military defense.
To achieve a military victory only to face an economic

catastrophe similar to that faced by the Sandinistas is
seen by the FMLN leadership as a Pyrrhic victory.

The

"lesson" of Nicaragua has been learned and has led the

Salvadoran guerrillas to rethink the proper means of

revolutionary transformation.

A final objective reality which is at the root of
the new policy of the FMLN is the growing popular

sentiment behind peace and the growing approval among
the majority of Salvadorans for the democratic character
of the regime, if not the performance of the government

itself.

Survey data gathered in late 1989 and published

in El Diario De Hoy shows solid support for the

Cristiani government, a rejection of violence and the
damage inflicted by terrorism, and strong support for a

negotiated settlement of the conflict. 57

Polls

FBIS-Latin America 13 November 1989, p. 39. A
portion of the findings are reported below:
When asked how would you rate the armed forces, 37%
of the respondents said excellent; 44% good; 9.3%
average; 2.7% bad; 0.3% very bad; 6.7% did not respond.
When asked how would you rate the job done by the
government, 21.3% said excellent; 54.3% said good; 15%
said average; 2.7% bad; 0.3% very bad; 6.4% did not
respond.
When asked how would you describe President
Cristiani 's performance, 29% said excellent; 51.3% good;
11% average; 1.3% bad; 7.4% did not respond.
57

,
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conducted by the Jesuit-run Central American University
(UCA)

confirm these findings.

In a series of polls

taken in 1988 and 1989, the UCA found that while

disillusionment with the current government is
widespread, only some 30 percent of the population has

adopted explicitly "radicalized" politics. 58
Spokespeople for the UCA dismiss the FMLN's plans
for insurrection as wishful thinking.

"People are very

conscious of their misery, of their hunger, even of who
is exploiting them,

"

asserts UCA Vice-Rector Ignacio

Martin-Baro.
Still this doesn't lead them to think of
insurrection. This is not to say that [the
FMLN] doesn't have the sympathy of the
majority perhaps they do. But insurrections
do not spring up by chance, much less after
nine years of civil war. 59

—

Equally problematic for rebels desiring popular

insurrection is that democratic roots are beginning to
take hold in El Salvador.

Clearly, Salvadoran elections

When asked who is responsible for breaking the
dialogue toward peace, 63% said the FMLN; 5.7% the Armed
Forces; 4.3% the government; 22.7% did not know; 3.9%
did not respond.
When asked who is responsible for the massacre of
the Jesuit priests, 26% said FMLN; 7% said Armed Forces;
5.3% said the government; 53.3% did not know.
When asked should the dialogue continue, 80% said
yes; 14% said no; 5.7% did not know; 0.3% did not
respond

58

Miles and Ostertag, "Rethinking War," p. 23.

59

Quoted in Ibid.
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throughout, the 1980s were part of a counterinsurgency

strategy aimed at defeating the FMLN.

Elections that

were free of fraud were seen as essential to legitimize
the government in the eyes of Salvadorans, a necessary

first step before aggressive military actions against
the guerrillas could be taken, and to ensure the

maintenance of military assistance from the United
States.

It was also assumed that free and fair

elections would result in the coming to power of a
popular, centrist government that could survive long

enough to build a lasting support base that would permit
future governments to consolidate the program of middle-

class reform.

That is, elections would curtail the

extreme right while helping secure aid to defeat the

guerrillas

60

While the latter assumption has not proven correct-the election of ARENA in 1989

— the

first two have.

Democratic roots are beginning to take hold in El
Salvador, as evidenced by the successful completion of

several rounds of national elections which selected the
first civilian governors in over half a century, major

improvements in government respect for human rights, and

60

Jose Z.
Salvador," in
America, eds.
(Chapel Hills

Garcia, "Recent Elections in El
Elections and Democracy in Central
John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson
University of North Carolina Press, 1989),

pp. 60-92.
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the tentative emergence of a competitive party
system. 61

Hence, the FMLN peace proposal of 1989 and

their recent vow not to interfere with the municipal and

legislative elections of March 10, 1991 signal a growing

recognition of the changing environment in which the
FMLN works. 62
The "demise of communism" and the development of the

"post-Cold-War order" have played an important part in

altering the environment in which Central American

revolutionaries must work.

Soviet perestroika

,

the

defeat of the Sandinistas in February 1990 elections,
and the growth of a consensus behind democratic

practices within El Salvador, all signal the need for
the FMLN to rethink its more traditional ways of

attempting to achieve state power.

Indeed, taking state

power outright has become unfeasible, and Salvadoran

revolutionaries have been forced to seek new routes for
realizing popular demands.

Negotiations, power-sharing,

even competing in elections if their integrity could be
guaranteed, all are currently seen as more viable means
to pursue social transformation in the developing "new

world order."

61

Ibid.

Mark A. Uhlig, "Salvador Guerilla Leaders To Stop
Subverting Election," New York Times 2 March 1991, p.
62

,

3.
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CHAPTER

7

PERESTROIKA AND THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT
IN LATIN AMERICA

This concluding chapter will examine the impact of

perestroika and the changes in the socialist world it
has ushered in for the revolutionary Left in Latin

America.

The chapter begins with a discussion of

perestroika's implications for the Left in Cuba,
Nicaragua, and El Salvador, and ends with reflections on
the fate of the Latin American revolutionary Left in the
era of "the demise of Communism."

Cuba
If Cuban-style perestroika is in the cards,

then

many speculate that the 1991 Communist Party Congress
will set the process in motion.

One of the main topics

of discussion at the congress, which was originally

scheduled for March 1991 but has been postponed until
October, is the role of the party in Cuban society under
the prevailing circumstances.

Yet, if recent comments

by high-ranking members of the Cuban Communist Party
(PCC)

are any indication of what one can expect from the

congress, then plans for a Cuban-style restructuring

will not emerge from the meeting.

According to Ambassador to Nicaragua Fernando
Ravelo Renedo, the upcoming PCC congress "will not
263

encourage changes that transgress socialist principles,"
ai"id

instead will be charged with "perfecting socialist

democracy."

1

While admitting that the congress will

seek to renovate the party, Ravelo categorically rules
out the possibility that the congress will introduce

political pluralism and scoffs at the notion that

renovation may require replacing the party's top
leadership, including Fidel.
The people think of Fidel as their guide in
the renewal, and it has not cross [sic] their
minds that he could be removed from the
revolution's leadership. Were he to leave,
the people would feel as if they had been
orphaned. 2

Ramon Suarez Vega, a PCC Department of Ideology

official concurs with Ravelo 's analysis of the upcoming
congress.

While positing that the party's "renovation"

will require that more young people (between the ages of
28 and 40)

be integrated into important leadership

positions, he argues that

Cuba will not renounce any of its fundamental
socialist principles. The PCC is a MarxistLeninist party and is not going to renounce
any of those principles.
3

These assertions give greater credence to the

position of Juan M. del Aguila who, in 1990, wrote that:
Envoy to Nicaragua Views Upcoming Party
Congress," Barricada 7 February 1991, p. 6.
lM

.

2

Ibid.

Ideology Official on Congress, Other Issues,
FBIS-Latin America 15 March 1991, p. 1.
3

"

.
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As was the case when medieval monks preserved
Catholicism against pagan doctrines, Cuba's
ideologues seek to invigorate Marxism-Leninism
against foreign and domestic heretics. A
theory whose failures are evident not only in
the communist world but also in underdeveloped
societies ... is revived in Cuba at a time
when regional if not global trends threaten to
dismiss it altogether as an organizing
principle. The country could well become the
communist world's monastery in the late
twentieth century, an isolated shrine in a
world besieged by ideological confusion. 4

As was illustrated in Chapter 4, President Castro's

harsh anti -perestroika views have the religious

character of the "true believer's" defense of orthodoxy
against various heresies.

Ostensibly, Castro is

defending genuine socialism in a world where erstwhile
allies have "sold out" to capitalism and "bourgeois

democracy."

Moreover, the rhetorical defense of

socialism is coupled with Rectification policies which
harken back to the early years of the revolution and

which are contrary to the economic liberalization seen
throughout the rest of the socialist world.

While

Castro perceives his response to the changes taking
place around him as a sign of socialist Cuba's strength
in an increasingly hostile world, a more correct

Juan M. del Aguila, "Cuba: Guarding the
Revolution," in Glasnost, Perestroika and the Socialist
Community eds. Charles Bukowski and J. Richard Walsh
(New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 70.
4

,
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interpretation is that Castro's response is a sign of
the weakness of the revolution. 5

A thorough Cuban-style perestroika is unlikely.
Such a restructuring would profoundly destabilize the

nation and threaten the PCC leadership.

Bringing Cuba

into the mainstream of world politics would require

Castro to allow other political actors to function free
of his control.

This in turn, would engender the rise

of potential rivals to his leadership.

Such potential

challenges to Castro's complete authority have never
been allowed by the maximum leader; Castro has never

allowed anyone to gain the personal base and acquire the
kinds of skills necessary to be a credible successor.
Moreover, to embrace perestroika would be to renounce
the two defining principles of the Cuban revolution:

socialism and hostility to the U.S..

To implement

Cuban-style restructuring would, in effect, be an
admission that Castro had made serious mistakes in

charting his revolution on a socialist and anti-U.S.
course.

Such an admission would undermine the

legitimacy of the revolution and deny that Cuba's

transformation signals the "wave of the future" for the
Third World.

Howard J. Wiarda, "Is Cuba Next? Crises of the
Castro Regime," Problems of Communism 40 January-April
5

(

1991): 84-93.
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If Cuban perestroika is not in the cards,

one must

ask whether President Castro can realistically maintain
his nation's position as "the communist world's

monastery."

The answer is no; change in Cuba is

inevitable.

Castro's government probably will not fall

in the near future.

Castro still has control of a

potent and loyal security apparatus, his survival
strategy of increasing "democracy" among the

revolution's supporters, and Castro's still considerable
moral legitimacy all point to the fact that those who

envision a quick demise of the PCC are mistaken.
However, storm clouds loom on the horizon for

revolutionary Cuba.

A number of interrelated problems

can be identified which will make it more and more

difficult for the Cuban leadership to maintain the
status quo.

First, support for Fidel is to a large

extent generational.

As those older Cubans who remember

life under Batista, the revolutionary struggle or the

early years of the revolution and are especially

supportive of President Castro die off there will be a
parallel decline in the intensity of popular support for
the revolution and its maximum leader.

This is not to

say that Cubans in their 40s and younger are opposed to

Fidel, rather these Cubans lack the same strong ties to

the maximum leader found among the older generation.

Most of the younger generations of Cubans are patriotic
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and quite likely would fight to defend the revolution.

However these groups of citizens, in part because of
their interest in the West and Western styles--including

increased freedom and democracy

— are

more likely to see

Castro as an anachronism and obstacle to Cuba's economic
health and political development.
Second, as the Cuban economy continues to decline

and material hardship grows, discontent with the status

quo is bound to grow.

While President Castro recently

implored Cubans to be proud of their position as "the
sole standard-bearer of socialism" in a world where

"former allies have capitulated" to the forces of

imperialism

6
,

the government has also announced that it

is suspending all investment "of a social nature," save

those related to the completion of some works and for
agriculture. 7

Cuba's limited resources are now being

employed to produce adequate food supplies for the
population, to develop tourism and to further the

production of medicinal goods.

The decision to

terminate investment "of a social nature" will have
important implications for the Cuban leadership.

Not

only will it make material hardships worse for the
"Castro Addresses Federation of University
Students Congress Closing," Havana Cubavision Network 22
December 1990. In FBIS-Latin America 28 December 1990,
6

,

pp.

3-18.

’"Betting on Tourism as Exchange Earner," Latin
American Weekly Report 13 June 1991, p. 8.
,
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majority of Cubans, but it will have the effect of
diminishing the credibility of the PCC's claim that the
revolution has benefitted the majority.
Third, recent visitors to the island posit that the

PCC is increasingly elitist and out of touch with the

populace. 8

The upper echelons of the Cuban leadership

are most concerned with holding on to their power and to
the considerable privileges it brings.

Moreover, within

the PCC old-guard communists (who are in their 60s and
70s) monopolize most of the important positions,

freezing out the younger generation of leaders.

This

younger cadre of leaders, mostly in their 40s, are
bureaucrats and technicians, not ideologues and are
growing more and more impatient with the old leadership
and their inefficiencies.

This younger cadre is also

growing increasingly eager to enjoy the privileges that
important leadership positions bring.

Wiarda reports

that Castro is seen by his subordinates as increasingly
out of touch, and while he is still honored and deferred
9
to, he is also ignored more and more often.

Castro's rejection of perestroika and his

unwillingness to bring Cuba into the mainstream of world
politics at a time when democracy is on the march and

communist regimes are falling has important implications
8

Wiarda, pp. 86-87.

9

Ibid.
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for the Central American Left.

The growing isolation of

Castro's Cuba and Castro's steadfast refusal to adapt
the revolution to changing circumstances has reduced

Castro's appeal to the Latin American Left.

The case

studies of Nicaragua and El Salvador have shown that the

Cuban model of revolution has been eschewed by both the
FSLN and FMLN

,

and, as will be detailed below, both

revolutionary groups have rejected Castro's
intransigence and have rethought what it means to be
"revolutionary" in Latin America in the late twentieth
century.

Nicaragua
The FSLN out of power is a political party in
crisis.

In the 18 months since their electoral defeat,

the Sandinistas have been regrouping and have begun a

search for a new identity.

Among Sandinista loyalists

there is a widespread feeling that change is necessary.
However, no consensus exists as to what these changes

should be.

Many internal debates should be aired at the

FSLN's first Party Conference to be held July 19-21,
1991.

Leading up to the conference, the FSLN has held

numerous regional and local meetings and has encouraged
public debate as to the future of the party.
One issue that was raised early in the process of

debate before the July conference was the low level of
270

internal democracy within the FSLN

An article in

.

Barricada complains that
the FSLN functions like a fiefdom, wherein
negotiations are made on behalf of the
"grassroots." From the fiefs emerges a class
that refuses to be replaced. We see the same
faces in different posts. Before they were in
the government; today they are in the party.
The FSLN seems to be divided
into those
with "connections" and rights and those
without connections and rights.
The FSLN
cannot function as a political party or be a
political option as long as that situation
prevails.
New faces are needed for the
new era as well as persons without any
disgraces that could elicit criticism. 10
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

These concerns have engendered a FSLN restructuring
of its internal workings aimed at democratizing the

party.

For the first time Sandinista district leaders

are being elected by the rank and file instead of being

named by party higher-ups.

Working commissions have

drawn up documents on Sandinista philosophy and bylaws

which have been debated in urban barrios and rural
communities throughout Nicaragua.

An ethics committee

charged with investigating allegations of corruption has
been established.

Finally, the delegates to the party

congress, who will be elected directly by FSLN members,

will have the opportunity to elect top party leaders,
11
including the party's National Directorate.

Augusto Zamora, "The Sandinist Relief,"
Barricada 8 February 1991, p. 3.
10

,

u The test of the FSLN's sincerity in proposing a
democratization of the party will be whether the "oldguard" leaders allow themselves to be voted out of power
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Since their electoral defeat in February 1990,

internal FSLN debates have occurred between two party
factions: the "pragmatists" (also sometimes identified
as Social Democrats) and the "orthodox"

Leninists).

(or Marxist-

The debates between the two factions are

not exactly new.

The issues of contention--the utility

of broad class alliances, and what constitutes proper

revolutionary strategy

— echo

the debates among the three

revolutionary tendencies prior to their unification.
Current battlelines are drawn over how closely to

collaborate with the UNO coalition of Violeta Chamorro
as it attempts to bring stability and economic recovery

to the nation.

Implicit in this discussion is the basic

question: should the FSLN see itself as the vanguard of
a popular, working class movement,

or should it strive

to build a multi-class, nationalist party capable of

winning the 1996 election.

Pragmatists have advocated

working with moderates in the UNO coalition, arguing
that the Nicaraguan people are sick and tired of

conflict and that stability will give the FSLN room to

maneuver in order to protect what is left of the
revolution.

Rafael Solis, the former secretary of the

legislative assembly, has even suggested that the
and replaced with those they consider inexperienced.
See " 'Sandinists Militants' Group Issues Proclamation,"
Barricada 18 June 1990, p. 5. See also Julie Light,
"Nicaragua: Speaking Bitterness," NACLA Report on the
Americas 24 (May 1991): 4-7.
,
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Sandinistas "co-govern" with more moderate elements of
the UNO alliance and enter the 1996 elections in

alliance with UNO moderates.

Co-governing would not

entail sharing cabinet posts, Solis maintained, but

would be a process of finding common ground.
The Sandinista leadership has to put it to
workers bluntly: If the government falls, we
are not the ones who will take power, but
rather Vice President [Virgilio] Godoy and the
UNO extremists. And that would lead to
another civil war. 12

Similarly, former Sandinista cabinet minister

Alejandro Martinez Cuenca argues that the FSLN should
strive to unite different nationalist currents in favor
of development with social justice.

Sandinismo should

defend the rights of the poor, but from a "multi-class,

pluralistic perspective." 13

Former Sandinista

ambassador to the Organization of American States Carlos

Tunnerman agrees.

The FSLN should promote a social pact

that would be "the heart of a new national, multi-class
project.

" 14

The orthodox see such a strategy as an unwise

accommodation to U.S. interests and the Nicaraguan
business class, the very interests which championed the

Quoted in Light, p. 5. See also Xavier Reyes
Alba, "Sandinist Ramirez: Possible Alliance Unsuitable,"
Barricada 22 January 1991, p. 6.
12

“Quoted in Carlos M. Vilas, "What Are They
Saying," NACLA Report on the Americas 24 (May 1991):
14

Ibid
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6.

FSLN's demise.

They argue that the only way to

safeguard the people's interests is to work from below,
even if this puts the FSLN on a collision course with
UNO moderates.

What is needed, argues sociologist

Orlando Nunez Soto, is "a revolutionary alliance of
urban workers and campesinos

.

15

According to

Sandinista Jurist Augusto Zamora: "Instead of suicide
accords with the oligarchy, we need a national popular
and anti-imperialist revolutionary front

...

to win

back power." 16

Another point of debate between the two factions
concerns proper revolutionary strategy.

More

specifically, should the FSLN maintain its traditional

anti-imperialist stance which pits the party against the
U.S. and with the socialist world, or should this be

updated and altered given changed circumstances.
FSLN Commander Victor Tirado, who is a member of
the FSLN National Directorate, has been an eloquent

spokesman for the pragmatist position.

In an article

published shortly after the FSLN's electoral defeat he
argued that, with the fall of the socialist bloc and the

decline of Soviet support for the Third World, the era
of anti-imperialist revolutions has come to an end.

15

Quoted in Villas, p.

16

Ibid.

6.
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M° reover"/ anti-imperialist movements end up in economic

disaster
If we understand anti-imperialist struggles to
mean a total military and economic
confrontation with imperialism, then the cycle
of these kinds of revolutions is ending.
We
have to look for new options.
The
worldwide trend can be summed up in two
phrases: market economy and free elections. 17
.

.

.

Finally, should the FSLN continue to define its mission
as "a perpetual struggle against U.S. imperialism, then,
of course, we [are] going to be struggling

eternally

" 18
.

Orthodox Sandinistas, including the only surviving
founder of the FSLN, Tomas Borge, have argued that

despite global changes the FSLN must remain antiimperialist.

According to Borge,

Statements that imperialism doesn't exist or
that it doesn't merit a confrontation, a
political or ideological war, are
historically false. 19
.

.

.

FSLN National Directorate member Luis Carrion concurs:

Anti-imperialism is the flip side of our
defense of Nicaraguan sovereignty, and of our
commitment to the peoples of the Third
World. 20

Sergio Ferrari, "Tirado Outlines Post-Election
Plans," Barricada 20 March 1990, p. 3.
17

,

18

Ibid.

19

Quoted in Vilas, p.

20

Ibid

6.
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Since last year, the pragmatists within the FSLN
have gained a clear edge.

The pragmatist position is

stronger among the upper reaches of the party than at
the base, hence orthodox Sandinistas emphasize

democratization and renovation within the party while
refusing to revise their positions on class alliances
and the anti-imperialist nature of the party. 21

Evidence of the pragmatists' advantage is found in the
FSLN's response to the labor protests of the summer

Violent clashes between Sandinista trade

1990.

unionists and strike breakers in July 1990 threatened to
plunge the country into civil strife.

Fears of a power

play by the Right brought Sandinista leaders and UNO

moderates together to resolve the conflict before it

escalated out of control. According to National Workers
Front leader Damaso Vargas, during the July strikes
"there were actions in Managua that the [FSLN]

departmental commission opposed, and,
out, even tried to dismantle." 22

I

should point

The strikes were also

a litmus test of the army's working relationship with

the government.

Defense Minister General Humberto

Ortega ordered troops to dismantle barricades, but vowed
the Sandinista army would never turn its guns on

See footnote number 10. Augusto Zamora is a
member of the orthodox faction.
21

22

Quoted in Vilas, p.

7.
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protesters.

Ortega has since pledged to depoliticize

the armed forces and has complied with instructions to

slash the size of the army by more than half.

The

pragmatist position is also dominant in the FSLN

'

Principles and Program which will be debated at the July
party conference.

According to Jaime Wheelock, member

of the FSLN's National Directorate and head of the

commission charged with drawing up the draft of the
FSLN's Principles and Program, the document stresses
that the FSLN is committed to the development
of a Nicaragua where all of its citizens, from
the peasants to the business owners, have
equal rights and both may play a part in the
sacrifices for the benefits of the nation's

wealth. 23

The document does not define the Front as a

revolutionary and anti-imperialist party, nor does it
describe the FSLN's goal as the creation of socialism.
We are for a non-capitalist alternative; we're
even supportive of the socialist development
of society, but in a suitable, politic and
[and] according to
realistic way
international rhythms and conditions. 24
.

.

.

El Salvador

The FMLN's two-track policy of negotiating while

keeping military pressure on the ARENA government

Jaime Wheelock, "Socialism is an Ideal Not a
Dogma," Barricada International June 1991, p. 24.
23

,

24

Ibid.
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continues.

As described in Chapter

6,

FMLN strategists

view continued military actions primarily as a means of
impressing upon the Salvadoran government and its U.S.
supporters that the war is unwinnable, that the FMLN is
a political force that cannot be ignored, and therefore,

that serious negotiations aimed at resolving the

conflict are imperative. 25

Reports from government

ministers and guerrilla commanders alike indicate that
these negotiations, aided by a United Nations mediator,
are making progress toward a military truce and eventual

national reconciliation.

A major impediment to progress in the negotiations
has been the issue of the Salvadoran military.

The FMLN

has demanded that the military demobilize before a

ceasefire.

The guerrillas have also called for the

subordination of the military to civilian powers and for
the establishment of a commission to investigate abuses

allegedly perpetrated by the military and paramilitary
groups.

The ARENA government, on the other hand, has

See "FMLN Vows to Continue Downing Planes," San
Salvador Radio Cadena, in FBIS-Latin America 7 December
25

,

1990, pp.

10-11.

The FMLN s decision in early February 1991 to
return 17 of the 28 surface-to-air missiles acquired
from the Sandinista army was described by the
clandestine Radio Farabundo Marti as a "political
"Politically speaking, the
victory" for the guerrillas.
return of the missiles has been the most overwhelming
expression of the dual power which exists in El
Salvador, given the FMLN's existence, its territorial
control, and its army" ("Rebels View Missile Return,"
FBIS-Latin America, 5 February 1991, p. 9).
'
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been unwilling to demobilize the Army until a ceasefire
is reached, arguing that if the FMLN is genuine in its

calls for peace then it should simply lay down its arms
first

Important progress on this issue came at the UN-

mediated Mexico City negotiations between the FMLN and
the Salvadoran government held April 4-27, 1991.

The

"Mexico Declaration" issued at the conclusion of the

negotiations called for constitutional amendments which
would: subordinate the armed forces to civilian power;

create a "truth commission" charged with investigating
alleged abuses perpetrated by the military and

paramilitary groups; and, create a Civilian National
Police to replace the public security corps, which will
operate under civilian control independent from the Army
in urban and rural areas. 26

Early on the morning of

April 30, 1991 the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly

approved the reforms and soon thereafter the FMLN

announced that it has set up a political committee to
prepare for their incorporation to legal political

A full text of the "Mexico Declaration" is found
For the
in FBIS-Latin America 29 April 1991, pp. 7-10.
President
"Arena
see
ARENA response to the declaration
'Optimistic " FBIS-Latin America 29 April 1991, p. 10.
For the FMLN response see "Rebel Commanders View Talks,"
Notimex (Mexico City) in FBIS-Latin America
29 April 1991, p. 10-11.
26

,

,

,

'

,

,
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activity.

At a press conference on the northern

outskirts of San Salvador, FMLN commander Gerson

Martinez asserted that
the future of this country will be civilista
must be civilista
All social forces and
political society must fight to build a
country where the authority of the civilian
society prevails over any military
authority. 28

—

The Demise of the Socialist Paradigm and the
Revolutionary Left

This work has examined how revolutionary movements
have adjusted, or failed to adjust, to the enormous

changes in the socialist world

— changes

set in motion by

Soviet perestroika and foreign policy new thinking.

detailed in Chapter

3,

As

perestroika and foreign policy

new thinking have engendered a Soviet "strategic

withdrawal" from the Third World.

This new posture

toward Third World nations and revolutionary movements

corresponds with new Soviet understandings about the

revolutionary potential of the Third World, and is

motivated by the related desires to reduce the costs of
defending the USSR's vital interests, devote more of the
nation's scarce resources to the domestic economy, and
"Details on Approval of Constitutional Changes,"
FBIS-Latin America 1 May 1991, p. 11. See also
"Getting Ready for the Ceasefire," Latin American Weekly
Report 11 July 1991, pp. 2-3.
27

,

,

28

p.

Quoted in "Getting Ready for the Ceasefire,"

2
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improve relations with the West, especially the United
States.

As the Soviet Union has distanced itself from

erstwhile allies in the Third World, and as the USSR has

allowed the nations of Eastern Europe to chart their own
political and economic course, the revolutionary Left in
Latin America has lost a number of important potential
allies and sources of assistance.

Perestroika and the transformations in the
socialist world has also made the Cuban model of

revolutionary change irrelevant.

The Cuban model is

increasingly seen by the Left as not viable.

This is a

crucial development for the revolutionary Left.

The

Cuban experiment, along with the Soviet, made up the
socialist paradigm in Latin America; by the early 1960s
each new revolutionary movement added, subtracted or

altered aspects of the Cuban and Soviet models in order
to fit their own particular circumstances. With the

demise of the socialist paradigm the Left's point of

reference for conceiving of an alternative to Latin

America's current state of affairs is no more.

Under

these new circumstances, it is impossible for the Left
to think outside of the parameters of the current

reality in Latin America.
In a Latin America in which socialism, especially

in its anti-democratic, Stalinist form, is in severe

crisis and in which the market economy and electoral
281

democracy are seen as the waves of the future, the idea
of revolution has faded.

This is not because the crises

that were thought to be the foundation for both its

inevitability and desirability have changed; if anything
they are more and more present. 29

Rather, the idea of

revolution has faded because the outcome of revolution
has become unattractive or unimaginable and because,

after the 1990 elections in Nicaragua, it has become
reversible.

The defeat of the FSLN was a rejection of

the revolution by the people themselves, albeit one

delivered under duress.
Under these new conditions only those like Castro

who knows that Cuban-style perestroika would lead to his
fall from power and probably the rolling back of most of

the revolution

— and

the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso

are isolated from the rest of the hemisphere
to traditional revolutionary formulas.

— can

— who
adhere

Hence, one sees

the Nicaraguan FSLN rethinking its revolutionary

strategy and project and working to build electoral
democracy.
It is likely that any future Sandinista government

will look much like the People's National Party (PNP)
Cuban President Castro often declares that while
the crisis in socialism gets full media attention, what
goes unnoticed is that capitalism in Latin America is in
crisis too. He has a point. Many nations in the region
struggle under increasing debt burdens and declining
economies and have seen their standard of living fall to
the level of the 1960s.
29
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government of Michael Manley in Jamaica.

Manley first

governed Jamaica between 1972-1980, when he championed
the replacement of capitalism with "democratic

socialism,

"

lectured his citizens on the dangers of the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and of the larger

world system of imperialism, challenged U.S. foreign
policy, and formed close ties with Cuba's Castro.

The

nation suffered severe economic problems and grew

increasingly isolated internationally during Manley's
tenure and in 1980 he was defeated in elections which

brought the conservative Edward Seaga to power as Prime
Minister.

Manley's second opportunity to govern Jamaica

came in 1989 when his PNP defeated the Jamaican Labor

Party (JLP) of Seaga.

Since 1989, Manley has been

candid about the "mistakes" he made in the 1970s and his
government has dropped its harsh anti-imperialist
rhetoric, distanced itself from Castro, developed a

better relationship with the United States, and entered
into a working relationship with the IMF.

Explaining

his government's new posture Manley concedes that "The

world has changed.

Jamaica has changed.

And

I

think

have changed." 30

These new conditions have also led the Salvadoran

guerrillas to rethink the taking of power through

Quoted in Saul Landau, "Lonely Manley," Mother
Jones, March/April 1991, p. 26.
30
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I

violent revolution. This traditional revolutionary path
to power is rejected in favor of a more peaceful

strategy which may allow FMLN leaders to share power

with those forces against whom they have battled since
the early 1980s.
The last years of the twentieth century are clearly
a time of renovation for significant segments of the

revolutionary Left in Latin America.

Old notions of

what it means to be a revolutionary are being rethought.
This does not signal any so-called end of history,

rather it means only that certain historically important
ideas are fading away.

In fact, the current situation

for the revolutionary Left in Latin America could be the

best thing that has ever happened to it.

The demise of

largely anti-democratic paradigm may provide the Left

with the opportunity to democratize itself.

Such a

transformation could allow Left movements to create
strategies and programs that link their struggles more

closely with the burgeoning desire for freedom and

democracy sweeping the hemisphere.

284

BIBLIOGRAPHY
"A Historic Rethink is Afoot in CMEA. " Current Digest of
the Soviet Press 42 (January 1990): 12-13.

Aganbegyan, Abel.
"The Economics of Perestroika."
International Affairs (London) 64 (Spring 1988):
179-185.
Aguilar, Luis E., ed. Marxism in Latin America
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978.
.

Alba, Victor.
Historia Del Comunismo En America Latina
Mexico: Ediciones Occidentales 1954.

.

,

Alba, Xavier Reyes. "Sandinist Ramirez: Possible
Alliance Unsuitable." Barricada, 22 January 1991,
6

.

Albright, David E., ed. Communism in Africa
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980.
.

Albright, David E.
"Vanguard Parties in the Third
World." In The Pattern of Soviet Conduct in the
Third World ed. Walter Laquer, 208-225. New York:
Praeger, 1983.
,

Alexander, Robert J. Communism in Latin America
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1960.
Crisis in the
Ambursley, Fitzroy, and Robin Cohen, eds
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983.
Caribbean
.

.

Americas Watch. Human Rights in Nicaragua: Reagan,
New York: Americas Watch,
Rhetoric and Reality
.

1985.
"El Fin de la Guerra y el Nuevo
Arismendi, Rodney.
Imperialismo Norteamericano " In Marxism in Latin
America, ed. Luis E. Aguilar, 182-185.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978.
.

Armstrong, Robert, and Janet Shenk. El Salvador: The
Boston: South End Press,
Face of the Revolution
.

1982.

Chapel
Baloryra, Enrique A. El Salvador in Transition
1982.
Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
.

285

Barnes Michael D.
"A Visit to Havana." The Times of
the Americas 21 February 1990, 20.
,

.

Baryshev, Alexander.
"A Soviet View: U.S. -Cuban Warming
Overdue." The Times of the Americas 21 February
.

1990, 21.

Benjamin, Medea.
"Things Fall Apart." NACLA: Report on
the Americas 24 (August 1990): 13-22.
Bermann, Karl, ed.
Sandino Without Frontiers
Virginia: Compita Publishing, 1988.

Hampton,

.

Berryman, Phillip. The Religious Roots of Rebellion:
Christians in Central American Revolution
Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1984.
.

"El Salvador: From Evangelization to
Insurrection." In Religion and Political Conflict
in Latin America ed. Daniel H. Levine, 58-78.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
.

,

1986.

"What's Happening in Moscow?"
Besancon, Alain.
National Interest 8 (Summer 1987): 11-13.

The

"Betting on Tourism as Exchange Earner." Latin American
Weekly Report 13 June 1991, 8.
,

Bialer, Seweryn. The Soviet Paradox: External
New York: Knopf,
Expansion, Internal Decline
.

1986.

Triumph of the People
Black, George.
Press, 1981.

London: Zed

.

"Bias Roca Construction Contingent Awarded High Labor
Distinction." Granma Weekly Review 5 December
,

1986,

3.

Pittsburgh:
Blasier Cole. The Giant's Rival
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987.
.

,

"Blowing Hot and Cold On Spain." Latin American Weekly
Report 9 August 1990, 3.
,

"From the Balance of Forces to a
Bogdanov, Radomir.
Balance of Interests." New Times (Moscow), April
1988, 53-61.

286

Bollinger William.
"Villalobos on Popular
Insurrection." Latin American Perspectives 62
(Summer 1989): 38-47.
,

Booth

John A. The End and the Beginning The
Nicaraguan Revolution
Boulder: Westview Press,
,

;

.

1985.

Booth

John A.
and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds
Elections and Democracy in Central America
Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
,

,

.

Borge, Tomas.

Tentacion

.

Carlos. El Amanecer Ya No Es Una
Managua: SENAPEP, 1979.

Borkenau, F. World Communism: A History of the
Communist International
Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1962.
.

Brown, Archie.
"What's Happening in Moscow?"
National Interest 8 (Summer 1987): 6-10.

The

Brutents, K. N.
"A Great Force of Modern Times."
International Affairs February 1981, 83-84.
.

Bukowski, Charles, and J. Richard Walsh, eds.
Perestroika and the Socialist Community
Praeger, 1990.

.

Glasnost
New York:

Cassen, Robert, ed.
Soviet Interests in the Third
World
Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1985.
.

Castaneda, Jorge G.
"Latin America and the End of the
Cold War." World Policy Journal 7 (Summer 1990):
469-492.
"Castro Regime not Prepared to Discuss v Imperialist
Multi-Party System." Latin American Regional
Reports: Caribbean 26 July 1990, 1.
,

"Castro: Beleaguered Champion of Socialism." Current
Digest of the Soviet Press 42 (November 1990):
20 - 21

.

Central America Information Office. El Salvador:
Cambridge: Central
Background to the Crisis
America Information Office, 1982.
.

"New Directions in Soviet Policy
Cerdas Cruz, Rodolfo.
in Latin America." Journal of Latin American
Studies 21 (February 1989): 1-22.
287

Cheston, T. S., and B. Loeffke. Aspects of Soviet.
Policy Toward Latin America
New York: MSS
Information Corporation, 1974.
.

"China Gives Cuba Ten-Year Interest-Free Loan."
Weekly Review 2 April 1990, 1.

Granina

.

Christian, Shirley. Nicaragua: Revolution in the
Family
New York: Random House, 1985.
.

Claudin, Fernando. The Communist Movement
Monthly Review Press, 1970.

.

New York:

Close, David. Nicaragua: Politics. Economics and
Society London: Pinter, 1988.
.

Cockburn, Alexander.
"Victory for Violence." New
Statesman and Society 9 March 1990, 18-21.
.

"Communist Party Promotes Broad National Debate." Granma
Weekly Review 1 July 1990, 1.
,

Connor, Walker. The National Question in MarxistLeninist Theory and Strategy
Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984.
.

Conroy, Michael E.
"Economic Aggression as an
Instrument of Low-Intensity Warfare." In Reagan
Versus the Sandinistas ed. Thomas W. Walker, 5779.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.
,

"The Political Economy of the 1990
Nicaraguan Elections." International Journal of
Political Economy 20 (Fall 1990): 5-33.
.

Coraggio, Jose Luis. Nicaragua: Revolution and
Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985.
Democracy
.

World Marxist

"The Lessons of Chile."
Corvalan, Luis.
Review 21 (January 1978): 34-48.

"Marxism in Venezuela." Problems of
Communism 22 (November /December 1973): 51-71.

Cross, Benedict.

"Cuban Communist Party is Moving to Slash its
Bureaucracy by Half." New York Times 7 October
,

1990, 9.

"Cubans Outline Plan to 'Perfect' Communist Rule." New
York Times 18 February 1990, 9.
.

288

Dallin, Alexander.
"Gorbachev's Foreign Policy and the
'New Political Thinking' in the Soviet Union."
In
Gorbachev's Reforms: U.S. and Japanese Assessments
ed. Peter Juviler and Hiroshi Kimura, 97-114.
New
York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1988.

,

"Daniel Ortega on Peace, Economy, Politics, Plans."
Barricada 31 December 1987, 1-4.
,

Debray, Regis. A Critique of Arms
Books, 1977.

London: Penguin

.

del Aguilar, Juan M.
"Cuba: Guarding The Revolution."
In Glasnost, Perestroika and the Socialist
Community ed. Charles Bukowski and J. Richard
Walsh, 63-86. New York: Praeger, 1990.
,

"Developments in Eastern Europe Put Cuba's Castro on the
Defensive." Latin American Regional Reports:
Caribbean, 25 January 1990, 1.
Diederich, Bernard. Somoza and the Legacy of U.S.
New York: Dutton,
Involvement in Central America
.

1981.

Diner stein, Herbert S. The Making of a Missile Crisis:
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
October 1962
Press, 1976.
.

"Soviet Policy in Latin America." American
Political Science Review 61 (March 1967): 80-90.
.

"The Latin American Communist
Dominguez, Edme.
Movement: Realities and Relations with the Soviet
In The USSR and Latin America: A
Union."
Developing Relationship ed. Eusebio Mujal-Leon,
119-158.
Boston: Unwin Hymer, 1989.
,

"Cuban Foreign Policy." Foreign
Dominguez, Jorge I.
Affairs 67 (Fall 1987): 83-108.

Donaldson, Robert H., ed. The Soviet Union in the Third
Boulder: Westview
World: Successes and Failures
Press, 1981.
.

"Dramatic Stage in the History of a Continent." World
Marxist Review 25 (May 1982): 15-23.
Duncan, W. Raymond, ed. Soviet Poli cy in the Third
World New York: Pergamon Press, 1980.
.

289

Duncan, W. Raymond. "Soviet Power in Latin America:
Success or Failure." In The Soviet Union in the
Third World: Successes and Failures ed. Robert
H. Donaldson, 1-25.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.
,

"Moscow and Latin America: Objectives,
Constraints, and Implications." In Soviet Policy
in the Third World ed. W. Raymond Duncan, 262-294.
New York: Pergamon Press, 1982.
•

,

"Soviet Interest in Latin America: New
Opportunities and Old Constraints." Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 2 6 May
•

(

1984):

163-198.

The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and
Influence
New York: Praeger, 1985.
.

.

Dunkerley, James. The Long War: Dictatorship and
Revolution in El Salvador
London: Verso, 1982.
.

Edelman, Marc.
"Lifelines: Nicaragua and the Socialist
Countries." NACLA: Report on the Americas 19
(May/June 1985): 33-53.
"Envoy to Nicaragua Views Upcoming Party Congress."
Barricada, 7 February 1991, 6.
"The New Soviet Approach to
Evangelista, Matthew.
Security." World Policy Journal 3 (Fall 1986): 561599.

Evans, Ernest. "Revolutionary Movements in Central
America: The Development of a New Strategy." In
Rift and Revolution: The Central American
Imbroglio ed. Howard J. Wiarda, 167-196.
Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1984.
,

"Soviet Strategy in Latin
Faleroni, Alberto Daniel.
America." In The Soviet Union and Latin America
ed. J. Gregory Oswald and Anthony J. Strover, 40New York: Praeger, 1970.
58.
,

"New Front of the Struggle Against
Fazio, Hugo.
Imperialism." World Marxist Review 20 (June 1977):
84-93.

"Tirado Outlines Post-Election Plans."
Ferrari, Sergio.
Barricada 20 March 1990, 3.
,

Feuchtwanger, E.J., Peter Nailor. The Sovie t Union and
the Third World. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.
290

"Fidel in the Inauguration of the Paradise and Sol
Palmeras Hotels." Granina Weekly Review 27 May
.

1990, 2-3.

"Fidel Speaks to Bias Roca Contingent." Granma Weekly
Review 17 June 1990, 3.
.

Fonseca, Carlos.

Obras

.

Managua: Nueva Nicaragua.

1982.

"Nicaragua: Zero Hour."
In Sandinistas
Speak ed. Bruce Marcus, 13-22. New York:
Pathfinder Press, 1982.
.

,

"Friends Become Foes as Cuba Refuses to Accept Moscow's
'New Thinking'." Latin American Regional Reports:
Caribbean, 5 April 1990, 1.

Fukuyama, Francis.
"Soviet Strategy in the Third
World." In The Soviet Union and the Third World:
The Last Three Decades ed. Francis Fukuyama and
Andrzej Korbonski, 24-45.
Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1987.
,

Fukuyama, Francis, and Andrzej Korbonski, ed. The
Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three
Decades Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.
.

In
Garcia, Jose Z.
"Recent Elections in El Salvador."
Elections and Democracy in Central America ed.
John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, 60-92.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
,

1989.

"Getting Ready for the Ceasefire." Latin American
Weekly Report 11 July 1991, 2-3.
,

Gilbert, Denis. Sandinistas
Blackwell, 1988.

.

New York: Basil

"Wars of Liberation and Soviet
Gilbert, Stephen P.
Military Policy." Orbis 10 (Fall 1966): 848-853.

Gleijeses, Piero. "The Reagan Doctrine and Central
America." Current History 85 (December 1986): 401404.

291

Golan, Galia
"Moscow and Third World Liberation
Movements: The Soviet Role." Journal of
International Affairs (London) 63 (January 1987):
303-324.
.

Goldman, Marshall I.
Norton, 1987.

Gorbachev's Challenge

.

New York:

Gonzalez, Edward. Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of
Charisma
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974.
.

"Cuba, the Third World, and the Soviet
Union." In The Soviet Union and the Third World:
The Last Three Decades ed. Francis Fukuyama and
Andrzej Korbonski, 67-81.
Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1987.
•

,

Goodman, Melvin A.
"The Soviet Union and the Third
World: The Military Dimension."
In The Soviet
Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades
ed. Francis Fukuyama and Andrzej Korbonski, 46-66.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.
,

Gorbachev, Mikhail. Toward a Better World
Richardson and Steirman, 1987.

.

New York:

Perestroika: New Thinking for Our
New York: Harper and Row,
Country and the World
.

.

1988.

"Gorbachev in Havana: A Reporter's Notebook." Cuba
Update 10 (Summer 1989): 10-12.
"El Torbellino
Gornov, Mi jail, and Yuri Koroliov.
Centroamericano ," America Latina (Moscow), June

1978,

7.

Soviet Penetration
Goure, Leon, and Morris Rothenberg.
Miami: University of Miami
of Latin America
Center for Advanced International Studies, 1975.
.

"The Imperialist Threat to Africa,"
Gromyko, A.
International Affairs July 1981, 47-50.
,

Gunlicks Arthur B., and Treadway, John D. ed., Tjie
Soviet Union Under Gorbachev: Assessing the First
New York: Praeger, 1987.
Year
,

.

"Will Castro Fall?"
Gunn, Gillian.
(Summer 1990): 132-150.
292

Foreign Policy 79

Halliday, Fred.
From Kabul To Managua: Soviet-American
Relations in the 1980s
New York: Pantheon, 1989.
.

Hanak, Harry.

"Foreign Policy."
In Khrushchev and
Khrushchevism ed. Martin McCauley, 180-194.
Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1987.
.

"Hard-Line Cubans Consider Reforms." Boston Globe.
18 February 1990, 2.
Hasagawa, Tsuyoshi.
"Gorbachev, The New Thinking of
Soviet Foreign-Security Policy and the Military:
Recent Trends and Implications." In Gorbachev s
Reforms: U.S. and Japanese Assessments ed. Peter
Juviler and Hiroshi Kimura, 115-148. New York:
Aldine De Gruyter, 1988.
/

,

Henze, Paul.

"Communism in Ethiopia." Problems of
Communism 30 (1981): 43-64.

Hernandez, Sahily Tabares.
"Biografia de Carlos Fonseca
Amador " In Sandino: Guerrillero Proletario ed.
Carlos Fonseca Amador, 5-12. Lima: Comision
Evangelica Latino Americana de Educacion Cristiana
.

,

,

1979.

Hodges, Donald C.
Intellectual Foundations of the
Nicaraguan Revolution
Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1986.
.

Holloway, David.
"Gorbachev's New Thinking." Foreign
Affairs 68 (Winter 1988/Spring 1989): 66-81.

Soviet Policy
Hosmer, Stephen T., and Thomas W. Wolfe.
and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts
Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1983.
.

"The Evolving Soviet Debate on Latin
Hough, Jerry F.
America." Latin American Research Review 16
124-143.
(Spring 1981)
:

The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet
Washington, D.C.:
Debates and American Options
1986.
Institution,
The Brookings
.

.

"The End of Russia's 'Khomeini' Period:
Dilemmas for US Foreign Policy." World Policy
Journal 4 (Fall 1987): 583-604.
.

Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing
Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
293

"Impending Change: 'Participation' with Strict PCC
Control " Latin American Regional Report:
Caribbean 1 March 1990, 4.
.

.

Interview with Daniel Ortega." Latin American
Perspectives 20 (Winter 1979): 114-118.
"Interview with Henry Ruiz ('Modesto')." Latin American
Perspectives 20 (Winter 1979): 118-121.
"Interview with Jaime Wheelock Roman." Latin American
Perspectives 20 (Winter 1979): 121-127.
Jonas, Susanne, and Nancy Stein. "The Construction of
Democracy in Nicaragua." Latin American
Perspectives 66 (Summer 1990): 10-37.
Jonas, Susanne.
"Central America in the Balance:
Prospects for the 1990s." Monthly Review 42 (June
1990): 11-24.

Juviler, Peter, and Hiroshi Kimura, ed. Gorbachev
Reforms: US and Japanese Assessments
New York:
Aldine De Gruyter, 1988.
'

.

Kanet, Roger E., ed.
Soviet Foreign Policy in the
1980s
New York: Praeger, 1982.
.

Keller, Bill. "Soviet Article Doubts Economic Line." New
York Times 9 May 1987, 4.
.

"Soviet Press Snaps Back at Castro,
Painting an Outdated Police State." New York
Times 8 March 1990, 1.
.

.

Khachaturov, K.
"Washington's Latin American Policy,"
International Affairs (Moscow), January 1982, 5965.

Khrushchev, Nitita S. Report of the Central Committee
of the CPSU to the Twentieth Party Congress,
Moscow: Foreign Languages
February 14, 1956
Publishing House, 1956.
.

.

"For New Victories of the World Communist
.
(January 1961):
" World Marxist Review 1

Movement
3-28.

Khrushchev Remembers
and Company, 1970.
.

294

.

Boston: Little, Brown

-

Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974.
•

.

Kinzer, Stephen.
"Nicaragua the Beleaguered
Revolution." New York Times Magazine 28 August
.

15-26.

1983,

Kolodzie j Edward A., and Roger E. Kanet, ed. The
Limits of Soviet Power in the Developing World
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.
,

.

Koroliov, Yuri.
"Metamorfosis de la Interdependencia
Aspecto Regional , " America Latina (Moscow),
April 1988, 10-23.
Laird, Robbin F., and Erik P. Hoffman.
Soviet Foreign
Policy in a Changing World
New York: Aldine
Publishing, 1986.
.

Landau, Saul.
"Lonely Manley." Mother Jones
March/April 1991, 26-29.

.

"Latin America: Decade With a Hard Beginning." World
Marxist Review 25 (March 1982): 19-25.

Laqueur, Walter.
Third World

.

The Pattern of Soviet Conduct in the
New York: Praeger, 1983.

Legvold, Robert.
"The Revolution in Soviet Foreign
Policy." World Policy Journal 4 (Fall 1987): 8298.

Leiken, Robert S., ed. Central America: Anatomy of
Conflict
New York: Pergamon Press, 1984.
.

In Central
Leiken, Robert S.
"The Salvadoran Left."
America: Anatomy of a Conflict ed. Robert S.
Leiken, 111-130. New York: Pergamon, 1984.
,

"El Salvador's Forgotten War."
Le Moyne, James.
Affairs
Foreign
69 (September 1989): 105-125.

The National Liberation Movement in the
Lenin, V. I.
East Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House,
.

1957.

"Communism and the East: Theses on the
National and Colonial Question." In The Lenin
Anthology ed. Robert C. Tucker, 619-625. New
York: W.W. Norton, 1975.
.

,

295

.Imperialism, The Highest Stage of
New York: International Publishers,

_•

Capitalism,
1977.

"Leonid Abalkin: We Value Our Friendship With Cuba."
Current Digest of The Soviet Press 4 2 (December
1990): 20.

Lernoux Penny. Cry of the People
Doubleday, 1980.
,

.

Garden City, N.Y.:

Levine, Barry B. The New Cuban Presence in the
Caribbean
Boulder: Westview Press, 1983.
.

Levine, Daniel H., ed.
Religion and Political Conflict
in Latin America
Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1986.
.

Lewis, Paul.
"As Shipments of Soviet Grain Lag, Cuba
Reduces Daily Ration." New York Times 7 February
,

1990,

3.

Light, Julie.
"Nicaragua: Speaking Bitterness." NACLA
Report on the Americas 24 (May 1991): 4-7.

Light, Margot.
Relations

The Soviet Theory of International
New York: St Martin's Press, 1988.

.

"Soviet Policy in the Third World."
International Affairs 67 (April 1991): 263-280.
.

Liss, Sheldon B.
Marxist Thought in Latin America
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
.

"Karl Marx: The International
Lopez, Victor Tirado.
Workers' Movement's Greatest Fighter and Thinker."
In Nicaragua: The Sandinista People's Revolution
New York: Pathfinder
ed. Bruce Marcus, 89-113.
Press, 1985.
,

"Soviets and Insurgents in Latin
Lopez-Alves, Fernando.
America: A Third World View." In Soviet-Latin
American Relations in the 1980s ed. Augusto Varas,
79-104.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.
,

El Salvador 1981-1984: La Dimension
Lungo, Mario.
San Salvador: UCA
Political de la Guerra
Editores 1985.
.

,

Lynch, Allen. The Soviet Study of International
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Relations
.

1987.

296

Marcella, Gabriel, and Daniel S. Papp.
"The SovietCuban Relationship: Symbiotic or Parasitic?" In
—Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and
Failures, ed. Robert H. Donaldson, 51-68.
Boulder:
Westview Press, 1981.
Marcus, Bruce. Nicaragua: The Sandinistas People's
Revolution
New York: Pathfinder Press, 1985.
.

Mariategui, Jose Carlos.
"The Anti-Imperialist
Perspective." New Left Review 70
(November /December 1972): 65-72.
Marin, Gladys.
"Lessons of Chile: The Working Class and
Its Policy of Alliance." World Marxist Review 20
(July 1977)
63-75.
:

Marx, Karl.
"The Civil War in the United States."
In
On America and the Civil War ed. Saul K. Panover,
94.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972.
,

Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. On Colonialism
New York: International Publishers, 1972.

.

McCauley, Martin, ed. Khrushchev and Khrushchevism
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987.

.

McKenzie, Kermit. Comintern and World Revolution, 19281943
New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.
.

Menon, Rajan.
Soviet Power in the Third World
Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.

.

New

Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. Cuba in the 1970s
Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1981.
.

The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two Decade
Appraisal
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1981.
.

.

"The Cuban Economy in the 1980s: The Return
In Socialist Cuba: Past
of Ideology."
Interpretations and Future Challenges ed. Sergio
Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.
Roca, 59-100.
.

,

"Las Particularidades de la Revolucion
Mikoyan, Sergo.
en Nicaragua y sus Tareas desde el Punto de Vista
de la Teoria y la Practica del Movimiento
Librador," America Latina (Moscow), March 1980,
101-115.

297

Milas, 0.

"Stages of the Struggle." World Marxist
Review 20 (February 1977): 50-62.

Miles, Sara.
"The Real War: Low Intensity Conflict in
Central America." NACLA: Report on the Americas 20
(April/May 1986): 16-23.
Miles, Sara, and Bob Ostertag.
" FMLN New Thinking:
Rethinking War." NACLA: Report on the Americas 23
September /October 1989): 16-23.
(

"Rethinking War." NACLA: Report on the
Americas 23 September /October 1989): 24-37.
.

(

Miller, Nicola.
1959-1987

.

Soviet Relations with Latin America
New York: Cambridge University Press,

1989.

Miller, Nikki, and Laurence Whitehead.
"The Soviet
Interest in Latin America: An Economic
Perspective." In Soviet Interests in the Third
World, ed. Robert Cassen, 114-159.
Beverly Hills:
SAGE Publications, 1985.

Montgomery, Tommie Sue. Revolution in El Salvador:
Origins and Evolution
Boulder: Westview Press,
.

1982.

Mujal-Leon, Eusebio, ed. The USSR and Latin America: A
Boston: Unwin Hyman,
Developing Relationship
.

1989.

Revolutionary Trends in Latin America
Munck, Ronaldo.
Montreal: McGill University Centre for Developing
Area Studies, 1984.

.

"Endgame: A Special Report on US Military
Nairn, Allan.
Strategy in Central America." NACLA: Report on the
Americas 18 (May/ June 1984): 1-54.
" v

New Model' CMEA Wins General Acceptance in Principle."
Current Digest of the Soviet Press 42 (January
1990):

14.

FSLN The Ideology of the Sandinistas and
Nolan, David.
Coral Gables, FL:
the Nicaraguan Revolution
University of
Studies
Institute of Interamerican
Miami, 1985.
:

.

"The Third Social Force in
Nunez Soto, Orlando.
National Liberation Movements." Latin American
Perspectives 8 (Spring 1981): 5-21.
298

Odom, William E.

"How Far Can Reform Go?" Problems of
Communism 36 (November-December 1987): 18-33.
"The Future of the Soviet Political
System," PS: Political Science and Politics 21
(June 1989)
193-198.
•

:

Oswald, J. Gregory, and Anthony J. Strover. The Soviet
Union and Latin America
New York: Praeger, 1970.
.

Panover, Saul K., ed. On America and the Civil War
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972.

.

Papp, Daniel S.
Soviet Perceptions of the Developing
World in the 1980s: The Ideological Basis
Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1985.
.

Pastor, Robert.
"Cuba and the Soviet Union: Does Cuba
Act Alone?" In The New Cuban Presence in the
Caribbean Basin ed. Barry B. Levine, 191-210.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1983.
,

Pearce, Jenny.
Promised Land: Peasant Rebellion in
Chalatenanqo El Salvador
London: Latin American
Bureau, 1986.
.

"Perestroika, The Nineteenth Party Conference and
Foreign Policy." International Affairs July 1988,
,

3-18.

"Whither the Nicaraguan Revolution?"
Petras, James.
Monthly Review 31 (October 1979): 1-22.
.

"Global Transformations and the Future

of Socialism in Latin America." New Political
Fall/Winter 1990, 181-193.
Science,

"Dreaming of an End to Castro, Cubans in
Pitt, David E.
Miami are Abuzz." New York Times 19 February 1990,
,

1

.

"Cuba Said to Seize 11 Rights Advocates."
New York Times 13 March 1990, 3.
.

,

"Politics: Liberal Reforms Outdated." Latin American
Regional Report: Caribbean 24 July 1990, 4.
,

"Characteristics of the Revolutionary
Ponomarev, Boris.
Process in Latin America." In Aspects of Soviet
Policy Toward Latin America ed. T. S. Cheston and
New York: MSS Information
B. Loeffke, 31-36.
Corporation, 1974.
,

299

"The World Situation and the
Revolutionary Process," World Marxist Review
•

(June 1974

)

:

17

9-13.

"Problems Looming With Old Partners." Latin American
Weekly Report 22 February 1990, 4.
.

"Production Halted at Moa Nickel Plant." Latin American
Regional Report: Caribbean 4 October 1990, 7.
.

Purcell, Susan Kaufman.
"Cuba's Cloudy Future." Foreign
Affairs 70 (Summer 1990): 113-130.

"Quayle Chides Castro but Fidel Gets Limelight." Los
Angeles Times 16 March 1990, 2.
.

Ra'anan, Uri.
"Moscow and the 'Third World'." Problems
of Communism 14
January /February 1965): 22-31.
(

Ramet, Pedro, and Fernando Lopez-Alvez.
"Moscow and the
Revolutionary Left in Latin America." Orbis 28
(Summer 1984): 341-363.

Ramirez, Sergio.
"The Lad From Niquinohomo "
In
Sandino Without Frontiers ed. Karl Bermann, 13-46.
Hampton, VA: Compita Publishing, 1988.
.

,

Randall, Margaret. Sandino 's Daughters: Testimonies of
Nicaraguan Women in Struggle
Vancouver: New Star
Books, 1981.
.

Ravines, Eudocio. The Yenan Way
Scribner's Sons, 1951.

.

New York: Charles

"Weathering the Storm." Cuba Update 10
Reed, Gail.
(Summer 1990): 19.
"Report of the LASA Delegation to Observe the Nicaraguan
General Election of 4 November 1984." LASA Forum
Winter 1985, 1-23.
,

"Perestroika in the USSR and the
Riva, Jose.
International Communist Movement." World Marxist
Review 31 (September 1988): 92-109.
In
"The Soviet-Cuban Relationship."
Robbins, Merritt.
Roger
E.
ed.
Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s
Kanet, 144-170. New York: Praeger, 1982.
,

Socialist Cuba: Past Interpretations
Roca, Sergio, ed.
Boulder: Westview Press,
and Future Challenges
1988.
.

300

Rodriguez, Mario Menendez. El Salvador: Una Autentica
Guerra Civil
San Jose, 1980.
.

Roett, Riordan.
"Brazilian Communism: A History of
Failure." Problems of Communism 33
January/February 1976): 77-81.
(

Rothenberg, Morris.
"Latin America in Soviet Eyes."
Problems of Communism 32 September /October 1983):
(

1-

12

.

Rubinstein, Alvin Z.
"A Third World Policy Waits for
Gorbachev." Orbis 30 (Summer 1986): 355-364.

Moscow's Third World Strategy
Princeton University Press, 1988.
•

Princeton:

.

Saivetz, Carol R., and Sylvia Woodby. Soviet-Third
World Relations
Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.
.

"'Sandinists Militants' Group Issues Proclamation."
Barricada 18 June 1990, 5.
,

Selser, Gregorio.
Press, 1981.

Sandino

New York: Monthly Review

.

Shearman, Peter. The Soviet Union and Cuba
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987.

.

London:

"Gorbachev and the Restructuring of
Soviet-Cuban Relations." The Journal of Communist
Studies 5 (December 1989): 63-83.
.

Sheehy, Gail.
The Man Who Changed The World: The Lives
New York: Harper Collins,
of Mikhail S. Gorbachev
1990.
.

"The USSR, Cuba, and the Revolution in
Sigmund, Paul E.
Chile." In The Soviet Union in the Third World:
Successes and Failures ed. Robert H. Donaldson,
26- 50.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1981.
,

"Soviet Foreign Policy Under
Simes, Dimitri K.,
Gorbachev: Goals and Expectations." In T he Soviet
Union Under Gorbachev: Assessing the First Year
ed. Arthur B. Gunlicks and John D. Treadway, 52-72.
New York: Praeger, 1987.
,

"Lies About Nicaragua." Foreign Policy 70
Smith, Wayne.
(Spring 1987): 166-182.

301

Smith

Wayne S.
Dialogue."
557-573.

Soule

John W.
"The Economic Austerity Packages of 1988
and Their Impact on Public Opinion." New Political
Science Fall/Winter 1990, 81-102.

"Washington and Havana: Time for
World Policy Journal 7 (Summer 1990):

,

,

.

"Soviet Aid May Be Cut."
11 July 1990, 3.

The Times of the Americas

.

"Soviet Foreign Aid Questioned." Current Digest of the
Soviet Press 42 (January 1990): 15.

"Special Measures for Fuel Shortage." Granma Weekly
Review 9 September 1990, 9.
,

Stalin, J. V. The Foundations of Leninism
Foreign Languages Press, 1975.

Stalin, Joseph. Works, Volume IV
Languages Press, 1973.

.

Peking:

.

Moscow: Foreign

Steele, Jonathan.
Soviet Power: The Kremlin's Foreign
Policy Brezhnev to Andropov
New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1983.

—

.

Tagor, Sergei.
Perestroika and Soviet-Latin American
Relations
Washington: The Woodrow Wilson Center
Working Papers, 1991.
.

Teitelboum, V.
"Reflections on the 1,000 Days of
Popular Unity Rule." World Marxist Review 20
(January 1977): 50-62.
Theberge, James D. The Soviet Presence in Latin
America. New York: Crane, Russak and Company,
1974.

"There's Plenty of Experience." Current Digest of the
Soviet Press 42 (February 1990): 26.
"What's Happening in Moscow?"
Thom, Francoise.
National Interest 8 (Summer 1987): 27-30.

Tucker, Robert C., ed. The Lenin Anthology
W. W. Norton, 1975.

Uhlig

.

The

New York:

"Salvadoran Guerrilla Leaders to Stop
Mark A.
Subverting Election." New York Times 2 March 1991,
,

.

3.

302

"Top Salvadoran Rebel Alters His Goals."
New York Times 7 March 1991, 3.
.

.

Ulam, Adam B.

Expansion and Co-Existence: Soviet
Foreign Policy 1917-1973
New York Praeger, 1974.
.

:

"What's Happening in Moscow?"
Interest 8 (Summer 1987): 11-13.

The National

•

"U.N. Votes, Local Dissenters Gaoled."
Weekly Report 22 March 1982, 3.

Latin American

.

United States Department of State.
Soviet Influence
Activities: A Report on Active Measures and
Propaganda, 1986-1987
Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of State, 1988.
.

"U.S.

Said to Plan 2 CIA Actions in Latin Region."
York Times
14 March 1982, 3.

New

.

"USSR Trade Developing in 'Decisive Manner’."
Barr icada
16 March 1988
4.
.

,

Valenta, Jiri, and Esperanza Duran, eds
Conflict i n
Nicaragua: A Multidimensio nal P erspective
Boston:
Allen and Unwin, 1987.
.

.

Valenta, Jiri, and Virginia Valenta.
"Soviet Strategy
the
Caribbean
Basin."
In Rift and
and Policies in
Revolution: The Central American Imbroglio ed
Washington D.C.:
Howard J. Wiarda, 197-252.
American Enterprise Institute, 1984.
,

The Soviet Union and the
Valkenier, Elizabeth Krill.
New York: Praeger,
Third World: An Economic Bind
1983
.

"New Soviet Thinking About the Third World."
World Policy Journal 4 (Fall 1987): 651-674.
.

"Mariategui: Marxismo, Comunismo and
Vanden, Harry E.
Notes." Latin American
Bibliographic
Other
(Number
3): 61-86.
Research Review 14

"Ideology and Politics in Latin
Varas, Augusto.
Amer ican-USSR Relations." Problems of Communism 33
(January/February 1984): 35-47.
America Latina Y La Union Sovieti ca: Una
Buenos Aires: Flacso-Rial, 1987.
Nueva Relacion.
.

303

Varas

Augusto, ed.
Soviet-Latin American Relations in
the 1980s
Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.
,

.

Varas, Augusto.
"Soviet-Latin American Relations Under
the U.S. Regional Hegemony." In Soviet-Latin
American Relations in the 1980s ed. Augusto Varas,
13-50.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.
.

Vergara, Ramon Gonzalez.
"Will Castro Survive if Cuba
is Forced to Pay Its Bills?"
Wall Street Journal
28 September 1990, 15.

.

Vidal, Raul.
"For the Chilean People's Freedom and
Happiness." World Marxist Review 25 (February
1982): 39-40.

Viera, Eduardo.
"The Political Climate is Changing."
World Marxist Review 25 (January 1982): 64-67.
Vilas, Carlos M.
"The Contribution of Economic Policy
and International Negotiations to the Fall of the
Sandinista Government." New Political Science
Fall/Winter 1990, 81-102.
.

"What Are They Saying?" NACLA: Report
on the Americas 24 (May 1991): 6-7.
.

Villalobos, Joaquin.
"A Democratic Revolution for El
Salvador." Foreign Policy 74 (Spring 1989): 103122

.

"Popular Insurrection: Desire or
Reality?" Latin American Perspectives 62 (Summer
.

1989): 5-37.

Von Beyme, Klaus. The Soviet Union in World Politics
Brookfield, MA: Gower, 1987.
Walker, Thomas W. ed. Reagan Versus The Sandinistas
Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.
,

Weber, Henri. Nicaragua: The Sandinist Revolution
London: Verso, 1981.
.

.

.

.

"Nicaragua: The Sandinista Revolution."

In Crisis in the Caribbean ed. Fitzroy Ambursley
and Robin Cohen, 105-124. New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1983.
,

"The Soviet Way in Latin America."
Wesson, Robert.
Affairs
149 (Fall 1986): 67-75.
World

304

Wetting Gerhard.
"New Thinking on Security and EastWest Relations." Problems of Communism 37
(March/April 1988): 1-14.
,

Wheelock, Jaime.
"Socialism is an Ideal Not a Dogma."
Barricada International June 1991, 23-24.
.

Whelan, James R. and Franklyn A. Jaeckle. The Soviet
Assault on America's Southern Flank
Washington,
D. C.: Regnery Gateway, 1988.
,

.

Whelan, Joseph G. and Michael J. Dixon. The Soviet
Union in the Third World: Threat to World Peace?
Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey s 1986.
'

,

White, Stephen.
"Colonial Revolution and the Communist
International, 1919-1924." Science and Society 40
(Summer 1976): 173-193.

Wiarda, Howard J., ed. Rift and Revolution: The Central
American Imbroglio
Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 1984.
.

Wiarda, Howard J.
"The Rising Soviet Presence in Latin
America." World Affairs 149 (Fall 1986): 59-61.

Latin America at the Crossroads
Boulder: Westview Press, 1987.
.

.

"The Soviet Union, the Caribbean, and
Central America: Towards a New Correlation of
Forces." In The Limits of Soviet Power in the
Developing World ed. Edward A. Kolodziez and Roger
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
E. Kanet, 94-120.
University Press, 1989.
.

,

Crises of the Castro
"Is Cuba Next?
Regime." Problems of Communism 40 January-April
1991): 84-93.
.

(

"Russia's Historic Stake in Black
Wilson, Edward T.
in Africa ed. David E.
Communism
Africa." In
Albright, 80-96. Bloomington: University of
Indiana Press, 1980.
,

"Young Communist League's Work Must be Profound and
Dynamic." Granina Weekly Review 13 May 1990, 5.
,

"The Sandinista Relief." Barricada
Zamora, Augusto.
8 February 1991, 3.

305

,

Zimbalist, Andrew, ed. Cuba's Socialist Economy: Toward
the 1990s
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987.
.

Zimbalist, Andrew, and Susan Eckstein, "Patterns of
Cuban Development: The First Twenty-Five Years."
In Cuba's Socialist Economy: Toward the 1990s ed.
Andrew Zimbalist, 7-21. Boulder: Lynne Rienner,
.

1987.

"New Thinking and New Foreign Policy
Zwick, Peter.
Under Gorbachev." PS: Political Science and
Politics 21 (June 1989): 215-224.

306

